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Chinese Government Delays Pre-Installation of Censorship Software on Computers Sold in China

China's Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) said on June 30, 2009, that it would delay a requirement that all computers "leaving the factory and sold" in China after July 1 must have government-approved censorship software "pre-installed." An MIIT spokesperson reportedly told journalists on June 30 that "recently, a number of companies have said that the workload is heavy, the time is sudden, and preparations are insufficient. In light of the practical situation, pre-installation can be delayed," according to a June 30 Xinhua article (in Chinese). The spokesperson did not indicate how long the delay would last. Xinhua also reported the announcement in a June 30 English-language article.

The spokesperson said MIIT issued the requirement to "protect minors to avoid receiving influence from obscene, pornographic, or other harmful information online," according to the Xinhua (Chinese) article. Tests have shown, however, that the software also filters political and religious content. The policy has been widely criticized both in and outside of China.

The spokesperson said that MIIT would continue pursuing the policy and would be seeking suggestions on how to pre-install the software, known as "Green Dam-Youth Escort," on computers, according to the Xinhua (Chinese) article. The spokesperson said that MIIT would continue to offer free downloads of the software online, and continue to install the software in computers located at elementary and middle schools, Internet cafes, and "other public places."

A June 30 New York Times article reported that some companies already had begun to comply with the directive. The article reported that Acer, a Taiwanese company, had said it would pre-install the software, and that vendors in Beijing said the software had been installed in some computers made by Lenovo, a Chinese company that is the top seller in China.

Commission Resources:

Commission Analysis: Chinese Government Requires Censorship Software To Accompany Computers Sold After July 1 (discusses the impact on freedom of expression, the public's response in China, confusion over the pre-installation requirement, and questions about transparency, short preparation time, government procurement, and intellectual property rights);
Commission Translation: Circular Regarding the Pre-Installation of Green Browsing Filter Software on Computers (English translation of official circular setting forth pre-installation requirement);
Section II-Freedom of Expression in the Commission's 2008 Annual Report.

Source: -See Summary (2009-06-30 / English / Free) \| Posted on: 2009-07-02
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=125073

Chinese Government Requires Censorship Software To Accompany Computers Sold After July 1

Chinese official censorship of the Internet is not limited to the removal of content such as pornography or content deemed to violate intellectual property rights, but also includes the removal of content the government and Communist Party deem to be politically sensitive. As such, Chinese censorship practices violate international standards for freedom of expression. Officials now have announced a plan to extend the reach of government control over Internet use by requiring all computers sold after July 1 to be packaged with a single brand of government-approved "pre-installed" filtering software. The stated aim is to protect youth from pornography, but tests show the software also filters political and religious content, and could be used to monitor computer users' Internet activity. The move has raised concerns that officials are further tightening control over the free flow of information. The short notice and lack of transparency with which the policy was introduced and its potential to restrain competition and free trade also has raised concerns over China's compliance with commercial rule of law norms.

On May 19, 2009, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) issued the Circular Regarding the Pre-Installation of Green Browsing Filter Software on Computers (Circular), which requires that computers sold within mainland China after July 1 must come "pre-installed" (yu zhuang) with the government-approved "Green Dam-Youth Escort" Internet browsing filtering software. The policy set forth in the Circular marks the first time the government has required computer manufacturers to include filtering software vetted by the government with all computers sold in China. The circular says MIIT, along with the Communist Party's General Office of the Central Guidance Committee on Ethical and Cultural Construction, and the Ministry of Finance (MOF), put the software through comprehensive tests and have spent public funds to purchase the rights to offer "Green Dam-Youth Escort" to the public for one year of use at no charge. The Circular states the purpose of the policy is to "establish a green, healthy, and harmonious" Internet and to "avoid harmful information on the Internet influencing and poisoning young people." Tests conducted by several outside sources, however, found the software also filters political and religious information, including references to Falun Gong.

