Enter single word or exact phrase to search news and headlines		Dated between  and (Format: yyyy-mm-dd)

• According to a December 24 report from the Guangdong Ethnic and Religious Affairs Commission (GERAC), a top official for religious affairs in Shaoguan municipality told a local gathering of registered Protestants on December 10 that they must "strengthen theological reconstruction, continuously draw out positive factors from the Protestant canon and doctrines, and push theological reconstruction to new heights."
  
  
• In late November, the TSPM/CCC of Jieyang municipality gathered to discuss proposals to facilitate the development of "harmonious churches." Theological reconstruction figured prominently in the proposals put forward by the TSPM authorities: "we must integrate our efforts to build harmonious churches, insist on the three-self principles, and deepen theological reconstruction; [in order to] resist infiltration and various forms of heresy, and bring about healthier development for the church" (GERAC, December 23).

• On February 9, the Zhejiang Ethnic and Religious Affairs Committee reported that the TSPM/CCC held a symposium on theological reconstruction with 151 registered church leaders from across the province. Deng Fucun, the Zhejiang TSPM chairman, told participants how theological reconstruction was necessary to make Christianity sufficiently "Chinese" and to maintain independence from foreign Protestants. Deng described the "spiritual essence" of the TSPM as "insisting on the principle of independence and free initiative without wavering; creating, with single-hearted devotion, a church that belongs to the Chinese people…exerting ourselves to further the construction of a harmonious society…"



• A January 22 report from the Hangzhou Municipal Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau (via the Hangzhou Office of Performance Assessment's official Web site) reveals the imperative to modify Protestant doctrine and teachings that lie behind theological reconstruction. Under the heading of "Primary Tasks to Do," the Bureau writes: "we must encourage and support religious circles to interpret doctrines and church rules in ways that conform to the times and accord with the demands of social progress, they must go a step further in deepening Protestant theological reconstruction, push forward with theological reconstruction until its positive results capture pulpits at the basic level."

• On February 2, the Jiangsu Ethnic and Religious Affairs Commission reported on a meeting held earlier the same day by the TSPM/CCC of Huai'an municipality to assess their work from 2009. Authorities congratulated TSPM/CCC clergy for their success at "energetically launching theological reconstruction, strengthening personnel training, and coming together to launch 'blessing the motherland' patriotic propaganda activities that celebrate the 60th anniversary of the founding of the New China…" Among its list of priorities for 2010, the Huai'an TSPM/CCC vowed to "safeguard against cults and resist external [forces] that use religion to infiltrate." Registered churches were also urged to "conduct a careful investigation into and promptly dispose of all existing unsafe and unstable factors in various locations."



• On January 25, the TSPM/CCC in Suzhou convened a meeting to review their 2009 activities and to make plans for 2010, according to an official report from the Suzhou Municipal Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau. Although the TSPM/CCC leadership found that official churches had "obtained a certain degree of success in launching patriotic education campaigns…promoting theological reconstruction… and attracting and fostering personnel," Suzhou religious affairs officials continued to emphasize Party-dictated political "study" for pastors in their 2010 agenda for Protestants: "all pastoral personnel shall attach great importance to study, take study as a responsibility, treat the study system as a type of hard restraint, and earnestly master [their] studies."



• The TSPM in Sihong county ordained 95 deacons on December 15, after determining that they were "politically reliable" and that they "insisted on the three-self patriotic principles, understood policies and regulations, understood church management, and were capable of correctly interpreting doctrines and church rules," according to a December 29 report from the Suqian Municipal Bureau of Ethnic and Religious Affairs.



• A December 3 report from the same source provided details of officially sponsored "preaching competitions" held in Sihong county in spring 2009 for the purpose of "guiding the masses of believers to the correct understanding of the Bible's basic teachings, purifying Protestants' faith, enhancing the adaptation of Protestant faith to socialism, raising their consciousness to resist cult infiltration and to oppose separatism, and promoting social harmony and stability."

• According to a January 27 report from the Jilin Ethnic and Religious Affairs Commission (via Buddhism Online), SARA approved a request to establish a new TSPM/CCC-controlled Bible school with the "primary task of educating and fostering Jilin province's full-time theology students and training existing pastoral personnel within the province who serve as the backbones of local churches." Jilin authorities stressed the need for TSPM/CCC leaders to strengthen "political and ideological education at the school," and "in a planned way, foster religious personnel who are patriotic, which will have decisive impact on the future face of Protestantism in Jilin."

• UFWD and SARA officials in Yiliang county launched a campaign in January to promote the incorporation of Party Chairman Hu Jintao's "scientific development concept" into the teachings of the state-sanctioned church, according to a January 25 report from the official Web site of the Yiliang county government and Party committee. Yang Chaoping, the vice
  director of the county UFWD, told local church leaders: "religion must adapt to socialist society; make great efforts to serve the construction of a harmonious society; insist on the three-self principles without wavering; resist, in practical ways, infiltration by external hostile forces; resolutely push forward with theological reconstruction; and accelerate the scientific development of the Protestant church." The vice head of Kuixiang township, Niu Changxiang, urged TSPM/CCC leaders to ensure that "the religious masses strictly abide by national laws and regulations, and endorse and support the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party…"

• In late November, the TSPM/CCC in Huangshi municipality held its third symposium on theological reconstruction, according to a December 1 report from the Hubei Ethnic and Religious Affairs Commission. Deng Hanguang, the Commission's Vice Director, attended the symposium and "affirmed" the efforts of the TSPM/CCC to reshape Protestant theology. Deng also "raised a clear demand" for how Protestants should explore ways to "deepen the study of the spirit of the leaders' remarks to the plenary session of the 17th Party Congress."

Source: -See Summary (2010-03-03 / English) | Posted on: 2010-03-12
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=136778

Source: -See Summary (2010-03-03 ) | Posted on: 2010-03-12
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=136723

Source: -See Summary (2010-02-25 / English) | Posted on: 2010-03-12
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=136443

Source: -See Summary (2010-02-23 ) | Posted on: 2010-03-12
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=136354

Source: -See Summary (2010-02-23 / English) | Posted on: 2010-03-12
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=136336

Source: -See Summary (2010-02-18 ) | Posted on: 2010-03-12
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=136147

• Aim of the Regulation. Stating that "ethnic separatism" is the main danger to stability in the XUAR, the regulation describes strengthening ethnic unity as citizens' "sacred duty" and "glorious obligation" (Article 5). It also notes that citizens have a "right" and "responsibility" to receive ethnic unity education (Article 6).
• Scope of implementation. The regulation spells out the responsibilities of various government offices, Party organizations, and other institutions in incorporating ethnic unity education into their work and describes intended recipients of such education (see generally Section 2 of the regulation). The regulation charges educational institutions (Article 12), the judiciary (Article 15), human resources offices (Article 16), religious affairs bureaus (Article 17), commercial and industrial agencies (Article 18), and social organizations like trade unions and women's federations (Article 19), among other groups, with including unity education in their work and spreading ethnic unity education to various segments of the population. Educational institutions' tasks include promoting unity education at the kindergarten level, which is lower than the grade level mandated in the national circular on unity education in schools.
• Controls Over Free Speech. Provisions in the regulation call for supervision of artistic and cultural venues (Article 13) and oversight of the publishing market (Article 14); forbid "contents and acts not beneficial to ethnic unity" in commercial activities (Article 18); and call on academic research institutions in philosophy and the social sciences to research "ethnic unity theory and major achievements in practice" and provide "scientific theory guidance and support" for ethnic unity education (Article 22). Other articles also carry implications for academic freedom. Article 12 forbids anyone from using forums or platforms at educational institutions to disseminate speech "not beneficial" to the "unity of the motherland, ethnic unity, and social stability." Article 23 lists a range of subjects as components of unity education, including the history of Xinjiang and "history of ethnic minority development," against a track record of politicizing academic analyses of the region and censoring historical analyses that deviate from state-sanctioned positions. (See the Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2009 Annual Report, page 147 and accompanying footnotes, for more information.)
• Punishments. The regulation details repercussions and penalties for "words and acts" (Article 36) and for disseminating speech (Article 37) "not beneficial" to ethnic unity. Under Article 37, spreading such speech can carry the possibility of administrative punishment or, where the violation constitutes a crime in the PRC Criminal Law, the possibility of criminal penalties.

Source: -See Summary (2010-02-04 / English) | Posted on: 2010-03-12
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=135732

Source: -See Summary (2010-02-01 / English) | Posted on: 2010-03-12
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=135611

Source: -See Summary (2010-01-26 / English) | Posted on: 2010-03-12
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=135388

• "Insist on adherence to the [CCP’s] leadership";
  
• "Insist on adherence to the socialist system";
  
• "Insist on adherence to the system of regional autonomy for minority nationalities"; and
  
• "Insist on adherence to a development path with Chinese characteristics and Tibetan traits."

• "Improvement in the people's livelihood";
• "Development of social undertakings";
• "Protection for the ecological environment"; and
• "Construction of the infrastructure."

• Great Western Development (GWD, Xibu da kaifa). In 1999, Jiang Zemin announced GWD, a program to accelerate economic development in an area made up of 12 provincial-level administrative areas, including all five of China's ethnic autonomous regions, and designated as "western China" for the purpose of the program. The Minister of the State Ethnic Affairs Commission described GWD in June 2000 as "the necessary choice for solving China's nationality problems." The Party circulated GWD policy guidelines in 2000 and GWD entered into effect on January 1, 2001. (See, Circular of the State Council on Policies and Measures Pertaining to the Development of the Western Region, 26 October 00, reprinted on the Meishan Municipality (Sichuan province) People's Government Web site (scroll down for English).) On June 29, 2001, two days after the Fourth Forum concluded, construction began on the Qinghai-Tibet railway, officially designated as a key GWD project.
  
• Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law (REAL) amendment. On February 28, 2001, the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress amended China's principal law governing the rights of ethnic minorities and the function of local governments of ethnic autonomous areas. (See Special Topic Paper: Tibet 2008-2009 for maps and information on Tibetan autonomous areas in China; see Section II—Human Rights—Ethnic Minority Rights in the Commission's 2009 Annual Report for recent information on ethnic minority issues.) The amended REAL "stipulates that . . . the state shall prioritize rational resource exploitation projects and infrastructural projects in localities under ethnic autonomy in accordance with unified plans and market demand," Xinhua reported on the date of amendment (translated in OSC, 28 February 01). According to a March 2001 TIN report (reprinted in WTN, 14 March 01), the amendments "bring [the REAL] into line with new policies to accelerate economic development in the western regions of China," and "focus on the development of autonomous regions according to the Party's political and economic priorities and the further integration of these areas into the rest of China."

Source: -See Summary (2010-01-22 ) | Posted on: 2010-03-12
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=135152

Source: -See Summary (2010-03-01 ) | Posted on: 2010-03-09
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=136566

• The figure 5.95 million contradicts the December 2007 Xinhua report on passenger traffic during the same 18-month period, surpassing that report by approximately one-quarter.
  
  
  • An average of approximately 10,870 passengers would have to commence travel each day for 18 months to reach a total of 5.95 million. If equal proportions of passengers traveled to and from the TAR -- a premise that ignores the likelihood that somewhat more than one-half of the passengers travel inbound and that some passengers remain for a time to work, trade, or engage in business -- the average daily passenger total in each direction would be approximately 5,435.
    
    
  • The figure 5,435, however, surpasses by about 1,000 persons the average daily total of approximately 4,400 Lhasa-bound passengers during the same 18-month period reported by the December 2007 Xinhua article. (See additional statistical information below.) The February 2008 report does not refer to any of the data provided by the December 2007 report, nor does it provide any new information that could account for the large increase in the reported number of passengers for the same period.
    
