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China Commits to "Open Government Information" Effective May 1, 2008

In a move that Chinese officials claim is intended to combat corruption, increase public oversight and participation in government, and allow citizens access to government-held information, the State Council on April 5, 2007, issued the first national Regulations on Open Government Information (OGI Regulation), which take effect May 1, 2008. Implementation begins at a time when the need for greater transparency in the areas of environmental health, land disputes, disease, and food, drug, and product safety has become apparent. The time lag between issue and effective date provided citizens and government departments a one-year preparatory period.

The national regulation may alter relations between citizens and traditionally protective government bureaucracies. But it is not entirely a new development. While the overall impact of the national regulation remains unclear pending implementation, over 30 provincial and city-level governments throughout China as well as central government agencies and departments have adopted OGI rules in the last several years. Guangzhou, which was the first municipality to do so in 2002 (Chinese, English translation) and Shanghai, which issued its regulations in 2004, are but two examples.

It is important to note that the national OGI Regulation is completely separate and distinct from China's commitment to press freedom for foreign journalists before and during the Olympics, as embodied in the State Council's Regulations on Reporting Activities in China by Foreign Journalists During the Beijing Olympic Games and the Preparatory Period, which took effect on January 1, 2007.

As implementation of the national OGI Regulation proceeds, a number of issues merit attention, the following among them:

Two Main Features of OGI
Government agencies at all levels have an affirmative obligation to disclose certain information, generally within 20 business days. This includes information that "involves the vital interests of citizens," with emphasis on information relating to, among other items, environmental protection, public health, food, drug, and product quality, sudden emergencies, and land appropriation and compensation.

Citizens, legal persons, and other organizations (Requesting Parties) may request information and are entitled to receive a reply within 15 business days and no later than 30 business days. Requesting Parties can challenge a denial of access to information by filing a report with a higher-level or supervisory agency or designated open government information department or by applying for administrative reconsideration or filing an administrative lawsuit.

Areas to Watch During Implementation
No clear presumption of disclosure. As reported in an April 30 Xinhua article (via the Central People's Government Web site), Premier Wen Jiabao urged officials to proceed with implementation "insisting that disclosure be the principle, non-disclosure the exception." Chinese scholars and international experts, however, note that the national OGI Regulation does not set forth a clear presumption of disclosure. On this point it differs from earlier local-level OGI regulations and similar measures in other countries (see, e.g., an April 28 Caijing article and a May 9, 2007, Freedominfo.org article.)

Certain provisions may discourage officials from disclosing information. Under the OGI Regulation, officials who withhold information the disclosure of which is required under the Regulation may face both administrative and criminal penalties. At the same time, however, the OGI Regulation stipulates that officials must not disclose information involving "state secrets, commercial secrets, or individual privacy," and must set up mechanisms to examine the secrecy of information requested. This emphasis on safeguarding secrecy and the breadth and vagueness of the definition of "state secrets" under Chinese law may encourage officials to err on the side of non-disclosure. The regulation also prohibits officials from disclosing information that might "endanger state security, public security, economic security, and social stability." Agencies and personnel who fail to "establish and perfect" secrecy examination mechanisms or who disclose information later deemed exempt from disclosure under the OGI Regulation may face administrative or criminal punishment.

Requesting Parties may be denied access if the request fails to meet a recognized purpose. An opinion issued by the State Council General Office on April 29 states that officials may deny requests if the information has no relation to the Requesting Party's "production, livelihood and scientific and technological research." This reflects language in Article 13 of the OGI Regulation that says Requesting Parties may request information "based on the special needs of such matters as their own production, livelihood and scientific and technological research." This introduction of an apparent purpose test differs from earlier local-level OGI regulations and international practice, according to the May 9 Freedominfo.org article. Furthermore, another provision in the OGI Regulation which sets forth the information to be included in a request, does not instruct the Requesting Party to indicate the purpose of the request.

Requesting Parties lack an independent review channel to enforce the OGI. Some Chinese scholars have noted that the OGI Regulation's relief provisions constrain citizens from using the courts to challenge decisions that deny requests for information, according to the April 28 Caijing article. Because China's courts are subordinate to the National People's Congress Standing Committee and the Communist Party, "it can be anticipated that enforcement of emerging information rights in China, even with the adoption of the State Council OGI Regulations, will continue to face high hurdles within the existing court system," according to the May 9 Freedominfo.org article. While it is still too early to tell, one scholar notes that it may be possible, however, to achieve some independent review of non-political cases through creation of tribunals or commissions designed to handle OGI cases, the article said.