The U.S. government has called on Chinese officials to revoke the mandatory pre-installation. The request came in a joint letter from U.S. Secretary of Commerce Gary Locke and U.S. Trade Representative Ron Kirk to their counterparts at MIIT and China's Ministry of Commerce, according to a June 24 press release posted on the Office of the United States Trade Representative's Web site. The letter "points out that the proposed new rule raises fundamental questions regarding regulatory transparency and notes concerns about compliance with World Trade Organization (WTO) rules, such as notification obligations," the release said. "China is putting companies in an untenable position by requiring them, with virtually no public notice, to pre-install software that appears to have broad-based censorship implications and network security issues," Locke said. "Protecting children from inappropriate content is a legitimate objective, but this is an inappropriate means and is likely to have a broader scope. Mandating technically flawed Green Dam software and denying manufacturers and consumers freedom to select filtering software is an unnecessary and unjustified means to achieve that objective, and poses a serious barrier to trade," Kirk said.

The Circular says the requirement applies to both Chinese and foreign companies selling computers in China. In the first three months of 2009, the Chinese company Lenovo topped the market, selling 26.7 percent of the units shipped during the period, according to a June 8 Wall Street Journal (WSJ) article, citing statistics provided by the IDC research firm. U.S.-based companies Hewlett-Packard and Dell sold 13.7 percent and 8.1 percent, respectively, of the units during the period. There were nearly 40 million computers sold in China in 2008, second only to the United States, the article said.

Impact on Freedom of Expression

The Chinese government already implements a system of censorship of the Internet that violates international human rights standards for freedom of expression. (See "Internet Censorship" in Section II - Freedom of Expression, in the Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2008 Annual Report.) Chinese laws require Internet service and content providers to remove politically sensitive content. The government blocks Web sites, including the Congressional-Executive Commission on China's Web site, and filters content containing politically sensitive information. Recently, for example, authorities reportedly blocked access to social networking and video-sharing Web sites such as Twitter and Flickr, just before the 20th anniversary of the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests on June 4. In an apparent move to protest Internet censorship at this time, numerous domestic Web sites shut down to undergo "maintenance." (For more information see, e.g., June 2 New York Times (NYT) article, June 4 Guardian article).

The new requirement, however, would extend the reach of government censorship and monitoring of citizens' Internet activities, according to foreign experts who have tested the software. A June report published by Open Net Initiative (ONI) found that the policy would "increase the reach of Internet censorship to the edges of the network, adding a new and powerful control mechanism to the existing filtering system." ONI is comprised of researchers from the University of Toronto, Harvard Law School, University of Cambridge, and Oxford University. In describing how the Green Dam software works, ONI said:

Not only does it block access to a wide range of Web sites based on keywords and image processing, including porn, gaming, gay content, religious sites, and political themes, it actively monitors individual computer behavior, such that a wide range of programs including word processing and email can be suddenly terminated if content algorithm detects inappropriate speech.

Researchers in the Computer Science and Engineering Division at the University of Michigan also found that the Green Dam software blocks both "obscenities and politically sensitive phrases (for example, references to Falun Gong)," according to a June 11 analysis.

The ONI report found that the software could be modified to monitor "personal communications and Internet browsing behavior" and that the scope of content that the software filters could be changed without any notification to the user. According to the June 8 WSJ article, the software, developed by the Jinhui Computer System Engineering Co. with assistance from Beijing Dazheng Human Language Technology Academy Co., operates by linking to an external database of sites that are to be blocked. Jinhui's founder, Bryan Zhang, told WSJ that the company would compile and maintain the list of blocked sites and would send updates of new blocked addresses to users' PCs. Zhang claimed that the list would be limited to pornographic sites, but that the software was capable of blocking other types of content, although Jinhui would have no reason to do so. Users will not, however, be able to see the list of "pornographic or violent" sites that the company has decided to block, according to a June 8 Reuters article.

The reports by ONI and the University of Michigan researchers also found that the software went much broader than what was necessary to protect children and that flaws in the software's design subjected the user to security risks, including infringement on personal privacy, hacking, and spam. The government has ordered Jinhui to fix recently discovered security vulnerabilities, according to a June 15 China Daily report.