    
• The assertion that 5.95 million passengers traveled on the railway in an 18-month period exceeds the railway's stated capacity, as reported in official Chinese media.
  
  
  • In May 2006, a TAR official stated that the railway would transport 4,000 tourists per day into the TAR when it commenced service on July 1. A June 28, 2006, China Tibet Information Center (CTIC) report published shortly before the railway began operation discussed the number and composition of Qinghai-Tibet railway trains. A total of four trains would arrive in Lhasa each day and the capacity of each train would be 936 persons, based on the number and capacity of each type of car the trains reportedly would include. Car capacities range from 32 to 98 passengers depending on the standard of accommodation. Based on the CTIC information, the capacity of four trains would be 3,744 passengers.
    
    
  • CTIC's preliminary schedule information appears to remain generally consistent with timetables available on the Travel China Guide Web site on February 25, 2008. Although passenger services for Lhasa depart from seven Chinese cities, only four trains arrive in Lhasa each day: service from Beijing runs daily; the services departing from Chengdu city and Chongqing city merge into a single train in Baoji city; the service departing from Lanzhou city merges in Xining with the Xining city service; and, according to CTIC, the services departing from Shanghai city and Guangzhou city depart on alternate days. The timetable for Naqu (Nagchu), the capital of Naqu prefecture in the TAR, illustrates how services with different points of origin retain their original service numbers after they merge to form a single train.
    
    
  • The December 2007 report does not provide any information that explains how the railway accommodates the average daily number of TAR-bound passengers claimed by the article (approximately 4,400), which exceeds by approximately 650 passengers per day the 3,744 passenger per day capacity of the four arriving trains based on the CTIC information. The excess number of passengers could be accommodated by adding one or two cars to some of the services.
    
    
  • If the February 2008 report of 5.95 million passengers arriving in and departing from the TAR each day during the first 18 months of operation (10,870 passengers per day) is accurate, then it would surpass by nearly 3,400 passengers per day the railway's daily bidirectional capacity of 7,488 passengers based on the CTIC information. The CECC has not seen any public reports by Chinese news media announcing large increases of service on the Qinghai-Tibet railway.
    
    
  • Even if Chinese authorities had announced a significant expansion of Qinghai-Tibet railway service, such an announcement would not resolve the contradiction between the passenger statistics provided by the December 2007 and February 2008 Xinhua reports.
    
    
• The February 2008 report characterizes all of the Qinghai-Tibet railway's 5.95 million passengers as "tourists," contradicting the December 2007 report's acknowledgement that nearly one-half of the passengers during a 12-month period were not tourists.
  
  
  • The December 2007 report stated that "more than a half" of Qinghai-Tibet railway passengers from July 2006 to June 2007 were tourists, implying that somewhat less than half of the passengers during that period were not tourists.
    
    
  • A September 14, 2006, Xinhua report on the railway's initial period of operation revealed that less than half of the Lhasa-bound passengers were tourists. Midway into September 2006, after two and one-half months' of railway operation, Jin Shixun, the Director of the TAR Committee of Development and Reform, said that 40 percent of the passengers were tourists and that the rest were business persons, students, transient workers, traders, and individuals visiting relatives. (See additional details below.)

• Approximately 2.35 million passengers arrived in Lhasa during the 18-month period from July 2006 to December 2007, based on the December 2007 report.
  
  
  • Referring to the period January-December 2007, the last 12 months of the 18-month period, the December 2007 report stated, "About 1.6 million passengers are forecast to travel on the Qinghai-Tibet railway this year." The article reported that during the first 12 months of operation, July 2006 through June 2007, "[A] total of 1.5 million people had come to [the TAR] by train."
    
    
  • Based on the average monthly passenger traffic provided by these statistics, an average of approximately 125,000 passengers per month (4,170 per day) arrived in the TAR in July to December 2006, and an average of approximately 133,300 passengers per month (4,440 per day) did so in January to December 2007. Based on those figures, the 18-month total of passenger arrivals in the TAR would have been approximately 2.35 million. The December 2007 report did not provide any information about the number of passengers departing from the TAR.
    
    
• Among the approximately 2.35 million persons arriving in Lhasa from July 2006 to December 2007, more than a half million may have been non-Tibetan, mostly ethnic Han, workers, traders, and business persons who intended to remain for a period in the TAR to work, engage in business, or seek other economic opportunity, based on information provided in the September 2006 and December 2007 Xinhua reports.
  
  
  • If information provided in the September 2006 report about the different purposes of passengers for traveling to the TAR remained representative throughout the 18-month period of July 2006 to December 2007, then as many as 1.41 million of the 2.35 million arriving passengers may have been non-tourists, and over half of the 1.41 million non-tourists may have been mainly Han who intended to remain for a period in the TAR for economic reasons. The remaining 940,000 passengers (40 percent of 2.35 million), would have been tourists.
    
    
    • According to the September 14, 2006, Xinhua report, the railway carried 272,700 passengers in the period from July 1, 2006, until Xinhua published the report (76 days). The figure suggests an average of approximately 3,590 arrivals per day in the TAR, a plausible figure because the Shanghai and Guangzhou services did not start operation until October 1 and 2, respectively, according to Xinhua reports on the same dates. According to the September 2006 report, of the 60 percent of the passengers who were not tourists, 30 percent were businesspersons, and the remaining 30 percent were "students, transient workers, traders, and people visiting relatives in Tibet."
      
      
  • The December 2007 Xinhua information reports a lower proportion of non-tourist arrivals than the September 2006 report, but even the more recent information supports the observation that the railway passengers may have included more than a half million mostly Han workers, traders, and businesspersons.
    
    
    • The December 2007 Xinhua report stated that "more than a half" of the 1.5 million passengers arriving in the TAR between July 2006 and June 2007 were tourists -- a greater proportion of tourist arrivals than the 40 percent Xinhua reported in September 2006. It is unlikely, however, that the proportion of tourists surpassed one-half by a substantial amount. If, for example, the proportion of tourists had reached 60 percent, or even more, officials and news reports would have been likely to call attention to the figure and identify it.
      
      
    • If, for the purpose of illustration, the tourists who made up "more than a half" of the 1.5 million arriving passengers reached 55 percent of the total, then the 45 percent of arriving passengers who were not tourists during the 12-month period would have been numbered approximately 675,000 (about 56,250 per month). If that rate of arrivals for non-tourists represented an average for the entire 18-month period, then approximately 1 million non-tourists would have arrived in the TAR. If the proportions of purposes for non-tourist travel that the September 2006 report described continued to be indicative for the 18-month period, then over half of the 1 million non-tourists arriving in the TAR may have been principally Han persons seeking work and business opportunity.
      

• National census and yearbook data on the same period conflict because each collects data differently. The census methodology is designed to include temporary residents, recent arrivals, and persons without a household registration. But because census day in 2000 was November 1, a substantial number of Han who work or trade in the TAR had departed by census day to spend the winter elsewhere in China. Provincial annual statistical yearbooks rely on data compiled by the Public Security Bureau (PSB).
  

• A TAR government official explained to a CECC staff delegation visiting Lhasa in 2003, before the Qinghai-Tibet railway was completed, why the Han population appeared to be larger than official statistics indicate. He said that "every day" there is a mobile Han population numbering more than 200,000 in the TAR, and that it peaks from June through October. (CECC 2004 Annual Report.) A Tibetan academic in Lhasa told a CECC staff delegation in 2002 that the temporary population of Han workers and traders in Lhasa's urban district alone reaches approximately 100,000 during summer and declines to about 10,000 in winter.
  
  
• A Chinese academic study of the migrant worker population in Lhasa in 2005, before the railway was completed, concluded that the actual number of temporary migrants is much larger than official records reveal. Studying the migrant workers in the TAR is difficult, the paper observed, because the workers move seasonally and generally try to avoid registering with local authorities in order to escape payment of fees and charges. The paper noted that the Great Western Development program promotes the flow of "a large number of temporary migrants" into the TAR, and leads to increased competition between a "low quality" local Tibetan workforce and incoming (mostly Han) migrant workers.
  

Source: -See Summary (2008-03-04 / English / Free) | Posted on: 2010-03-06
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=102411

Source: -See Summary (2009-09-02 ) | Posted on: 2010-02-21
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=129250

The accusations against him are connected to essays he published on his Web site about the protests in Tibet [in 2008], and related to information he disclosed to the outside world about the suppression of Tibetans during the protests and the detention of monks at monasteries by People's Armed Police, etc. These essays on his site have already been deleted. He is charged with "divulging state secrets."

• In June 2009, the National People's Congress (NPC) Standing Committee reviewed a draft revision of the PRC Law on Guarding State Secrets (State Secrets Law) and the NPC released the draft for public comment, but the proposed changes do not address abuses that occur under the current state secrets legal framework. Currently, the broad and vague definition of ''state secrets'' in Chinese law and regulations gives officials wide latitude to declare almost any information a state secret.
  
  
• [Police] can declare that a case involves state secrets to deny criminal defendants basic procedural rights, including access to counsel and an open trial. Citizens cannot challenge such a determination and officials may declare information a state secret retroactively.

During [2008's] "Tibet incident", [Konchog Tsephel and Kunga Tsayang] themselves witnessed how their fellow countrymen of their hometown determinedly took to the streets and voiced their opposition. The two writers revealed their aspirations and discussed facts on the internet, which then unexpectedly became the reason for them becoming criminals accused of jeopardising "state security" and revealing "state secrets". In other words, one could say that the country's action of using its power to suppress the violent behaviour of the opposing masses belongs to the category of secret which is often practiced but never spoken of.

Source: -See Summary (2009-12-09 ) | Posted on: 2010-02-05
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=133098

• "strengthen the building of grassroots democracy, research the adoption of the documentation system and other methods, vigorously develop community-based social organizations, enhance the ability of communities to self-govern" (Item 4 in section of Agreement marked "Content of Agreement").



• "Unless other regulations specify otherwise, explore establishing a system whereby civil society organizations apply and register directly with the Ministry of Civil Affairs. The Ministry of Civil Affairs shall regard this as a point for observation, tracking, and research" (Item 11).



• "Ministry of Civil Affairs will consult with relevant departments regarding the transfer of administrative and registration jurisdiction over foreign foundations with representative offices in Shenzhen to the Shenzhen municipal government, authorize the city of Shenzhen to launch a pilot project regarding the registration and management of foundations, chambers of commerce, and trans-provincial trade associations" (Item 12).



• "promote the transfer of government functions for public services that social organizations are capable of undertaking, especially newly increased public services; government procurement services, delegation or contracting of responsibilities, and other methods can be adopted—[in order to] support the provision of public services by social organizations" (Item 14).



• "accelerate the establishment of a legal incorporation management system for charitable organizations, increase the public creditability of charitable organizations, explore the creation of a system that can effectively link, and to a moderate degree separate, the collection, use, and supervision of charitable funds, [and] move forward on constructing the standardization of charitable groups" (Item 27).

Source: -See Summary (2010-01-21 ) | Posted on: 2010-02-05
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=135081

Source: -See Summary (2010-01-20 / English) | Posted on: 2010-02-05
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=134999

Source: -See Summary (2010-01-20 / English) | Posted on: 2010-02-05
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=134989

These attacks and the surveillance they have uncovered—combined with the attempts over the past year to further limit free speech on the web—have led us to conclude that we should review the feasibility of our business operations in China. We have decided we are no longer willing to continue censoring our results on Google.cn, and so over the next few weeks we will be discussing with the Chinese government the basis on which we could operate an unfiltered search engine within the law, if at all.