Sufficiency of funding, preparedness, and public awareness. For many departments, OGI implementation may amount to an unfunded mandate. Many agencies face resource constraints or rely on funding sources predisposed to favor non-disclosure. Local governments may not favor information disclosure that could negatively impact local business. Local environmental protection bureaus, for example, which are funded by local governments, may not receive funding adequate to implement OGI effectively. (See a CECC analysis of the Measures on Open Environmental Information, the first agency implementing regulations to come out after the OGI Regulation.) Already, a number of localities failed to meet a March deadline to make catalogues and guides intended to assist parties in requesting information available to the public. As reported by Caijing on April 28, this resulted in part from inadequate funding and technical expertise. While the government has focused on training officials, it has been less active in raising public awareness, the article added.

Access to information may not apply to media, whether foreign or domestic. The national OGI Regulation applies to "citizens, legal persons, and other organizations." This suggests its applicability to foreigners remains open to interpretation during implementation. It also remains unclear whether journalists in general may request access to information under the national regulation (see an August 2007 Committee to Protect Journalists report). According to an April 29 Procuratorial Daily article (via Xinhua), some Chinese experts argue that the regulation clearly applies to news organizations, which have the status of "legal persons or other organizations," and journalists, which have the status of "citizens," although foreign journalists may not be covered because they are not citizens. Some local-level OGI regulations in existence prior to the national regulation made clear its applicability to foreigners. The Guangzhou regulation, for example, provides that foreigners, stateless persons, and foreign organizations have the same rights and obligations to request information, limited to the extent that the requesting party's country or region of origin imposes restrictions on government information access to Chinese citizens. It remains to be seen whether the national OGI Regulation will be implemented so as to trump local OGI rules that are broader in application or whether the national regulation will be interpreted in a similarly broad fashion.

Source: -See Summary (2008-05-02 / English / Free) | Posted on: 2008-05-12  
 Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=105351

Censorship of Internet and Foreign News Broadcasts Following Tibetan Protests

Foreign media in mid-March reported incidents of censorship of the Internet and international news broadcasts in China following Tibetan protests that began on March 10. The Chinese government and Internet companies operating in China routinely censor political content on the Internet in China, but the recent actions indicate stepped up efforts to control access to information about the protests. About a week after the protests started, foreign news media in China noted that access to foreign Web sites had been blocked, video Web sites and search engine results appeared to be censored, and foreign news broadcasts were temporarily blacked out.
  • Access to the U.S.-based video sharing Web site YouTube.com was reportedly blocked on March 16 after dozens of videos about the protests showed up on the site, according to a March 17 Associated Press (AP) article (via The New York Times). AP reported that the site was "usually readily available in China." The Guardian said on March 17 that Internet users reported its site being blocked.
  • No footage of the protests was posted on the Chinese-based video Web sites 56.com, Youku.com, and Tudou.com, the AP article said. As reported in an earlier CECC analysis, regulations that strengthen control over audio and video Web sites went into effect on January 31.
  • Foreign media reported that searches on China's popular search engine Baidu and Google for news stories on Tibet turned up no protest news in the top results or inaccessible links, while sites such as Sina.com, Sohu.com, and the Chinese versions of Yahoo! and Microsoft's MSN ran only official stories from Xinhua, according to a March 17 BusinessWeek report, a March 18 Wall Street Journal (WSJ) report, and a March 18 BBC report.
  • News broadcasts of BBC World were reportedly blocked when stories about the protests were aired and a CNN spokeswoman confirmed that its coverage of China had been censored, according to the March 17 Guardian article. Under Chinese law, foreign satellite television is generally available only in hotels, apartments, or other places specifically designated for foreigners.
The March 18 WSJ report noted that because of the state-controlled media's limited coverage of the protests, as well as "content-filtering and Internet-portal self-censorship," many Chinese at the time were unaware of the Tibetan protests or their severity. Since then, however, China's media have devoted extensive coverage to the topic, focusing on the violence associated with some of the protests (see, e.g., a March 23 Xinhua article), Chinese citizens' anger over foreign media accounts of the protests (see, e.g., an April 4 People's Daily article profiling an anti-CNN Web site), and denouncing the Dalai Lama and foreign critics of China's Tibet policy (see an April 17 Agence-France Presse article for a summary of this.)