The software's censorship of politically sensitive information and the broad scope of the pre-installation requirement violate international human rights standards for freedom of expression. Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) sets forth certain exceptions for when a government may impose a restriction on freedom of expression. These are limited to protecting the "rights or reputations of others," "national security, public order, or public health or morals." Article 19 also requires that the scope of the restriction be limited to that which is "necessary" to protect the interest. In this case, the government has provided a "public health or morals" justification for the restriction but, as tests have shown, the software also filters out political and religious content. Furthermore, the government has not shown why it is necessary to require that the software be "pre-installed" in all computers if the intent is to protect youth (see extended discussion and analysis of the "pre-installation" requirement below). Also as indicated below, citizens have suggested more limited ways that the government can achieve its aim.

Public Response in China

The MIIT's announcement sparked widespread criticism and discussion in China, including over the policy's impact on freedom of expression and its broad scope:

Wei Yongzheng, a professor at Hong Kong Shue Yan University, and Zhou Ze, an associate professor at China Youth University for Political Sciences, said in a letter to the State Council that although the MIIT's stated purpose is to protect youth, in practice the requirement could restrict Internet users from accessing other information, in violation of freedom of expression provisions in the ICCPR and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, according to a June 11 Caijing article (in Chinese). The two scholars noted that Chinese laws do not clearly delineate what constitutes "harmful information" to be censored on the Internet. "The filtering system only needs to be installed in computers that youth may use, and their guardians can take responsibility," they said.

A June 9 Caijing editorial (in Chinese) also raised questions about what constitutes "harmful information." "Is there a transparency mechanism for the determination of the 'blacklist' and a free-flowing channel for corrections and remedies? How do they make sure this does not become a 'back door' for abuse of authority?" the editorial said.

In a June 11 editorial titled, "Questionable Move," the state-run English-language China Daily questioned why the government was requiring every computer to install the software when taxpayers' money could have been used to sponsor a Web site offering the software on a voluntary basis. The editorial also raised concerns about who would decide what content to block and the criteria for blocking. "Are software developers qualified to do that? How is citizens' freedom of expression or right to know to be balanced against the need to filter 'unhealthy' content?" read the editorial.

Online surveys conducted by four popular Chinese Web portals showed that more than four in five respondents indicated they will not use the software or will uninstall it, according to a June 15 China Daily article.

On June 22, Reuters reported that Internet users in China were calling for a boycott of the Internet on July 1 to protest the government policy.

Confusion Over Pre-Installation Requirement

Although the Circular does not require the computer user to use the software, many users may end up utilizing the software by default. The government has not clarified whether computer manufacturers must pre-install the software on the computer or whether they may fulfill the "pre-installation" requirement by merely providing a CD version of the software with the computer. The extent to which users will have the choice to manually activate the software if pre-installed in the computer will also impact how widespread use of the software will be.

The Circular appears to indicate that providing a CD-version of the software alone would be sufficient, although Article 2 of the Circular also requires that the software "be included in the recovery partition" in the computer as a backup file. Another June 15 China Daily report quoted an unnamed MIIT official as saying, "The PC makers only need to save the setup files of the program on the hard drives of the computers, or provide CD-ROMs containing the program with their PC packages." NYT, however, reported on June 18 that it could not obtain official confirmation of the unnamed official's interpretation that providing a separate CD alone would be sufficient. According to the NYT article, "[t]he directive makes clear that the government intends to ensure universal use of Green Dam on new computers in China." Other provisions in the Circular suggest that the government expects computer manufacturers to include filtering software beyond the one year it is available to the public for free. Article 5 requires computer manufacturers to report the number of computers shipped with filtering software on a monthly basis in 2009 and on a yearly basis starting in 2010.