Source: -See Summary (2010-01-20 ) | Posted on: 2010-02-05		more ...
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=134968

• Subsidies for farmers to buy minivans or light goods vehicles (Article 2),


• Subsidies for scrapping old vehicles (Article 3),


• Allocation of 10 billion yuan from the central government for development of technology (Article 9), and


• Subsidies for a national fuel-efficient and new-energy vehicle demonstration project (Article 10).

Source: -See Summary (2010-01-21 ) | Posted on: 2010-02-05
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=135079

Source: -See Summary (2010-01-15 / English) | Posted on: 2010-02-05
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=134666

• Liu was denied the right to hire the attorney of his choice. After Liu's arrest, officials barred Mo Shaoping from representing Liu because Mo was a fellow signatory of Charter 08.


• Liu's defense attorneys were denied the right to present their opinions to prosecutors before the indictment was issued, as required by law, and were not given adequate time to prepare for trial.


• Officials barred Liu's wife and foreign diplomats from attending the December 23 trial, according to a December 25 CHRD report.


• Judges reportedly limited Liu's defense lawyers to less than 20 minutes to present their arguments for Liu's innocence, according to the December 25 CHRD report. The report also said that the presiding judge cut Liu off while he was delivering his prepared statement, preventing him from finishing his remarks.


• No witnesses appeared in court, a common occurrence in China. Most criminal cases proceed solely on the basis of written witness statements for the prosecution, leaving the defense with no opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses and challenge such statements. (See p. 106 of the CECC 2009 Annual Report.) According to the trial court judgment, there were 11 witnesses for the prosecution, including Liu's wife. The other 10 were human rights activists who allegedly participated in Charter 08. At least one witness has denied making the statements that the prosecution had attributed to him. In a December 25 statement published on CHRD's Web site, prominent intellectual Zhang Zuhua said he never told police that Liu had published Charter 08 on overseas Web sites, pointing out that both he and Liu had been apprehended by authorities before the charter was released online. "How could I have said that 'Liu Xiaobo posted Charter 08 on foreign Web sites'? Clearly, this characterization has no basis," Zhang said. Another witness, human rights defender Teng Biao, said in a December 26 essay (via Boxun) that the statements from his police interrogation cited in the court judgment were not relevant since he had never mentioned Liu Xiaobo. Teng noted that in his experience authorities often cited family and friends as witnesses not for evidentiary purposes, but rather to sow discord among them and to raise suspicions about the moral character and integrity of the "witnesses."

• "We Are Willing To Share Responsibility with Liu Xiaobo" (December 10 statement from Chinese citizens who co-drafted or signed Charter 08, via Independent Chinese Pen Center)


• Online Yellow Ribbon Campaign (see December 23 Radio Free Asia article)


• "The Dirtiest of Political Trials" (December 23 statement by Ding Zilin, leader of the Tiananmen Mothers, translated by Human Rights in China)


• U.S. State Department (December 24 Statement by Mark Toner, Acting Spokesman) - "[W]e call on the Government of China to release him immediately and to respect the rights of all Chinese citizens to peacefully express their political views."


• UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay (December 25 Remarks via UN News Centre) - "The conviction and extremely harsh sentencing of Liu Xiaobo mark a further severe restriction on the scope of freedom of expression in China."


• European Union Presidency (Undated Statement on the Sentencing of Liu Xiaobo) - "The verdict against Mr Liu gives rise to concern with respect to freedom of expression and the right to a fair trial in China."


• Former Czech President Vaclev Havel (January 6 Letter to Chinese President Hu Jintao, which Havel attempted to deliver to Chinese Embassy in Prague, as reprinted in the Washington Post) - "There is nothing subversive to state security or damaging to future prosperity when citizens act guided by their own will and according to their best knowledge and conscience, when they associate among themselves to discuss and express peacefully their concerns and visions about the future development of their society."


• Joint Statement by CECC Chairman Byron Dorgan and Cochairman Sander Levin (December 23)

Source: -See Summary (2010-01-14 / English / Free) | Posted on: 2010-02-05
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=134546

Source: -See Summary (2010-01-11 / English / Free) | Posted on: 2010-02-05
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=134265

Source: -See Summary (2010-01-07 / English) | Posted on: 2010-02-05
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=134110

• Envisions the development of automotive technology, both through indigenous innovation and by studying international cutting-edge technology (Articles 7 to 12). The policy refers to support for technology to lower emissions, raise fuel-efficiency, produce hybrid and electric vehicles, use new vehicle materials, and use alternative fuels.


• Lays out a framework for the structural adjustment of the auto sector. This is done through the creation of large auto enterprise groups and alliances, and international cooperation to broaden the scope of operations and cope with globalization (Articles 13 to 16). Provides for "an exit mechanism" for companies that cannot compete (Article 17).


• Lays out detailed investment approval procedures and requirements (Articles 40 to 51). These cover government approval of various categories of auto or auto parts companies, establishment of automotive research and development centers, and foreign shareholding ratio restrictions applicable to foreign investment in the sector.


• Encourages the growth of private automobile consumption, and sets standards (Articles 56 to 69). These standards include a range of regulations to facilitate and encourage auto purchases, such as regulations on types of vehicles, toll road charges, fees, auto finance, the second-hand market, insurance premiums, and construction of parking lots.


• Additional miscellaneous provisions. These include, for example, provisions on technical standards, trademarks and branding, sales and service networks, import restrictions, and support from other industries, such as metallurgy and electronics.

Source: -See Summary (2009-12-11 / English) | Posted on: 2010-02-05
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=133273

Source: -See Summary (2009-11-28 ) | Posted on: 2010-02-05
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=132585

Source: -See Summary (2009-11-17 / Chinese) | Posted on: 2010-02-05
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=132161

• Chinese regulations that expressly prohibit foreign investment in businesses that import reading materials, AVHE products, or sound recordings, as well as regulations that give the Chinese government discretion to determine who may import reading materials, AVHE products, sound recordings, and films into China. For example, Articles X(2) and X(3) of the Catalogue of Prohibited Foreign Investment Industries in the Catalogue for the Guidance of Foreign Investment Industries prohibit foreign investment in the "business of… importing of books, newspaper and periodical" and the "business of… importing of audio and visual products and electronic publications." The Panel found that these provisions violate commitments in the Chinese government's Protocol of Accession to the WTO (Protocol) and the Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China (Working Party Report) that require China to permit all enterprises in China and foreign enterprises and individuals to import and export all goods (with some limited exceptions) to and from China by December 2004. In addition, the Panel found other regulations that violate commitments in the Protocol and the Working Party Report. Examples include Articles 41 and 42 of the Regulation on the Administration of Publishing, which require companies that import publications into China to be Chinese wholly state-owned enterprises, and Article 30 of the Regulations Regarding Management of Films, which gives the State Administration of Radio, Film, and Television discretionary authority to decide who can import films.

• Chinese regulations that restrict the ability of wholly foreign-owned enterprises and Chinese-foreign joint ventures to distribute reading materials, AVHE products, and sound recordings within China. For example, the Panel found that Article 8(4) of the Rules for the Management of Chinese-Foreign Contractual Joint Ventures for the Distribution of Audiovisual Products, which stipulates that the Chinese partner in a Chinese-foreign joint venture distributor of audiovisual products must be the majority shareholder, violates national treatment provisions in the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). Article XVI:2(f) of the GATS prohibits parties to the GATS from putting ceilings on the percentage or total value of foreign investment. The Panel also cited other regulations expressly prohibiting foreign investors from engaging in the distribution of the products in question, such as Article 4 of the Several Opinions on the Introduction of Foreign Capital Into the Cultural Sector, which prohibits foreign investors from distributing publications or audiovisual products within China.

Source: -See Summary (2009-08-27 / English / Free) | Posted on: 2010-02-05
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=129022

• Joint Statement by CECC Chairman Byron Dorgan and Cochairman Sander Levin (12/23/09)
• Prosecutors Indict Liu Xiaobo; Trial To Take Place December 23 (12/22/09)
• Joint Statement by Chairman Byron Dorgan and Cochairman Sander Levin - Human Rights Day 2009 (12/9/09)
• Beijing Police Transfer Liu Xiaobo's Case to Prosecutors (12/9/09)
• Beijing Police Formally Arrest Liu Xiaobo on Inciting Subversion Charge (7/2/09)
• Officials Extend Liu Xiaobo's Residential Surveillance Beyond Legal Time Limit (6/9/09)
• Officials Harass Charter 08 Signers; Liu Xiaobo Under Residential Surveillance (1/14/09)
• Charter 08 and the Detention of Liu Xiaobo (12/17/08)
• Charter 08 (Chinese and English Text) (12/10/08)
• Over 300 Citizens Issue "Charter 08"; Several Activists Detained (12/9/08)
• Beijing Police Crack Down on Human Rights Activists During U.N. High Commissioner's Visit (8/30/05)
• Chinese Authorities Crack Down on Freedom of Expression, Detain Four Writers, Encourage Strengthening Restrictions on the Media (12/14/04)


• Political Prisoners Known or Believed to be Detained or Imprisoned in China as of October 7, 2009 (1,279 Cases) (10/7/09)
• CECC 2009 Annual Report (10/10/09)
• CECC Political Prisoner Database


• U.S. Department of State Message on the Indictment of Chinese Activist Liu Xiaobo (12/15/09)

Source: -See Summary (2010-01-05 ) | Posted on: 2010-01-08
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=133838

• Prosecutors Indict Liu Xiaobo; Trial To Take Place December 23 (12/22/09)
• Joint Statement by Chairman Byron Dorgan and Cochairman Sander Levin - Human Rights Day 2009 (12/9/09)
• Beijing Police Transfer Liu Xiaobo's Case to Prosecutors (12/9/09)
• Beijing Police Formally Arrest Liu Xiaobo on Inciting Subversion Charge (7/2/09)
• Officials Extend Liu Xiaobo's Residential Surveillance Beyond Legal Time Limit (6/9/09)
• Officials Harass Charter 08 Signers; Liu Xiaobo Under Residential Surveillance (1/14/09)
• Charter 08 and the Detention of Liu Xiaobo (12/17/08)
• Charter 08 (Chinese and English Text) (12/10/08)
• Over 300 Citizens Issue "Charter 08"; Several Activists Detained (12/9/08)
• Beijing Police Crack Down on Human Rights Activists During U.N. High Commissioner's Visit (8/30/05)
• Chinese Authorities Crack Down on Freedom of Expression, Detain Four Writers, Encourage Strengthening Restrictions on the Media (12/14/04)


• Political Prisoners Known or Believed to be Detained or Imprisoned in China as of October 7, 2009 (1,279 Cases) (10/7/09)
• CECC 2009 Annual Report (10/10/09)
• CECC Political Prisoner Database


• U.S. Department of State Message on the Indictment of Chinese Activist Liu Xiaobo (12/15/09)

Source: -See Summary (2009-12-23 ) | Posted on: 2010-01-08
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=133614

Source: -See Summary (2009-12-30 / English / Free) | Posted on: 2010-01-08
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=133403

• "The Chinese Communist Party's Dictatorial Patriotism" (October 3, 2005, posted on Epoch Times' Web site) - Liu argues that the source of a nation's sovereignty is its people and that the government and ruling party are servants of the nation. Therefore, Liu argues, in order for a government to be truly patriotic, it must respect its people and their right to peacefully criticize and oppose their government. Dictatorships, however, according to Liu, pay lip service to patriotism but do not respect or love the main component of a nation—its people.


• "Can It Be That the Chinese People Are Only Suited To Accepting 'Party-ruled Democracy'?" (January 6, 2006, posted on Observechina.net) - Liu critiques the 2005 government white paper Building of Political Democracy in China (via Xinhua) and criticizes its claim that it places authority in the people; instead Liu coins the term "party-ruled democracy" to describe the Chinese Communist Party's dictatorship and approach toward democracy. Liu also discusses recent history including the Chinese government's violent suppression of the 1989 Tiananmen protests.