On April 1, members of the International Olympic Committee expressed concern to Beijing Olympic officials about Internet censorship relating to the Tibetan protests and sought assurances that Internet access would be open for foreign journalists during the Olympics, according to an April 2 South China Morning Post article (subscription required). At an April 1 press conference (English, Chinese), Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Jiang Yu said China would honor its commitment for the Olympics, but added "[a]t present, our measures are in line with general international practice." She said the "main reason for inaccessibility of some foreign websites in China is that they spread information prohibited by Chinese law" and "Chinese laws have clearly stipulated which on-line activities are prohibited."

China's Internet regulations prohibit dissemination of a broad range of content, including not only information that contains pornography or violence or endangers national security, but also content vaguely defined as "harmful to the honor or interests of the nation" or "disrupting the solidarity of peoples." As noted in the CECC's 2007 Annual Report, China has blocked access to a number of foreign news Web sites and Web sites promoting human rights.

Source: -See Summary (2008-04-23 / English / Free) | Posted on: 2008-05-12  
 Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=104874

China Blocks Foreign Reporters From Covering Tibetan Protests

Chinese officials have barred foreign journalists from entering large parts of western China to cover recent incidents of Tibetan protests. The closed areas include the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), about half of Sichuan province, and parts of Qinghai, Gansu, and Yunnan provinces, according to a March 20 Deutsche Welle article and an April 10 Wall Street Journal (WSJ) article. Foreign journalists trying to enter or leave the areas reported incidents where local police locked them in a hotel overnight or threatened to confiscate their footage, according to the Foreign Correspondents Club of China (FCCC) and an April 5 Associated Press (AP) article (via the International Herald Tribune). The Tibetan protests, many peaceful but some of which have been violent, began on March 10 in Lhasa, the capital of the TAR. The protests spread quickly to the Tibetan areas of Sichuan, Gansu, and Qinghai provinces, where most of the reported protests have occurred.

Foreign reporters and journalists' advocacy groups say the travel ban contravenes foreign journalist regulations intended to fulfill a commitment China made in its successful bid for the Olympics, according to a March 17 Committee to Protect Journalists statement and the April 5 AP article. According to the International Olympic Committee's (IOC) bid evaluation, China promised "no restrictions on media reporting and movement of journalists up to and including the Olympic Games." On April 10, IOC President Jacques Rogge, referring to the restrictions on travel to the TAR, said that the foreign journalist regulations are "not yet fully implemented" and that he had asked China to implement the regulations "in full" and "as soon as possible," according to an April 11 Washington Post article.

China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) spokesperson Qin Gang said at a March 25 press conference (English, Chinese) that the travel restrictions are intended to ensure the safety of journalists. He also said "it is legal and reasonable for local governments to take some restrictive measures," and noted "some foreign governments also warned their citizens against traveling to these areas." Even before the protests, China continued to require journalists to obtain a special travel permit to visit the TAR, despite the "no restrictions" nature of its commitment for the Olympics. An MFA official said this was "due to restraints in natural conditions and reception capabilities." Since the protests began, the government has organized supervised tours to Lhasa and Xiahe, in Gansu province, for a limited number of invited journalists, according to an April 10 New York Times (NYT) article. During the government-managed trip to Lhasa, AP reported that the journalists were "frequently monitored, and even followed," according to a March 26 article.

The travel ban appears inconsistent with international human rights standards. While such standards recognize that freedom of expression may be restricted in order to respect the rights or reputations of others, or protect national security, public order, public health, or morals, such restrictions "shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary." (See Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.) The ban, however, appears more than necessary for the protection of foreign journalists, the justification provided by Chinese officials, given its geographic scope and the nature of the threat. Foreign journalists indicate that the borders of the closed off areas extend far beyond reported protest sites and that the size of the closed areas is much larger than in conflicts in other parts of the world, according to the FCCC Web site and a March 18 Christian Science Monitor article. While there have been reports of violence, officials have at various times claimed that conditions in closed areas are "completely normal" or that "social order and stability has been restored." (See, e.g., a March 20 MFA press conference (English, Chinese) and the April 5 AP report.) Furthermore, during both government-supervised media tours, groups of monks used the opportunity to voice their grievances to the journalists, suggesting that instead of being targets of violence, foreign reporters might be welcomed by protesters eager to have their messages heard.

The ban also appears to be motivated by political concerns rather than the safety of foreign journalists. Widespread censorship of the Internet and domestic and Western news of the protests has been reported. (See, e.g., a March 17 Guardian article, a March 17 NYT article, and a March 18 WSJ article.) Officials and the state-controlled media have sought to discredit the Western media by focusing on their "biased" and "unfair" reporting of the protests. (See, e.g., an April 8 MFA press conference (English, Chinese) and a March 31 People's Daily article.) These actions suggest that officials are concerned about the political impact of unsupervised coverage of the protests, particularly by Western media.