Questions Over Transparency, Short Preparation Time, Government Procurement, and Intellectual Property Rights

Although the Circular is dated May 19, the MIIT did not post the directive on its Web site until June 9, less than a month before computer manufacturers are expected to comply. When the WSJ first reported the story on June 8, it said that the circular had not yet been publicized by state media. A June 25 WSJ article said that officials in China gave notice of the requirement to manufacturers in May. Officials from foreign companies said they were given little time to properly test the software. "The lack of transparency, the shortness of time for implementation, and the incredible scope of the requirement that is not matched anywhere around the world present tremendous challenges to the industry," an unnamed official told WSJ in the June 8 article. On June 16, 19 trade associations representing companies from the United States, Europe, Japan, and Canada sent a letter to the MIIT calling on China to reconsider the July 1 pre-installation requirement and to instead engage "in meaningful dialogue on the topic of parental controls," according to the June 17 issue (subscription required) of Inside US-China Trade.

In response to the Circular, Chinese citizens have filed requests with government agencies for more information, according to a June 15 Caijing article (in Chinese, shorter June 17 English version). On June 11 and June 12, Beijing lawyers Li Fangping and Liu Xiaoyuan filed separate open government information requests with the MIIT and MOF seeking information about the software and its procurement. Li told the Globe and Mail in a June 20 article that he was seeking the information because citizens "have no idea how this software would affect users' internet safety, the safety of their information, and right to privacy."

Chinese citizens also have questioned the legality of the government's endorsement of one product as part of a consumer's computer purchase. In their letter to the State Council, professors Wei and Zhou said the move violates Article 7 of the Anti-Unfair Competition Law, which says that governments "may not abuse their administrative powers to restrict others to buying the goods of operators designated by them." They also said the government had restricted competition in violation of the Anti-Monopoly Law (Arts. 8, 32, and 37), and had violated product quality and consumer protection laws, according to a June 12 CBN (Diyi Caijing) article. A June 10 editorial in the Beijing News questioned the fairness of the bidding process under the Government Procurement Law. The editorial noted that the bid went to two relatively unknown companies, despite the presence of a large number of Chinese and foreign companies with experience as well as reports that some well-known Internet security companies had not participated in the bidding. The June 8 WSJ article, citing material from Jinhui and Dazheng's Web sites, notes that the companies have ties to China's Ministry of Public Security and the People's Liberation Army.

An American company has alleged that the software violates intellectual property rights. The software company Solid Oak alleges that "Green Dam-Youth Escort" contains codes copied from the company's own parental control software and has sent "cease and desist" letters to U.S. companies to prevent them from shipping PCs with the software to China, according to a June 19 Financial Times article. Jinhui's founder denied the allegation.

Background

The Circular refers to an earlier government campaign begun in January 2009 to remove "vulgar content" on the Internet. The campaign's primary target appeared to be pornography, but employees at Web sites attempting to carry out the government's directive at the time noted increased pressure to control political content as well. In mid-January, the Beijing Municipal Government's Information Office reportedly ordered the closure of the blog hosting Web site Bullog (www.bullog.cn) after the site failed to remove large amounts of "harmful information" relating to current events and politics. The CECC noted increased blocking of foreign- and Hong Kong-based Web sites taking place in December 2008. The sites included the Chinese-language sites for the BBC, Voice of America, and Deutsche Welle, YouTube's Hong Kong and Taiwan sites, and the Web sites for the Hong Kong-based news organizations Ming Pao, Asiaweek, and Apple Daily. Google's YouTube video sharing Web site has been blocked in China since March, according to a June 20 WSJ article.

Source: -See Summary (2009-06-22 ) \| Posted on: 2009-07-02
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=124386

Beijing Police Formally Arrest Liu Xiaobo on Inciting Subversion Charge

Chinese public security officials formally arrested prominent intellectual Liu Xiaobo on June 23, 2009, on the charge of "inciting subversion of state power," according to the Xinhua News Agency (as reported by Singapore Lianhe Zaobao on June 24). The Commission has not been able to locate the original Chinese-language Xinhua article through a publicly available source online, although numerous media and NGO reports in Chinese have quoted directly from it. (See, e.g., June 24 BBC report, June 24 Chinese Human Rights Defenders report). The Commission was able to locate an English-language Xinhua report (via China Daily), dated June 24, which quoted a statement from the Beijing Public Security Bureau as saying: "Liu has been engaged in agitation activities, such as spreading of rumors and defaming of the government, aimed at subversion of the state and overthrowing the socialism system in recent years."