• "Changing State Power Through Changing Society" (February 26, 2006, posted on Observechina.net) - Liu discusses how societal changes in the post-Mao era in the relationship between citizens and the state has improved prospects for political reform and urges a gradual, non-violent approach in the pursuit of a liberal democracy.


• "The Multi-faceted Dictatorship of the Chinese Communist Party" (March 13, 2006, originally on Observechina.net, posted on Epoch Times' Web site) - Liu discusses how the Communist Party has maintained political control, despite the sudden decline in the popularity of the Party's ideology after the events of June 1989, by appealing to the economic self-interests of elites, business people, and officials and entangling them in corruption, bribery, and tax evasion which "autocrats" can use to punish them at any time.


• "The Negative Effects of the Rise of the Chinese Communist Party on Democratization in the World" (May 6, 2006, posted on Epoch Times' Web site) - Liu calls the Chinese Communist Party one of the largest obstacles to democratization around the world for, among other things, using the prospect of energy cooperation to build closer relations with Iran and other countries that oppose the United States and the West, using "dollar diplomacy" to extract political concessions from free countries in Europe, and pressuring American companies to restrict freedom of expression to gain access to the Chinese market.


• "Continuing Questions with Regard to the Black Kiln Child Slave Incident" (July 16, 2007, posted on Human Rights in China's Web site) - Liu questions the official handling of a 2007 scandal in which children were sold to work in brick kilns in Shanxi province, calling officials "cold-blooded and brazen."

• Joint Statement by Chairman Byron Dorgan and Cochairman Sander Levin - Human Rights Day 2009 (12/9/09)
• Beijing Police Transfer Liu Xiaobo's Case to Prosecutors (12/9/09)
• Beijing Police Formally Arrest Liu Xiaobo on Inciting Subversion Charge (7/2/09)
• Officials Extend Liu Xiaobo's Residential Surveillance Beyond Legal Time Limit (6/9/09)
• Officials Harass Charter 08 Signers; Liu Xiaobo Under Residential Surveillance (1/14/09)
• Charter 08 and the Detention of Liu Xiaobo (12/17/08)
• Charter 08 (Chinese and English Text) (12/10/08)
• Over 300 Citizens Issue "Charter 08"; Several Activists Detained (12/9/08)
• Beijing Police Crack Down on Human Rights Activists During U.N. High Commissioner's Visit (8/30/05)
• Chinese Authorities Crack Down on Freedom of Expression, Detain Four Writers, Encourage Strengthening Restrictions on the Media (12/14/04)


• Political Prisoners Known or Believed to be Detained or Imprisoned in China as of October 7, 2009 (1,279 Cases) (10/7/09)
• CECC 2009 Annual Report (10/10/09)
• CECC Political Prisoner Database


• U.S. Department of State Message on the Indictment of Chinese Activist Liu Xiaobo (12/15/09)

Source: -See Summary (2009-12-22 / English / Free) | Posted on: 2010-01-08
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=133497

Source: -See Summary (2009-12-17 / English / Free) | Posted on: 2010-01-08
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=133274

• In February 2009, authorities attempted to prevent Dr. Gao Yaojie from meeting with U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, according to Dr. Gao's written statement for a December 3 Commission roundtable. Authorities cut her telephone line in May following news that she was to receive a French human rights award for women, according to a November 29 ChinaAid statement. Dr. Gao left China for the United States in August, hoping to find a "peaceful environment" in which to finish her three books and reveal "the truth about the AIDS epidemic in China," according to the statement.


• On August 4, Asia Catalyst reported that Chinese police seized the passport of an unnamed Chinese AIDS advocate and prevented him from leaving the country to attend the International Conference on AIDS in Asia and the Pacific, to which he was invited by UNAIDS. According to the report, he was warned that if he spoke to the media and international organizations, he would "face the same fate as Hu Jia."


• HIV/AIDS advocate Hu Jia continues to serve a three-and-a-half year prison sentence for "inciting subversion of state power." He is expected to be released on December 17, 2011. On November 17, 2009, Hu's wife Zeng Jinyan reported on her blog that she and her daughter were still under "soft detention" in their home, and were being monitored by seven or eight domestic security protection officials sitting outside the building.


• On December 2, Chinese Human Rights Defenders reported that Beijing authorities detained Henan activist Tian Xi, who reportedly was infected with HIV in 1996 through a hospital blood transfusion, after he unfurled a banner outside of the Ministry of Health on November 19. Officials then forcibly returned him to his home in Gulu township, Xincai county, Henan province, where he remains under 24-hour surveillance, according to the report.

Source: -See Summary (2009-12-11 / English) | Posted on: 2010-01-08
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=133285

Source: -See Summary (2009-12-07 ) | Posted on: 2010-01-08
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=132951

• Article 34 includes language similar to that reported in the June draft, stating that "no organization or individual may lure or force minors to participate in religious activities" and that they "may not use religion to carry out activities to obstruct compulsory education." The regulation lacks criteria for determining what acts constitutes "luring" or "force," leaving latitude to interpret the terms in a manner that conflicts with "the liberty of parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to ensure the religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their own convictions," as defined in the ICCPR.
• Article 48 also contains language similar to that in the June draft, stating that where minors are "lured" or "forced" into such activities, they "can ask for protection from schools, neighborhood committees, village committees, offices for the protection of minors, or public security organs," and such "organizations or work units receiving requests for help must take measures in a timely manner and not refuse or shift responsibility."
• Article 53 contains the regulation's final mention of religion. It stipulates that where "any organization or individual lures or forces a minor to participate in religious activities" in violation of Article 34, the controlling agency will give "criticism and education" and "order the situation to be amended." In addition, public security organs will give administrative punishment "in accordance with law" in cases of violations of the Public Security Administration Punishment Law, which includes the possibility of short-term detention. The 1993 XUAR Implementing Measures for the Law on the Protection of Minors did not specify penalties for violations of its religion-related provisions.

Source: -See Summary (2009-11-27 ) | Posted on: 2010-01-08
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=132578

Last year, on the eve of Human Rights Day, which is observed each year on December 10th, 303 Chinese citizens—including scholars, writers, lawyers, and activists—issued on the Internet Charter 08, a document calling for political reform and greater protection of human rights in China. Liu Xiaobo, a prominent intellectual and dissident who signed Charter 08, was detained the night before the document was released. In June 2009, authorities formally arrested Liu for "inciting subversion." Earlier this month, the police forwarded the case to prosecutors, almost a year after he was taken into custody. Many of the other original signers of Charter 08 (which has since garnered over 10,000 signatures within and outside China) have been subjected to harassment, surveillance, and unlawful house arrest. Chinese authorities have blocked Charter 08, and any reference to it, on the Internet.

Human Rights Day commemorates the anniversary of the United Nations General Assembly's adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948. China voted to adopt the UDHR in 1948, and the current Chinese government has committed itself to protecting the fundamental human rights that are enshrined in the UDHR through international agreements and its own domestic law. In April 2009, the Chinese government reaffirmed this commitment in its first-ever National Human Rights Action Plan.

As detailed in this Commission's 2009 Annual Report, there were many setbacks for rule of law and human rights in China during this past year. In addition to the crackdown on Charter 08 signers, the persecution of human rights lawyers, including Jiang Tianyong and others, reached an unprecedented level; authorities have revoked or suspended the licenses of numerous human rights lawyers and many face ongoing persecution and harassment. Ten months after his disappearance, lawyer Gao Zhisheng remains missing. Petitioners continue to be detained and abused in illegal "black jails." The trials of people—mostly Uyghurs—charged with crimes committed during unrest in Xinjiang in July have been marked by violations of international standards for due process including judges selected for "political reliability" and curbs on defendants' right to independent counsel. The Chinese government continues to suppress civil society initiatives and freedom of expression. For their efforts to advocate peacefully for parents of schoolchildren killed in the May 2008 Sichuan earthquake, authorities put Huang Qi and Tan Zuoren on trial for endangering national security; Huang Qi recently was convicted and sentenced to a prison term of three years for "illegal possession of state secrets." The cases of over 1,200 of the many political and religious prisoners who are being held in China's jails and prisons today are documented in the Commission's publicly accessible Political Prisoner Database.

On Human Rights Day 2009, this Commission calls on the Chinese government to cease the harassment, control, and arbitrary detention of Chinese citizens who engage in peaceful advocacy for their rights under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, other international human rights instruments, and China's own Constitution and laws.


Human Rights Day 2008

Source: -See Summary (2009-12-09 ) | Posted on: 2009-12-10
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=133153

Source: -See Summary (2009-12-09 / English / Free) | Posted on: 2009-12-09
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=133112

• Agriculture. China said it would allow imports of U.S. pork and live swine. These had been banned starting in May 2009 because of swine flu. It is not clear how great an impact this commitment will have on U.S. exports to China which, according to industry, as reported in the October 30 Wall Street Journal, had been growing before the ban. Since the ban was imposed the Chinese have ramped up the domestic industry.
• Clean tech. Access to China's market for foreign wind turbines had been largely restricted for foreign manufacturers. China agreed to allow greater access by removing a 2007 local content requirement for wind turbines, according to an October 30 China Daily report. This commitment was somewhat overshadowed by news of a large wind energy project in Texas that, according to a report in the November 1, 2009 New York Times, will use wind turbines manufactured in China, providing roughly 2000 jobs for Chinese workers.
• Government procurement. China made some commitments concerning government procurement, which has been largely closed to foreign companies as well as companies in China that have foreign investors. China agreed to treat products of these foreign-invested companies the same as products of domestically-owned companies. Further, China agreed to submit a revised offer to join the WTO Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) by early in 2010. The 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008 JCCTs had also included commitments concerning China's joining the GPA.
• IPR. Every JCCT since 2004 has included commitments by China to improve its IPR protection in light of rampant piracy in China. These commitments have ranged from the general, such as China's commitment at the 2004 JCCT to significantly reduce levels of infringement and make greater use of criminal penalties, to the specific, such as the 2005 commitment to post an IPR ombudsman at the Chinese embassy in Washington DC. This year, according to the USTR fact sheet, the Chinese gave some general assurances concerning Internet piracy and encouraging the protection of certain types of publications at public libraries, and agreed to work with the U.S. to address certain IPR issues.

Source: -See Summary (2009-11-19 / English / Free) | Posted on: 2009-12-09
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=131919

Source: -See Summary (2009-07-28 ) | Posted on: 2009-12-09
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=133127

• calling on journalists to follow the "correct" political orientation and to maintain complete consistency with the Party's Central Committee.
• noting that in the past 60 years China's news media has played an important role in supporting the Party as it led China through socialist revolution and socialist modernization.

Source: -See Summary (2009-11-24 / English / Free) | Posted on: 2009-12-09
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=132226

Source: -See Summary (2009-11-19 / English) | Posted on: 2009-12-09
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=132273

Source: -See Summary (2009-11-17 ) | Posted on: 2009-12-09
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=131154

• Zhu claimed that the Dalai Lama broke off talks with China twice in November 2008 and demanded an explanation before talks could resume. "If the Dalai Lama side really intends to continue talks, he must first well explain why he cut off the talks twice last year, especially what they did on the second occasion." Zhu's remark about "the second occasion" refers to an unusual meeting of Tibetan political, religious, educational, cultural, and community leaders living outside of China. The meeting was convened in India to "hold an extensive discussion and debate with regard to the Tibetan cause in the light of recent emergency events in Tibet and the international scenario," according to a November 22, 2008, Tibetan government-in-exile (TGiE) report. The meeting participants adopted a set of recommendations urging, among other things, that Tibetans "follow the guidance of His Holiness the Dalai Lama based on the prevailing situation." The recommendation also observed that "views to stop sending envoys and to pursue complete independence or self-determination if no result comes out in the near future were also strongly expressed," the TGiE report said. The Dalai Lama's Special Envoy, Lodi Gyari, a meeting participant, referred to the eighth round of dialogue that had concluded on November 5 and said, "As far as our task is concerned, it has certainly come to a crucial stage. We did not even talk about future meetings," according to a November 21 Reuters report. The Commission has not observed any reports of statements by the Dalai Lama or his representatives asserting that they had "cut off the talks." [See Special Topic Paper: Tibet 2008-2009 for information on the current status of discussions between the Chinese government and the Dalai Lama's representatives.]
  