Meanwhile, journalists also report problems interviewing and reporting on Tibetans in areas outside of the closed zones.
  • In the Sichuan capital of Chengdu, police prevented ABC News from filming in a Tibetan neighborhood on March 16, according to the FCCC Web site.
  • The April 5 AP article reported that on April 3 plainclothes officers followed a reporter in Danba, Sichuan, and questioned the Tibetans she interviewed.
  • Officials also stopped journalists from covering a small candlelight vigil by Tibetan students at Peking University on March 17, according to a March 20 Reporters Without Borders article.
In a March 26 statement, the FCCC said it was "extremely concerned about recent reports that sources in Tibetan areas and elsewhere have experienced various forms of intimidation." The FCCC said that it had received 50 reports in March of violations of the regulations that occurred as journalists attempted to cover the protests.

For more information about the foreign journalist regulations, which went into effect on January 1, 2007, and expire on October 17, 2008, and China's mixed progress in implementing the regulations in 2007, see a previous CECC analysis.

Source: -See Summary (2008-04-16 / English / Free) | Posted on: 2008-05-12  
 Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=104496

Authorities Block Uighur Protest in Xinjiang, Detain Protesters

Authorities suppressed demonstrations by ethnic Uighurs in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR) who gathered on March 23 and 24 to protest human rights abuses, according to reports from U.S. media. The protests, which took place in Hoten city and nearby Qaraqash county, appear to have stemmed from a prominent businessman's death while in official custody and from general grievances over government policy in the region. Of the 1,000-plus protesters, most of whom were women, authorities reportedly detained 600 and, according to unconfirmed reports, have since released more than half.

According to a series of reports from Radio Free Asia (RFA), 600 women gathered on March 23 at a bus stop in Hoten and marched to a marketplace in the city center, by which time their numbers had grown to over 1,000. (See an April 1 RFA report in English, and March 29 reports (1, 2) and March 31 reports (1, 2) from RFA's Uighur service for more information.) According to sources cited in the March 29 articles, participants called for the release of political prisoners, an end to physical abuse of prisoners, respect for Uighur customs, and religious freedom. Women also wore headscarves during the protest in defiance of admonishments against such apparel issued during a government campaign to promote stability, according to the first March 31 article.

Sources also connected the demonstrations to the death of Mutellip Hajim, according to multiple RFA reports. Authorities detained Mutellip Hajim, a jade merchant and father of eight, in January 2008 in apparent retribution for his activities supporting the families of prisoners and helping underground religious schools, as well as for violating population planning requirements, according to a source cited in a March 28 RFA article. Mutellip Hajim reportedly died in detention after being subjected to torture, and his corpse was returned to his family on March 3, with orders not to publicize his death. He had previously served a four-year sentence starting in 2003 for slander, a charge stemming from a dispute with authorities over jade prices, according to a source cited in the March 28 article.

As clashes broke out with police, authorities detained 400 protesters on the first day and 200 on the second, according to sources cited in the RFA articles. The first March 31 RFA article also reported that more than half of those detained have been released and six people died in the protests, but that it had not been able to verify either figure.

Also on March 23, a group gathered to demonstrate at a market in Qaraqash county, in Hoten district. Sources indicated to RFA that police blocked the demonstration and detained protesters, leading to clashes between the groups, according to a March 30 RFA article. The April 1 RFA article reported that a police officer said the demonstration had been "peacefully dispersed."

The Hoten government posted a statement on its Web site on April 1 describing the Hoten city demonstrations as an attempt to incite a disturbance by people carrying separatist flags who were connected to the "three forces" of terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism. In the brief statement, the government also said it stopped the protestors and "dealt with them according to law." The government said no injuries or deaths occurred. An April 4 report from Tianshan Net said that Hizb ut-Tahrir, an Islamic political movement active internationally, had instigated demonstrations in Hoten after disseminating leaflets in cities throughout the XUAR. According to the first March 29 RFA article, Hoten police earlier told local hotel workers that the demonstration was provoked by protests in Tibetan areas of China. The government elsewhere has claimed a link between alleged Uighur and Tibetan separatist organizations. (See, e.g., a March 22 People's Daily article.) In addition, a Hoten government spokesperson claimed a link to Tibetan protests in comments to the British Broadcasting Company (BBC), according to an April 2 BBC report. The spokesperson also said that "most of the protesters" had been detained and some "sent for 're-education,'" according to a BBC paraphrasing of the remarks.