Chinese Human Rights Defenders (CHRD), an NGO that monitors human rights developments in China, also said that Beijing police have barred prominent defense lawyer Mo Shaoping from representing Liu, according to a June 24 report. CHRD reported that authorities said it was because Mo was a fellow signatory of Charter 08, a document calling for political reform and greater protection of human rights in China.

The underlying basis for the charge against Liu is unclear, but officials took Liu into custody on December 8, 2008, a day before Charter 08's release. More than 300 Chinese citizens released the charter on the eve of the 60th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Since then, more than 8,000 persons have signed the document, a substantial majority of whom reside in China.

In the months after taking Liu into custody, officials kept Liu in residential surveillance under conditions that violated Chinese laws, including denying Liu access to counsel and keeping him at an undisclosed location beyond the legal time limit for residential surveillance.

The charge of "inciting subversion" refers to a crime under Article 105 of China's Criminal Law. Article 105, Paragraph 2 makes inciting others "by spreading rumors or slanders or any other means to subvert the State power or overthrow the socialist system," a crime punishable by up to five years in prison, or no less than five years for "ringleaders and the others who commit major crimes." Chinese officials have frequently relied on the "inciting subversion" crime to punish citizens who publicly criticize the government, often in essays appearing on the Internet. (See, e.g., Yang Chunlin, Hu Jia, Lu Gengsong).

The 53-year old former university professor has been an outspoken critic of the Chinese government. According to a June 24 Associated Press report (via Google), "in [Liu's] writings, most published only on the Internet, Liu has called for civil rights and political reform, making him subject to routine harassment by authorities." In 2008, Liu was detained on the anniversary of the 1989 Tiananmen protests and prevented from meeting Members of the U.S. Congress. In 1996, he was sentenced to 3 years' reeducation through labor for his writings on political reform, and in 1989 he was detained for 20 months after the 1989 Tiananmen Democracy protests. For more information, see Liu Xiaobo's record in the Commission's Political Prisoner Database.

For more information, see CECC analysis of officials' extension of Liu's residential surveillance beyond the legal time limit, CECC analysis of official harassment of Charter 08 signers, censorship of Charter 08 on the Chinese Internet, and the legality of Liu's residential surveillance, and CECC analysis of the Charter 08 document and initial reports of Liu's detention.

Source: -See Summary (2009-06-24 ) \| Posted on: 2009-07-02
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Circular Regarding the Pre-Installation of Green Browsing Filter Software on Computers (CECC Full Translation)

On May 19, 2009, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) issued the Circular Regarding the Pre-Installation of Green Browsing Filter Software on Computers, which requires that computers sold within China after July 1 must come "pre-installed" (yu zhuang) with the government-approved "Green Dam-Youth Escort" Internet browsing filtering software. Testing by outside sources has found that the software filters pornography, but it also filters specific political and religious content. Chinese citizens and media have criticized the requirement as exceeding the scope necessary to achieve the Circular's stated purpose (the protection of minors). They have raised concerns about privacy and who would determine what content is to be filtered by the software, and argued that the choice to install should be an individual one. In addition, questions have been raised both in China and outside of China as to whether the Circular is consistent with China's commercial rule of law reforms, and whether it complies with international norms related to freedom of expression and international trade. The following is a translation of the Circular prepared by the Congressional-Executive Commission on China. The Chinese text was retrieved from the MIIT Web site on June 9, 2009.