  
• Zhu asserted that the Dalai Lama should restrain his international travel because "such activities . . . disturbed the central government and were detrimental to friendly relations between China and relevant countries." Zhu's demand that the Dalai Lama curtail international travel is consistent with recent Party and government statements pointing to what Chinese state-run media has described as an emerging "China doctrine" (China Daily, 12 March 09) that would pressure countries "cultivating ties with China" to deny entry to the Dalai Lama. The China Daily article referred to a March 7, 2009, news conference where, according to a China Central Television report the same day (translated in OSC, 10 March 09), Minister of Foreign Affairs Yang Jiechi said: "In handling their relations with China, no country in the world should allow Dalai to pay visits or use their territory to engage in separatist activities. That should be within the norms of international relations, not a so-called special favor to China." [See Special Topic Paper: Tibet 2008-2009 for information on the Chinese government's shift toward a more aggressive international policy on the Tibet issue.]

Source: -See Summary (2009-11-03 ) | Posted on: 2009-12-09
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=131381

That I have been arbitrarily prohibited from returning to China and my home after traveling abroad—this is a threat to all Chinese citizens. My misfortune is something that every Chinese person could experience. In the past, others have experienced this misfortune, now it is my turn; if there is someone the leaders are dissatisfied with, then tomorrow that person will meet the same fate. Moreover, based on my experience of having tried seven times to return to China, I've realized this: the Chinese government's unlawful measures in prohibiting its own country's citizens from returning home not only harm Chinese citizens, but in the end, the Chinese government's own dignity and reputation is also harmed.

Source: -See Summary (2009-11-02 ) | Posted on: 2009-12-09
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=131324

• In 2005, authorities in Shenzhen municipality, Guangdong province, began requiring Internet chatrooms, bulletin boards, news groups, and instant messaging systems to implement a real name system as part of an Internet "purification and rectification" initiative.


• As noted in the Commission's 2007 Annual Report, the Internet Society of China, a think tank affiliated with the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, attempted to implement a policy that would have required all bloggers to register with their real names. The government backed away from the plan after Internet companies resisted the plan, arguing that the system would be impossible to implement. According to a May 22, 2007, Xinhua article, a Chinese blogger said that the risk of being identified would discourage bloggers from reporting the truth.

Source: -See Summary (2009-11-10 / English / Free) | Posted on: 2009-12-08
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=130744

(1) endanger state security or harm national and social interests; (2) destroy ethnic unity, incite ethnic separatism, or endanger social stability; (3) endanger the safety of the Internet and information systems; (4) violate intellectual property rights, trade secrets, or the lawful rights and interests of individual privacy, citizens, corporations, or other groups; (5) furnish, produce, or disseminate false or harmful information; (6) produce or disseminate information that is obscene, pornographic, violent, terrorist, homicidal, or that instigates crime; and (7) carry out other acts prohibited in laws and regulations.

Source: -See Summary (2009-10-13 / English) | Posted on: 2009-12-08
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=130352

• Recognizing a "Positive Role" for Religious Communities. The amended Jiangsu RRA states in Article 1 that the regulation was drafted in part to "bring into play the positive role of public figures from religious circles and lay believers in the promotion of social and economic development," apparently the first regulation to include such language since high-level Communist Party officials and statements began to articulate a "positive role" for religious communities. Article 5 of the Hubei regulation also includes similar language. Despite articulating a "positive role" for religious communities, authorities have used the sentiment to bolster support for state goals more so than to accept and protect religious life within Chinese society. See the CECC 2009 Annual Report for more information.
• China's Five Recognized Religions. Article 2 of the Jiangsu RRA, retained under the amendments, defines religion to mean only the five religions recognized by the Chinese government: Buddhism, Catholicism, Daoism, Islam, and Protestantism. The article is similar to provisions in some other provincial-level regulations. Like the national RRA, neither the older 2001 Hubei regulation, the new Hubei RRA, nor the Hainan provisions include specific mention of the five groups, which conceivably could create space for local innovations in accommodating other religions. See CECC analyses on other provincial-level regulations (1, 2) for more information.
• Religious Activities in the Home. Similar to other recent regulations, Article 14 of the Jiangsu RRA states that religious activities are to be held at registered venues, and Article 19 of the Hubei RRA states that "in general" they are to be held in such venues. Article 11 of the Hainan provisions similarly provides that religious citizens can carry out religious activities in registered venues but also stipulates that they can "live a religious life within one's home," language on worship at home similar to a number of other recent regulations on religious affairs. Language on worship at home carries potential significance for groups of people who want to gather in private residences, outside of state-controlled venues, to hold worship services. As discussed in the CECC 2007 Annual Report, the Chinese government states there are no registration requirements for religious gatherings within the home, but continues to target some private religious gatherings for closure. For more information, see CECC analyses of other provincial-level regulations (1, 2).
• Property Protections. Compared to the 2002 version of the regulation, the amended Jiangsu RRA appears to refine and possibly increase property protections for venues for religious activities. Article 32 (revised from Article 30 in the 2002 regulation) lends more specificity to the circumstances in which local governments may demolish religious property and adds more specificity to the process for compensating religious groups. In addition, newly added Article 43 outlines steps including the possibility of criminal liability for people who violate Article 32 and demolish religious property without permission.
• More Specificity, New Deadlines for Official Actions. Some provisions in the new or amended pieces of legislation add specificity to older provisions or clarify them by specifying time limits for officials to make decisions that affect religious communities. See, e.g., Articles 19 and 23 (previously Article 22) of the Jiangsu RRA. Articles 14 and 15 of the Hubei RRA lend more specificity, consistent with the national RRA, to the process of establishing and registering venues for religious activity. For various provisions in the Hainan provisions (some without counterparts in the older regulation) that add time limits for official decisions, see, e.g., Articles 5, 6, 8, 9, and 13.
• Increased Controls. By introducing more clarity, the regulations also articulate more explicit controls in some cases. For example, the older Hubei regulation provided only a limited number of restrictions on the activities of religious personnel (See Article 7). The new regulation, in contrast, contains 6 articles (Articles 30-35) governing a wider scope of their activities. Some articles include new benefits—like the provision of insurance (Article 34)—but taken as a whole, the articles spell out more controls over the activities and qualifications of religious personnel. The Hainan provisions similarly articulate limits on religious personnel's cross-provincial movement (Article 10) missing from the older regulation.
• Penalties Changed. Article 41 (previously Article 38) of the Jiangsu regulation adds to and refines a list of activities that may meet with official sanction, such as religious personnel leading religious activities before their status has been put on file. Whereas under the 2002 regulation such activity could be fined, however, the new revisions only specify that religious affairs bureaus order the activities to stop. (Other articles in the amended Jiangsu RRA continue to specify fines and other penalties.) The 1997 Hainan regulation lacked provisions on liability. In contrast, the new provisions spell out both penalties for officials who abuse their power (Article 21) as well as for citizens or religious organizations that violate the provisions (Articles 22-27).

Source: -See Summary (2009-08-05 ) | Posted on: 2009-12-08
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=127976

Source: -See Summary (2009-11-19 / English / Free) | Posted on: 2009-12-08
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=131524

Source: -See Summary (2009-11-19 ) | Posted on: 2009-12-08
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=132290

Source: -See Summary (2009-11-19 / English) | Posted on: 2009-12-08
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=132274

Source: -See Summary (2009-11-24 / English) | Posted on: 2009-12-08
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=132227

Source: -See Summary (2009-11-12 / English) | Posted on: 2009-12-08
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=131859

Source: -See Summary (2009-09-05 ) | Posted on: 2009-11-06
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=129323

• The court reportedly rejected requests by Tan's lawyers to call three witnesses, including Ai Weiwei, a noted artist and blogger who helped design the Beijing Olympics' Bird's Nest Stadium and was investigating the deaths of students in the quake, according to the China Daily article, a second August 13 CHRD article, and an August 12 Human Rights in China (HRIC) report. Ai told various news agencies that he planned to still watch the trial but that police came to his hotel and prevented him and 10 other volunteers from leaving until after the trial ended (see, e.g., August 12 Reuters article, August 12 Guardian article). Ai also indicated that police had used force in the process, including striking him in the face.
• Tan's lawyers, Pu Zhiqiang and Xia Lin, reported that the judge frequently cut them off during the trial and that their request to show video evidence was not accepted, according to the China Daily and second CHRD articles.
• Parents of earthquake victims attempting to attend the trial were detained, according to an August 13 Global Times article.
• The court did not allow reporters into the court, according to the China Daily article. Police reportedly searched the hotel rooms of two Hong Kong reporters attempting to cover the case, claiming that they were acting on reports that the journalists possessed drugs, and did not free them until seven hours later, according to an August 13 Agence France-Presse article (via The Australian).
• Police barred hundreds of supporters from entering the courtroom saying the supporters needed passes, even though court officials earlier had told them that no passes were necessary, according to an August 12 CHRD report.

• Protect Huang Qi's and Tan Zuoren's rights to freedom of speech, expression, and association. Based on the published reports about these cases, Huang and Tan engaged in peaceful activities that are guaranteed under China's Constitution and international law. Specifically:
  • China's Constitution guarantees the rights to freedom of speech and association (Article 35) and the right to criticize officials (Article 41).
  • The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which China has signed and expressed an intent to ratify, guarantee all individuals the right to freedom of expression (Article 19) and association (Article 22 for ICCPR, Article 20 for UDHR).

• Allow parents, concerned citizens, and the news media to conduct their own investigations into the role shoddy construction may have played in the school collapses, free from harassment and official interference. China has pledged to protect such activities in its National Human Rights Action Plan of China (2009-2010), which says "the state will guarantee citizens' rights to criticize, give advice to, complain of, and accuse state organs and civil servants, and give full play to the role of mass organizations, social organizations and the news media in supervising state organs and civil servants." Furthermore, the plan calls for specific measures to guarantee human rights in areas hit by the earthquake, including "respecting earthquake victims" and "registering the names of people who died or disappeared in the earthquake and made [sic] them known to the public."

• Increase transparency regarding the government's own investigations into the school collapses by releasing the details of such investigations and information about victims, including students who died. The Regulations on Open Government Information require government agencies to disclose information that involves the vital interests of citizens (Article 9(1)).