The demonstrations followed March announcements that authorities would crackdown against the "three forces." The government has waged a longstanding campaign against the "three forces" and has used its anti-crime campaigns as a pretext for severe rights abuses in the XUAR. Authorities made the call while providing limited details on alleged terrorist activity in January and March and as local governments reported on various efforts to promote stability. As news of the demonstrations was released, Chinese media also reported that an all-women's division of the people's armed police had been established in the XUAR, though it is unclear if the timing of the announcement of the unit's establishment is connected to the Hoten women's demonstration. According to an April 3 article from the Metropolitan Consumers Morning Report (via the China Xinjiang Web), the women's unit, which is the third of its kind in China, will focus on fighting terrorism and separatism particularly in cases where it is not "convenient" for men to be involved in the situation, according to one of the unit's instructors.

For more information on conditions in the XUAR, see Section II--Ethnic Minority Rights, subsection on Rights Abuses in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, in the 2007 CECC Annual Report (via the Government Printing Office Web site).

Source: -See Summary (2008-04-09 ) | Posted on: 2008-05-12  
 Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=104191

Government Official Reaffirms State Controls Over Religion

Ye Xiaowen, Director of the State Administration for Religious Affairs, called for continued controls over religion to meet state goals in a March 13 interview in the Southern Weekend newspaper. (Translation cited here via Open Source Center, subscription required, April 10, 2008). "We should not expand religions," Ye said, "but strive to let existing religions do more for the motherland's reunification, national unity, economic development and social stability." The Chinese government currently recognizes only five religions for limited state protections and subjects these religious communities to stringent controls.

Although Ye stated that the government regulates only "religious affairs" touching on "social and public interests," rather than regulate "religions" or "religious belief," he stressed both here and in a 2006 interview the importance of government control over the internal practices of religious communities. In 2006 he said that government-led interpretations of religious doctrine would "convey positive and beneficial contents to worshippers and direct them to practice faiths rightly." In the 2008 interview, he stressed the importance of continued state controls over a variety of religious practices, such as Tibetan Buddhists' recognition of reincarnated Buddhist lamas and the appointment of Catholic bishops. Ye also called for blocking Chinese Protestants' interaction with foreign co-religionists and preventing the establishment of private Buddhist sites of worship.

Ye's comments follow a December 2007 study session in which Chinese President and Communist Party General Secretary Hu Jintao reaffirmed the Party's policies for controlling religion and called on religious communities to play a "positive role" in promoting state goals and to "closely unite" around the Party. For more information on religion in China, see Section II--Freedom of Religion in the CECC 2007 Annual Report (via the Government Printing Office Web site).

Source: -See Summary (2008-05-05 ) | Posted on: 2008-05-12  
 Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=104843

Wang Zaiqing Presumed Released From Prison, Shi Weihan Detained in Separate Bible-Printing Cases

House church pastor Wang Zaiqing completed his two-year prison sentence for "illegal operation of a business" on April 27 and is presumed to have since been released from prison, according to information from the Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC) Political Prisoner Database. Authorities in Huainan city, Anhui province, initially detained Wang on April 28, 2006, after he printed and distributed Bibles and other religious materials without government authorization. On October 9, 2006, the Tianjia'an District People's Court levied the two-year prison sentence on Wang and fined him 100,000 yuan (then approximately US$12,500).

In a separate development, authorities in Beijing detained bookstore owner Shi Weihan on March 19, 2008, in apparent connection to earlier activities involving the preparation and distribution of Bibles and other religious materials, according to an April 18 report from Compass Direct News. Authorities had first detained Shi on November 28, 2007, and accused him of illegally printing and distributing religious literature. After determining they had "insufficient evidence" to proceed, authorities released Shi on bail on January 4, 2008, and detained him again in March.

The cases of Wang Zaiqing and Shi Weihan reflect tight government control over the preparation and distribution of religious publications. Click here for a CECC analysis on China's regulation of religious materials. In recent years, authorities have penalized other citizens for their activities involving religious publications. In November 2005 authorities sentenced Pastor Cai Zhuohua to three years in prison for "illegal operation of a business" after he privately printed and gave away religious literature. In July 2007, authorities detained house church leader Zhou Heng and formally arrested him the following month for his alleged involvement in plans to receive and distribute religious literature. Authorities also accused him of "illegal operation of a business," but released him on February 19, 2008.

For more information, see Section II--Freedom of Religion in the CECC 2007 Annual Report (via the Government Printing Office Web site) and the CECC Political Prisoner Database.

Source: -See Summary (2008-04-29 / English) | Posted on: 2008-05-12  
 Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=105057



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