Circular Regarding the Pre-Installation of Green Browsing Filter Software on Computers

To Relevant Work Units:

In order to establish a green,¹ healthy, and harmonious online environment, and to avoid harmful information on the Internet influencing and poisoning young people, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, the General Office of the Central Guidance Committee on Ethical and Cultural Construction,² and the Ministry of Finance, in accordance with the relevant requirements of the Government Procurement Law, have utilized central authority financial funds to purchase one-year usage rights and services for the "Green Dam-Youth Escort" green online filtering software (hereinafter referred to as "'Green Dam-Youth Escort' software"), which is to be supplied to the society as a whole for use free of charge. Through comprehensive testing and application in pilot settings, this software product has been shown to filter harmful words and images on the Internet effectively, and already has satisfied requirements for pre-installation by computer manufacturers.

To consolidate further the gains of the Special Operation to Rectify the Trend of Vulgarity on the Internet,³ continue to combine punishment and prevention, protect the healthy growth of minors, and promote the healthy and orderly development of the Internet, in accordance with the overall scheme of the Nationwide Special Operation to Rectify the Trend of Vulgarity on the Internet, provided herewith is notification of the specific requirements for the pre-installation of green online filtering software in computers, as follows:

Computers manufactured and sold domestically should have the newest version of the "Green Dam-Youth Escort" software pre-installed when leaving the factory. Imported computers should have the newest version of the "Green Dam-Youth Escort" software pre-installed before being sold domestically.

The "Green Dam-Youth Escort" software should be pre-installed on the computer's hard drive or on a CD that accompanies the computer. It also should be included in the recovery partition and on the system restore CD as a backup file.

Suppliers of the "Green Dam-Youth Escort" software should take steps proactively to support the computer manufacturing industry in launching the pre-installation.

The computer manufacturing and sales industries should complete pre-installation tests of the "Green Dam-Youth Escort" software and other related work by the end of June 2009. Computers leaving the factory and sold after July 1, 2009, should have the "Green Dam-Youth Escort" software pre-installed.

In 2009, computer manufacturers and suppliers of the "Green Dam-Youth Escort" software every month should file a report with the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology's Software Service Industry Department showing the numbers of computers sold and filtering software pre-installed in the previous month, along with any suggestions. Beginning in 2010, the previous year's numbers should be reported before the end of February each year.

For those that fail to pre-install by the deadline, fail to report on schedule, send false reports, or refuse to report, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology will order the filing of a supplementary report or corrections within a specific time period.

May 19, 2009

¹ CECC Note: According to a June 8, 2009, Wall Street Journal article, the Chinese word for "green" in this context refers to an Internet free of "pornography and other illicit content."

² CECC Note: This is an entity of the Communist Party in China.

³ CECC Note: According to a January 5, 2009, China Internet Information Center (China.com) article, the State Council Information Office, Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, Ministry of Public Security, Ministry of Culture, State Administration for Industry and Commerce, State Administration of Radio, Film, and Television, and General Administration on Press and Publication, launched the Special Operation to Rectify the Trend of Vulgarity on the Internet on January 5, 2009.

工信部软[2009]226号

有关单位：

为构建绿色、健康、和谐的网络环境，避免互联网不良信息对青少年的影响和毒害，工业和信息化部、中央文明办、财政部按《政府采购法》有关要求，使用中央财政资金买断“绿坝-花季护航”绿色上网过滤软件（以下简称“‘绿坝-花季护航’软件”）产品一年使用权及相关服务，供全社会免费使用。经综合测试和试点应用，该软件产品可有效过滤互联网不良文字和图像内容，已具备计算机厂商预装条件。

为进一步巩固整治互联网低俗之风专项行动成果，坚持惩防结合，切实保护未成年人健康成长，推动互联网健康有序发展，根据全国整治互联网低俗之风专项行动的总体部署，现将计算机预装绿色上网过滤软件的具体要求通知如下。