Source: -See Summary (2009-08-14 / English / Free) | Posted on: 2009-11-06
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=128566

Source: -See Summary (2009-08-12 ) | Posted on: 2009-11-06
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=128444

• The procuratorate has approved the arrests (pizhun daibu) of a total of 237 people in 139 cases, and public security officials also have sought approval to arrest 295 people involved in 175 cases, based on information in a September 11 English-language China Daily report and Chinese-language Xinhua report. The procuratorate has initiated prosecution of 51 people in 14 cases, according to the reports, which appears to clarify information reported the previous week (see below) on cases transferred for review for prosecution. Based on the reports, 956 cases in total have been filed for investigation.
• The procuratorate has approved the arrests (pizhun daibu) of 196 people in 121 cases related to July 5, and 14 cases involving 51 people have been transferred by public security organs to the procuratorate for review for prosecution, according to the text of a September 4 Chinese-language Xinhua report citing the XUAR government information office. A September 4 English-language Xinhua report (via China.cn) states, in contrast to the Chinese-language report, that authorities have "prosecuted" the cases. (See Articles 136-149 of the Criminal Procedure Law for general information on reviewing cases and initiating prosecution.) Public security officials have sought approval to arrest an additional 239 people involved in 140 cases, and 825 people are being held in criminal detention (xingshi juliu), according to the reports. The numbers represent the second official statement on arrest figures, following information on a first group of arrests reported in August (see below). The September reports do not clarify whether the 196 arrests include the earlier numbers reported in August.
• Authorities have approved arrests (pizhun daibu) of 83 people in connection to crimes on July 5, according to August 4 English-language and Chinese-language reports from Xinhua. The English-language article said the information was the first official announcement on arrests from Urumqi authorities. The article reported that XUAR procurator Otkur Abduraxman "said those arrested will face charges including murder, intentional injury, arson and robbery." According to the Chinese-language report, however, those arrested are also suspected of "destroying vehicles, gathering crowds to disrupt social order, picking quarrels and making trouble, and inciting ethnic hatred and discrimination," in addition to the crimes listed in the English-language report. The Chinese-language report noted those arrested included both Uyghurs and Han. According to a July 18 report from the Legal Daily, citing a XUAR Party official, suspects' alleged crimes fall into five categories, including endangering state security, and include over 20 suspected crimes, including splittism and armed rebellion.
• Following the report of the 83 arrests, an August 23 English-language report from the China Daily (via People's Daily) said over 200 people had been formally arrested and that trials would begin that week, appearing to cite an unnamed Urumqi procuratorate official as the source of the information. The report said charges included splittism and inciting splittism. Hou Hanmin, a spokesperson for the XUAR government called the China Daily report "totally untrue" in an August 25 Global Times report, and another XUAR government official also denied the report, according to an August 25 New York Times report.
• The head of the Urumqi Public Security Bureau reported that 718 suspects had been placed under criminal detention (xingshi juliu) as of August 4, according to a Chinese-language report that day from Xinhua. See also a report of the detentions in an August 4 English-language Xinhua report. A PRC official later reiterated to the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination that 718 remained in detention and that those who "committed minor offences have been dealt with leniently and released," according to an August 10 Agence France-Presse report (via Yahoo). It is unclear, however, if all other people earlier held in connection to July 5 were outside of some form of custody or oversight as of that date, especially in light of comments from XUAR government chairperson Nur Bekri (below) indicating that some peaceful protesters may remain in a form of unofficial custody or under surveillance. According to an August 6 Xinhua report (via China Daily), "Authorities also admitted that some of the detained suspects in connection with the riot have been released as their offences were minor. But they didn't provide the exact number of those who were released."
• According to August 2 English-language and Chinese-language Xinhua reports, public security officers said they had detained (zhuahuo) 319 people in addition to 253 detentions reported earlier. The detentions (zhuahuo) of 253 "prime suspects" were reported in a July 29 Chinese-language Xinhua report, which also noted that a batch of suspects turned themselves in. A July 29 English-language Xinhua report on the detentions said they were "in addition to the more than 1,000 suspects detained by July 6."
  
• Xinhua reported in a July 10 Chinese-language article that authorities detained (zhuahuo) 190 people in a series of four operations on July 9 and July 10, in connection to events on July 5. This news appears to have been unreported in official English-language media.
• Xinhua's English-language service reported on July 7 that authorities had "arrested" 1,434 people--1,379 men and 55 women--in connection to events on July 5. The use of the term "arrests" appears to be an incorrect reference to the initial detention of these individuals. (Formal arrests (daibu) of over 1,400 people two days after alleged criminal activity would be unlikely given the usual progression of the criminal process, including the requirement under the CPL that the procuratorate approve all arrests. This terminology is also inconsistent with Chinese reporting. See, e.g., a July 7 Xinhua article (via Nanfang Daily), noting that police had "caught" (zhuabu) 1,434 people.) Some of the detainees "might be released if no serious criminal records were found," according to a paraphrasing of Urumqi Party Secretary Li Zhi's remarks in the English-language article.
• XUAR police chief Liu Yaohua initially reported early on July 7 that officials had detained roughly 700 people and continued to pursue "about 90 other key suspects," according to a July 7 English-language Xinhua report.

• 21 Suspects Involved in Urumqi Riot Prosecuted (Xinhua, September 25. Click here for Chinese-language reporting from Xinhua.)
• 108 Stand Accused in Urumqi Riot (China Daily, October 9. Click here for Chinese-language reporting from Xinhua and Yangzi Evening News, via Sanming Information Net.)
• Six Sentenced to Death over Xinjiang Riot (Xinhua, October 12. Click here for Chinese-language reporting from Xinhua.)
• Legal Scholars and Procurator Answer Reporters' Questions about Trial Conditions in Three Major Criminal Cases from "7-5" Incident (People's Daily, October 12, in Chinese. Includes background information, including limited details on legal defense.)
• China Sentences Six to Death over Xinjiang Riot (Xinhua, October 15. Click here for Chinese-language reporting from Xinhua.)
• Court Upholds Penalties to Xinjiang Riot Convicts (Xinhua, October 30. Click here for Chinese-language reporting from Xinhua, via Sina.)

• China Indicts 21 People in July Ethnic Violence (Associated Press, via Seattle Times, September 25.)
• China Court Sentences 6 to Death in Rioting (New York Times, October 12.)
• China Sentences Six More to Death for Xinjiang Unrest (Agence France-Presse, October 15.)
• China Sentences 3 More to Death for Xinjiang Riot (Associated Press, via Yahoo!, October 15.)

Source: -See Summary (2009-08-11 ) | Posted on: 2009-11-06
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=128326

Source: -See Summary (2009-07-22 / English) | Posted on: 2009-11-06
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=126995

Source: -See Summary (2009-04-06 / English / Free) | Posted on: 2009-11-06
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=131402

Source: -See Summary (2009-10-16 ) | Posted on: 2009-10-19
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=130525

• Tibetan New Year (Losar), February 25, 2009. Some Tibetans living in Tibetan autonomous areas of China intend to express in a passive manner their discontent with developments over the past year, including the death and imprisonment of Tibetan protesters, by foregoing the usual celebration of Losar. Reuters reported from Lhasa on February 12 that "many Tibetans" are boycotting Losar celebrations "in quiet defiance of the crackdown." A February 11 Xinhua report said that Nyima Tsering, Vice Chairman of the TAR People's Congress Standing Committee (TAR PCSC), at a February 10 press conference in Lhasa urged Tibetans to continue with Losar celebrations "in response to an underground campaign by some secessionists to boycott the festival." "Tibetan people are enjoying a good life now," Nyima Tsering said, "there is no reason for them to forgo celebrating their traditional holiday this year." If Chinese government officials choose to characterize Tibetan non-celebration of the New Year as an expression of "splittism," a crime under Article 103 of the Criminal Law, then authorities could pressure Tibetans to choose between celebrating Losar or facing the possibility of punishment that could include criminal prosecution.
  
  
• Fiftieth anniversary of March 10, 1959, the date when tens of thousands of Tibetans in Lhasa gathered outside the Dalai Lama's Norbulingka residence because they feared a People's Liberation Army plot to harm him. The Dalai Lama escaped from Lhasa a week later and fled into exile. On March 10 of every year since 1960 the Dalai Lama has made a formal statement to the Tibetan people. (See the Web site of the Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama for a chronology, biographical information on the Dalai Lama, and an archive of March 10 statements.)
  
  
• First anniversary of March 10, 2008, the start of the wave of Tibetan protests. The protests resulted in a large number of Tibetan deaths, detentions, and disappearances according to reports by media and NGOs, but Chinese government measures to prevent information from leaving China have prevented a complete and accurate accounting of the consequences. Chinese officials blamed "the Dalai Clique" for "masterminding" the 2008 protests and rioting, and did not acknowledge the role of rising Tibetan frustration with Chinese policies. (See the CECC 2008 Annual Report for information on the Tibetan protests and their consequences. See Tibet: Special Focus for 2007 of the 2007 Annual Report, and Section VIII—Tibet of the 2006 Annual Report for additional information on Chinese government and Communist Party policies that deprive Tibetans of rights and freedoms nominally protected under China's Constitution and legal system.)
  
  
• First observance of "Serfs Emancipation Day", March 28, 2009. The TAR People's Congress established the holiday on January 19, 2009, to commemorate the March 28, 1959, Chinese government decree that dissolved the Dalai Lama's Lhasa-based Tibetan government. Legchog (Lieque), the Chairman of the TAR PCSC, said on January 16, 2009, that Serfs Emancipation Day would "strengthen Tibetans' patriotism," according to a January 16 Xinhua report. RFA reported on January 16 that TAR prefectural and county officials had met to "ensure that all people mark the occasion with festivities." Chinese government measures to pressure Tibetans into celebrating the end of the Dalai Lama's government (and, by association, the departure of the Dalai Lama), have already provoked protests. For example, about 300 Tibetans, including monks, protested on January 10 in Jiangda (Jomda) county, Changdu (Chamdo) prefecture, TAR, in an attempt to dissuade local officials from sending a Tibetan dance troupe to Lhasa to participate in Serfs Emancipation Day celebrations, according to a February 9 Phayul report. Officials forced the dance troupe to depart for Lhasa on January 15 and authorities detained at least seven monks on January 24, the report said.

• The actual number of detentions during January may continue to increase beyond what has been reported thus far as additional information continues to come to light.
  
  
• The Jiangda county protest was forward-looking, focusing on March 28 "Serfs Emancipation Day" ceremonies, rather than reactive, such as Tibetan protests against anti-Dalai Lama and "patriotic education" campaigns.
  
  
• All 24 of the January 2009 detentions recorded in the PPD took place in Changdu prefecture or Ganzi (Kardze) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (TAP), Sichuan province. The two prefectures border each other, with the Yangzi River forming a boundary.
  
  
• January has concluded only recently—the actual number of January protests and detentions may surpass what has been reported so far.

Source: -See Summary (2009-02-25 ) | Posted on: 2009-08-30
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=117365

Source: -See Summary (2009-06-30 ) | Posted on: 2009-08-20
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=125102

• Honor the Chinese Constitution's guarantees for the freedoms of speech and association, distinguish between acts of peaceful protest and acts of violence, and not treat peaceful protest as a crime.


• Allow international observers and journalists immediate and unfettered access to the Xinjiang.


• Provide details about each person detained or charged with a crime, including each person's name, the charges (if any) against each person, the name and location of the prosecuting office and court handling each case, and the name of each facility where a person is detained or imprisoned.


• Ensure that security officials fulfill their obligations under Articles 64(2) and 71(2) of China’s Criminal Procedure Law to inform relatives and work places where detainees are being held.


• Allow access by diplomats and other international observers to the trials of people charged with protest-related crimes.

Source: -See Summary (2009-07-09 / English) | Posted on: 2009-08-19		more ...
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=128705

• Joint Press Release on the First Round of the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue; Washington, DC (7/28/09)
• Memorandum of Understanding to Enhance Cooperation on Climate Change, Energy and the Environment (7/28/09) (Also see pdf of original, signed document)
• Signing Ceremony for the U.S.-China Memorandum of Understanding to Enhance Cooperation in Climate Change, Energy, and the Environment (7/28/09)
• U.S. Fact Sheet: First Cabinet-level Meeting of Economic Track of U.S.-China S&ED (7/28/09) (pdf version)
• The First U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue Economic Track Joint Fact Sheet (7/28/09)
• Fact Sheet: U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED)


• Closing Remarks for U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (7/28/09)
• Joint Press Availability With Treasury Secretary Geithner and Secretary of State Clinton (7/28/09)
• Remarks at Closing Dinner by Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State (7/28/09)
• Strategic Track Discussion Session II (7/28/09)
• Treasury Secretary Timothy F. Geithner's Strategic and Economic Dialogue Closing Statement (7/28/09)
• Timothy F. Geithner Economic Track Opening Session Statement (7/28/09)
• Remarks at Plenary Session of the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue; Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State (7/27/09)
• Special Background Briefing on U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue; Washington, DC (7/27/09)
• Op-Ed by Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State and Timothy Geithner, Secretary of the Treasury: "A New Strategic and Economic Dialogue with China;" The Wall Street Journal (7/27/09)
• Secretary Geithner S&ED Opening Ceremony Statement (7/27/09)
• Press Release: U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue To Be Held July 27-28, 2009, in Washington, DC (7/13/09)
• Joint Statement by Secretary of the Treasury Geithner and Secretary of State Clinton (6/02/09)
• U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy F. Geithner Names Additions to Economic and Financial Leadership Team for China (6/01/09) (Photo)
• Speech by Secretary Geithner - The United States and China, Cooperating for Recovery and Growth (5/31/09)
• State Department-Treasury Department Joint Statement (4/01/09)
• EcoPartnerships.gov
• S&ED Pictures

Source: -See Summary (2009-08-05 / English) | Posted on: 2009-08-06
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=127997

• In March, Internet supervision departments issued an internal notice prohibiting Web sites from reporting on or commenting on an environmental impact report relating to the Guangdong Nansha oil refinery and petrochemical project, according to a March 18 China Digital Times report.


• In March, the Central Propaganda Department banned domestic media from republishing or reporting on an article on China's U.S. stock holdings and ordered Web sites to remove the article, according to a March 9 Ming Pao report (via Open Source Center, subscription required). The article was originally published by a Shanghai newspaper and included comments from an academic questioning China's use of foreign exchange reserves to invest in stock. The ban occurred during the annual sessions of the National People's Congress and Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.


• In February, propaganda officials in Beijing ordered Web sites to delete blogs and discussion groups about a fire at a hotel under construction on the grounds of China Central Television's headquarters. The officials also ordered Chinese media not to publish photos, videos, or in-depth reports about the fire, and to run only official stories issued by Xinhua instead of their own reports.

Source: -See Summary (2009-07-09 / English / Free) | Posted on: 2009-08-06
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=125914

• Chinese President Hu Jintao and members of the Communist Party Politburo's Standing Committee met on July 8 and issued a statement that the government would "firmly crack down on serious crimes" and target "[i]nstigators, organizers, culprits and violent criminals" involved in the "riot," according to a July 9 Xinhua report. "Cadres and the public in Xinjiang should stick to the principle that stability overrides everything," according to the statement as quoted in the Xinhua article.
• Politburo Standing Committee member Zhou Yongkang visited the region and called for measures to promote stability and promote Party policy. A July 10 Xinhua report paraphrased Zhou as saying, "All CPC members should fan out to communities and villages in the autonomous region to publicize the Party's policies, in order to ensure the region's social stability," and "Every household and every community in Xinjiang should contribute to the ethnic unity in the region." During his trip, Zhou Yongkang traveled to Kashgar and Hoten districts on July 11 and met with security forces there, according to a report that day from Xinhua. Urumchi Party Secretary Li Zhi had said some of the "criminal elements" involved in "beating, smashing, looting, and burning" came from Kashgar and Hoten districts, and that there was organization and pre-planning involved, according to a July 12 article from CCTV (via People's Daily).

• Abide by the guarantees for freedoms of speech, press, assembly, and association contained in the Chinese Constitution, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; distinguish between acts of peaceful protest and acts of violence; and not treat peaceful protest as a crime.
• Allow international observers and journalists immediate and unfettered access to the XUAR.
• Provide details about each person detained or charged with a crime, including each person's name, the charges (if any) against each person, the name and location of the prosecuting office ("procuratorate") and court handling each case, and the name of each facility where a person is detained or imprisoned.
• Ensure that security officials fulfill their obligations under Articles 64(2) and 71(2) of China’s Criminal Procedure Law to inform relatives and work places where detainees are being held.
• Allow access by diplomats and other international observers to the trials of people charged with protest-related crimes.

Source: -See Summary (2009-07-09 ) | Posted on: 2009-08-06
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=125931

• Xinjiang Authorities Block, Punish Free Expression
• Xinjiang Authorities Announce Heightened Security Threat, Strengthen Security Capacity, and Continue Propaganda Campaigns
• Xinjiang Authorities Strengthen Controls Over Religion
• Demolition of Kashgar's Old City Draws Concerns Over Cultural Heritage Protection, Population Resettlement
• Recruitment for State Jobs in Xinjiang Discriminates Against Ethnic Minorities
• Number of Xinjiang Students Receiving Mandarin-Focused "Bilingual" Education Increases
• State Security Cases From Xinjiang Appear to Surge in 2008

• Honor the Chinese Constitution's guarantees for the freedoms of speech and association, distinguish between acts of peaceful protest and acts of violence, and not treat peaceful protest as a crime.
• Allow international observers and journalists immediate and unfettered access to the XUAR.
• Provide details about each person detained or charged with a crime, including each person's name, the charges (if any) against each person, the name and location of the prosecuting office ("procuratorate") and court handling each case, and the name of each facility where a person is detained or imprisoned.
• Ensure that security officials fulfill their obligations under Articles 64(2) and 71(2) of China’s Criminal Procedure Law to inform relatives and work places where detainees are being held.
• Allow access by diplomats and other international observers to the trials of people charged with protest-related crimes.

Source: -See Summary (2009-07-06 ) | Posted on: 2009-08-06
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=125582

The research panel discovered that the 3.14 incident was caused by the confluence of many factors, including psychological loss created by development, discontent among economic classes, the question of migrants, influences from abroad, religious sentiment, and on-scene "mass reactions," which cannot be simply reduced to "splittist violence."

• Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR): Lhasa city, the TAR capital; and Naidong (Nedong) county, the location of Zedang (Tsethang), the capital of Shannan (Lhoka) prefecture;
• Gannan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (TAP), Gansu province: Hezuo (Tsoe) city, the Gannan capital; and Xiahe (Sangchu) county.

• Listen to the views of ordinary Tibetans and adjust policies in Tibetan areas on the basis of respecting and protecting the Tibetan people’s rights and interests.
• Guide economic development so that Tibetans acquire ample benefits, and reduce the discrepancy between urban and rural income.
• Increase central government supervision over local governments in order to reduce local corruption and dereliction of duty, and to speed up the process of democratizing power structures.
• Treat the education of Tibetans as the key to the long-term resolution of "the question of Tibetan areas"; improve educational opportunities available to young Tibetans, especially farmers and herders; develop appropriate content on Tibetan history and culture.
• Respect and protect Tibetan "freedom of religious belief," including recognizing the importance of religion to Tibetans; allow the resumption of "normal religious activities" such as Buddhist teaching, monastic travel to attend Buddhist teaching, and "the transmission of Tibetan Buddhism." (The latter is a reference to the Tibetan Buddhist belief that some Tibetan Buddhist teachers reincarnate, a tradition that the Chinese government seeks to control through regulations issued in 2007.)
• Seek to "reduce inter-ethnic prejudice, ignorance, and injury"; when "sudden incidents" occur, seek the support of "positive forces," such as religious figures, to help resolve them.
• Promote the rule of law in Tibetan areas by encouraging the introduction of "laws and regulations" at the local level; regulate the ownership and exploitation of natural resources; encourage experts to participate in policy discussions.
• Build up ethnic unity by "propagandizing" the success of the reform and opening up policy in Tibetan areas, and avoid depicting the Tibetan past as "serfdom." Along with highlighting the "vitality" of development, admit the "social problems facing Tibet."
• Handle crisis situations by first determining whether a problem is social, economic, or religious, and use different methods for handling each type. The central government should function as an "arbiter" and keep itself distinct from "local officials' inappropriate conduct."

In the past 20 years in China, the people who manage Tibet . . . have really gained power. Their economic interests and everything else are built on this power. They blame everything that goes wrong in Tibet . . . on the Dalai Lama, or on Tibetans in exile. . . . Sometimes it looks as though we are seeing only the truly top-level of China’s state leadership, and we assume such high-ranking views are the only reason for what is happening. [If] you look at the details, there's a messy political process going on. In that process, there are people who have political and economic self-interests playing a role in this particular policy.

Source: -See Summary (2009-07-04 ) | Posted on: 2009-08-06
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=125374

• Commission Analysis: Chinese Government Requires Censorship Software To Accompany Computers Sold After July 1 (discusses the impact on freedom of expression, the public's response in China, confusion over the pre-installation requirement, and questions about transparency, short preparation time, government procurement, and intellectual property rights);
• Commission Translation: Circular Regarding the Pre-Installation of Green Browsing Filter Software on Computers (English translation of official circular setting forth pre-installation requirement);
• Section II-Freedom of Expression in the Commission's 2008 Annual Report.

Source: -See Summary (2009-06-30 / English / Free) | Posted on: 2009-08-06
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=125073

Not only does it block access to a wide range of Web sites based on keywords and image processing, including porn, gaming, gay content, religious sites, and political themes, it actively monitors individual computer behavior, such that a wide range of programs including word processing and email can be suddenly terminated if content algorithm detects inappropriate speech.

• Wei Yongzheng, a professor at Hong Kong Shue Yan University, and Zhou Ze, an associate professor at China Youth University for Political Sciences, said in a letter to the State Council that although the MIIT's stated purpose is to protect youth, in practice the requirement could restrict Internet users from accessing other information, in violation of freedom of expression provisions in the ICCPR and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, according to a June 11 Caijing article (in Chinese). The two scholars noted that Chinese laws do not clearly delineate what constitutes "harmful information" to be censored on the Internet. "The filtering system only needs to be installed in computers that youth may use, and their guardians can take responsibility," they said.


• A June 9 Caijing editorial (in Chinese) also raised questions about what constitutes "harmful information." "Is there a transparency mechanism for the determination of the 'blacklist' and a free-flowing channel for corrections and remedies? How do they make sure this does not become a 'back door' for abuse of authority?" the editorial said.


• In a June 11 editorial titled, "Questionable Move," the state-run English-language China Daily questioned why the government was requiring every computer to install the software when taxpayers' money could have been used to sponsor a Web site offering the software on a voluntary basis. The editorial also raised concerns about who would decide what content to block and the criteria for blocking. "Are software developers qualified to do that? How is citizens' freedom of expression or right to know to be balanced against the need to filter 'unhealthy' content?" read the editorial.


• Online surveys conducted by four popular Chinese Web portals showed that more than four in five respondents indicated they will not use the software or will uninstall it, according to a June 15 China Daily article.


• On June 22, Reuters reported that Internet users in China were calling for a boycott of the Internet on July 1 to protest the government policy.

Source: -See Summary (2009-06-22 ) | Posted on: 2009-08-06
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=124386

Source: -See Summary (2009-06-24 ) | Posted on: 2009-07-02
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=124556

1. Computers manufactured and sold domestically should have the newest version of the "Green Dam-Youth Escort" software pre-installed when leaving the factory. Imported computers should have the newest version of the "Green Dam-Youth Escort" software pre-installed before being sold domestically.


2. The "Green Dam-Youth Escort" software should be pre-installed on the computer's hard drive or on a CD that accompanies the computer. It also should be included in the recovery partition and on the system restore CD as a backup file.


3. Suppliers of the "Green Dam-Youth Escort" software should take steps proactively to support the computer manufacturing industry in launching the pre-installation.


4. The computer manufacturing and sales industries should complete pre-installation tests of the "Green Dam-Youth Escort" software and other related work by the end of June 2009. Computers leaving the factory and sold after July 1, 2009, should have the "Green Dam-Youth Escort" software pre-installed.


5. In 2009, computer manufacturers and suppliers of the "Green Dam-Youth Escort" software every month should file a report with the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology's Software Service Industry Department showing the numbers of computers sold and filtering software pre-installed in the previous month, along with any suggestions. Beginning in 2010, the previous year's numbers should be reported before the end of February each year.

Source: Ministry of Information Industry (2009-05-19 / Chinese / Free) | Posted on: 2009-07-02		more ...
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=123365

Source: -See Summary (2009-02-25 ) | Posted on: 2009-07-02
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=118053

Source: -See Summary (2009-03-13 / English) | Posted on: 2009-07-02
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=119057

Source: -See Summary (2009-05-26 / English) | Posted on: 2009-07-02
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=122703

Though more attention has been paid in recent years to abiding by certain provisions of the CPL, Chinese law-enforcement authorities have in the past frequently ignored legally established rights and time limits, especially in cases like this one that appear to be of a political nature.

Source: -See Summary (2009-06-09 / English / Free) | Posted on: 2009-07-02
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=123377

• A district in Qaramay municipality reported in late November 2008 that the municipal government had issued a "notice on confiscating Muslim books such as 'The Truth About the Holy Teachings' and 'The Call to Orthodoxy,'" according to a November 29 report on the Jerenbulaq district (Baijiantan), Qaramay municipal government Web site. Authorities investigated local book and music sellers in accordance with the notice, the article reported.
• In an inspection of the cultural market in the XUAR capital of Urumqi, authorities reported confiscating 175 copies of "illegal religious pictures," according to a February 10 report from the Urumqi municipal government Web site.
• XUAR authorities will coordinate with propaganda departments from provinces including Gansu, Qinghai, Shaanxi, and the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region to establish a cross-provincial mechanism to stop the printing and sales of "illegal" religious materials, according to a March 2 Xinjiang Daily report about a meeting to enlarge the law enforcement teams that monitor cultural markets in the XUAR. The article also reported that in 2009, XUAR authorities established a fund to reward efforts to "purify" the cultural market, with focus on "illegal" religious and political publications.
• As part of a campaign to curb "illegal religious activity" in Hoten district, authorities reported finding large amounts of "illegal propaganda materials such as books, handwritten texts, CDs, and tapes," according to a March 4 article on the Xinjiang Peace Net. See a related Congressional-Executive Commission on China analysis for more information about the steps to fight "illegal religious activity" in Hoten.
• Authorities in the XUAR will implement a special system of oversight for bookstores, newspaper stands, audio and video suppliers, and similar vendors that are located within 500 meters of schools, according to a March 18 report from Tianshan Net. The report also provided statistics on the number of books confiscated in 2008. Of a total of 877,193 copies of items confiscated in 2008, 29,905 were "illegal" political materials. The article did not report the number of "illegal" religious items confiscated.

• According to April reports from Radio Free Asia (RFA), authorities in Turpan municipality detained Ekberjan Jamal, a young Uyghur man, on December 25, 2007, after he had used his cell phone to make audio recordings of November 2007 shopkeepers' demonstrations in Turpan and sent the recordings to friends overseas. (See an April 15 English-language report and April 13 and 14 Uyghur-language reports.) His friends gave the recordings to Hong Kong-based Phoenix News and to RFA. (See 2007 RFA articles about the demonstrations dated November 1, 2, and 26.) Ekberjan Jamal later posted on his own Web site the news based on his audio recordings. The Turpan Intermediate People's Court sentenced Ekberjan Jamal to 10 years in prison on February 28, 2008, for splittism and revealing state secrets, crimes under articles 103 and 111 of the Criminal Law. He is being held in the Xinjiang Number 4 prison in Urumqi, according to the RFA reports.
• Chinese state-run media reported in March that procuratorate officials approved the arrest of and initiated prosecution against a young man, identified only as "Ya," after he allegedly "spread rumors" on the Internet about a clash that broke out in January at an Internet Café in Shayar county, Aqsu district. (See a March 16 report from Tianshan Net and a March 17 report from Xinhua, via China Daily.) The reports said that "Ya" fabricated the nature of the clash, reporting that Han Chinese had beaten and killed a Uyghur youth, describing police indifference to the matter, and reporting that over 500 Uyghurs took to the streets to demonstrate. The Tianshan Net report said that "Ya's" article was then used by "separatist" Web sites overseas that aimed to "disrupt ethnic unity" and "influence social stability." (For reports on the incident by RFA after the clash broke out in late January, see a February 6 article as well as RFA Uyghur-language articles from January 30, February 3, and February 4. See also a January 31 report from the East Turkistan Information Center.)
• Also in March, official media reported that in June 2008, authorities from Hoten district intercepted and arrested people described as members of Hizb ut-Tahrir who planned to "sabotage" the Olympic torch relay. A report posted March 3 on the Hoten Peace Net (from the Hoten Frontier Defense Detachment) said that authorities found the group traveling in a vehicle carrying a computer, printer, and "reactionary" leaflets. The report did not provide additional details about the case.
• The Uyghur American Association reported in a March 16 press release that a court in Hoten municipality, Hoten district, sentenced Abdukadir Mahsum on February 26 to 15 years in prison for his activities organizing peaceful demonstrations in Hoten in March 2008 to protest government human rights abuses. The news follows other steps in the XUAR to punish people who plan or participate in demonstrations. In December 2008 public security offices took two young men into detention after they tried to organize a demonstration on the campus of Xinjiang University.

• Uyghur Historian Released From Prison
• Two Young Uyghurs Detained for Distributing Leaflets Calling for Student Demonstration
• Authorities Block Uyghur Protest in Xinjiang, Detain Protesters
• Xinjiang Government Strengthens Campaign Against Political and Religious Publications
• Uyghur Editor Korash Huseyin's Prison Sentence Expires
• Xinjiang Cracks Down on "Illegal" Religious Publications
• Xinjiang Government Seizes, Confiscates Political and Religious Publications

Source: -See Summary (2009-03-30 ) | Posted on: 2009-07-02
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=119624

• Creation of a black list. Journalists who "violate laws and regulations" will have their press cards revoked and names placed on a black list of journalists with "bad records."
• Amendment of the Measures for the Administration of Journalist Accreditation Cards to "strengthen the regulatory system relating to applying for, examining and verifying, and granting press cards."
• New measures to strengthen oversight over reporting and editing activities to "regulate order in news reporting and curb fake reports."

Source: -See Summary (2009-03-18 / English / Free) | Posted on: 2009-07-02
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=118599

Source: -See Summary (2009-03-18 / English / Free) | Posted on: 2009-07-02
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=119334

Source: -See Summary (2009-05-15 ) | Posted on: 2009-06-24
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=122238

Source: -See Summary (2009-03-17 / English) | Posted on: 2009-06-24
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=118758

Source: -See Summary (2009-03-17 / English) | Posted on: 2009-06-24
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=118848

• Strengthening leadership and deployment of work on religion, including through the establishment of leading groups on "illegal religious activity," the use of accountability systems among officials, and through strengthened supervision over government work in this area.
• Increasing warnings against "illegal religious activity" and increasing propaganda on issues such as Communist Party policy toward religion and the nature of the "three forces" of terrorism, separatism, and extremism; using media like art and broadcast communications to spread propaganda and using artistic performances and recreational activities to weaken religious atmospheres; and carrying out activities such as events for people to sign their names to show resistance to "illegal religious activities."
• Deepening capacity to investigate and detect "illegal religious activity," including by mobilizing the support of local organizations and schools.
• "Strengthening management and purifying the environment" through five steps: strengthening management of religious activities; strengthening oversight of students during vacation periods through a system of both fixed and unscheduled contact with students; strengthening the management of the "cultural market," an activity that has been tied to censorship campaigns in the region; strengthening "inspection and control" over floating populations; and strengthening capacity for management.
• Stopping violations of the law and attacking crimes through measures including: carrying out public education and punishment of participants in "illegal religious activities"; penalizing and holding accountable heads of households, religious leaders, and other responsible people for the acts of students in "illegal" scripture classes; and holding open arrests and trials at the sites of illegal activity to send a message to the public about the consequences of such activity.

• The discovery of scripture instruction sites at mosques within the scope of a few religious leaders' jurisdiction.
• "Illegal religious activity" extending across multiple localities.
• The discovery of "illegal tabligh activities" and people suspected of membership in Hizb ut-Tahrir.
• Failure to curb or report the presence of illegal propaganda.
• Inadequate enthusiasm among some religious figures toward contributing to the development of the rural economy.

Source: -See Summary (2009-03-12 ) | Posted on: 2009-06-24
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=118959

• Four schools recruiting teachers within the Shihezi municipal education system have reserved all open positions exclusively for Han Chinese, and one school has reserved three of four open positions exclusively for Han Chinese, according to a job announcement issued January 24, 2009, by the Shihezi 8th Division Personnel Bureau, available as a download from the Shihezi Education Net and online from a page posted January 28 by the Shihezi Number 10 Middle School. In total, the positions form 17 of 69 open positions available in schools within the Shihezi education system. The remaining 52 slots are specified as unrestricted by ethnicity and thus are open to applicants of all ethnic groups including Han. On February 6, the Shihezi Personnel Bureau amended the announcement to remove two other hiring restrictions in the job recruitment, according to a February 10 Xinjiang Daily report, but left the restrictions on ethnicity in place.
• Jing (Jinghe) township, in Jing (Jinghe) county, Bayingol Mongol Autonomous Prefecture (XUAR), has advertised 11 open community public welfare positions, 6 of which are reserved for Han Chinese, 1 for an ethnic Uyghur, 2 for ethnic Kazakhs, and 2 for ethnic Mongols, according to a January 16 announcement posted January 21 on the Jing county government Web site. The announcement specifies that ethnic groups including Hui, Manchu, Xibo, and Zhuang may apply for the positions open to Han Chinese.
• The Turpan District Tobacco Monopoly Branch Office is recruiting for two positions, both reserved for Han Chinese, according to an announcement posted January 14 on the XUAR Personnel Department Web site.
• A mining company advertised only for Han Chinese to fill 18 open positions, according to a September 16, 2008, job announcement posted the following day on the Koktoqay (Fuyun) county government, Altay district, Web site.
• A new store advertised for 30 employees, specifying that 20 positions were for Han Chinese and 10 for ethnic minorities, according to a September 4 announcement posted on the Jing county government Web site.
• Job openings publicized as part of government-organized job recruiting activities in Jing county included 17 positions explicitly reserved for Han Chinese, according to a May 16 announcement on the Jing county government Web site. (See also a May 12 description of the job recruiting activities posted May 15 on the same Web site.) Descriptions of the remaining 100-plus positions either did not mention ethnicity or specified that there were no restrictions based on ethnicity. Employers listed appeared to include private employers alongside state-owned enterprises.
• The Aqsu District (XUAR) Human Resources Department visited the Xi'an Jiaotong University in Shaanxi province to recruit personnel for jobs in Aqsu hospitals and an agricultural technology center, reserving 18 of 43 positions for Han Chinese, according to an April 16 posting on the Xi'an Jiaotong University Web site. The Aqsu District Human Resources Department job announcement specified the remaining slots as unrestricted by ethnicity, thereby leaving them open to applicants of all ethnic groups including Han.

Source: -See Summary (2009-02-09 ) | Posted on: 2009-06-10
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=117001