　　一、在我国境内生产销售的计算机出厂时应预装“绿坝-花季护航”软件最新适用版本；进口计算机在国内销售前应预装“绿坝-花季护航”软件最新适用版本。

二、“绿坝-花季护航”软件应预装在计算机硬盘或随机光盘内，且在恢复分区和恢复光盘中作为备份文件。

　　三、“绿坝-花季护航”软件提供者应采取积极措施，支持计算机生产企业开展预装相关工作。

四、计算机生产及销售企业应于2009年6月底完成“绿坝-花季护航”软件预装测试等相关工作，2009年7月1日后出厂和销售的计算机应预装“绿坝-花季护航”软件。

五、计算机生产者和“绿坝-花季护航”软件提供者在2009年内应按月向工业和信息化部软件服务业司报送上月计算机销售数量、过滤软件预装数量及工作建议，自2010年起于每年2月底之前上报上一年度数据。

对于逾期未预装、不按时上报、虚假上报和拒不上报的，工业和信息化部将责令其限期补报或改正。

二〇〇九年五月十九日

Source: Ministry of Information Industry (2009-05-19 / Chinese / Free) \| Posted on: 2009-07-02		more ...
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Shenzhen Rights Defense Lawyer Liu Yao Released From Detention: In Final Appeal, Liu Sentenced to an 18-month Prison Term, Suspended for 2 Years

Attention to the challenges faced by China's rights defense (weiquan) community has spiked with the recent news that authorities have not renewed the lawyers' licenses of some of China's most prominent human rights lawyers. The case of Shenzhen lawyer Liu Yao, discussed below, is an example that shows that the difficulties Chinese lawyers face for taking on sensitive cases are not new. Rather, they constitute a long-standing and persistent problem for China's continued development of the rule of law.

On April 16, 2009, the Heyuan Intermediate People's Court in Guangdong province sentenced Shenzhen rights defense lawyer Liu Yao to 18 months in prison, suspended for 2 years, in the second appeal and final hearing in his case, in connection with his representation of villagers from his hometown in Dongyuan county, Heyuan municipality, whose land was reportedly illegally seized for the purpose of building a new hydroelectric station, according to a Radio Free Asia (RFA) article and a Human Rights in China (HRIC) report, both dated April 17. Liu's case highlights several pressing issues in China, including the expropriation of rural land, difficulties citizens face in obtaining redress for their grievances, fair trial challenges, and the risks human rights lawyers face in taking on sensitive cases (see the May 26 Human Rights Watch report on the possibility that officials will not renew the law licenses of a group of rights defense lawyers in apparent retaliation for their work on sensitive cases).

Authorities released Liu Yao from the Dongyuan County Detention Center on April 16 after having detained him for more than 15 months as his case moved back and forth between the Dongyuan People's Court and the Heyuan Intermediate People's Court. During his challenge to the original verdict and sentence -- a challenge that involved two appeals and a retrial -- Liu's original sentence of four years for "intentional destruction of property" (Article 275 of the Criminal Law ) was gradually reduced, but the verdict of guilt was upheld. Liu maintains he is innocent and told Radio Free Asia that he planned to submit a petition to the Guangdong High People's Court. One of Liu's attorneys, the prominent Beijing rights defense lawyer Li Fangping, told Caijing that based on the Lawyers' Law, the conviction means that Liu will be permanently prohibited from practicing law, as reported in an April 17 article. Liu Yao's case received substantial attention among rights defense lawyers throughout China, and was particularly noteworthy for the advocacy that the Shenzhen lawyers' community provided on Liu's behalf. In early February 2009, 511 Shenzhen lawyers signed a petition (available on Human Rights in China's Web site) calling for the Heyuan Intermediate People's Court to hold an open and fair hearing to adjudicate Liu's second appeal, in what HRIC called "the largest joint signature campaign to date by China's legal community."

Factual Background
In 2006, villagers in Paitou sought the assistance of Liu (who was born in Paitou) to represent them in a land dispute involving the Heyuan Fuyuan Hydropower Corporation (Fuyuan) and the Dongyuan county government, according to an August 14, 2008, Caijing article and a February 1, 2009, Voice of America (VOA) report. Liu discovered that Fuyuan had failed to obtain the approvals necessary to appropriate the land and convert it to a nonagricultural use. Moreover, in November 2007, Dongyuan county's State Land and Resource Bureau ordered Fuyuan to halt construction, but Fuyuan failed to comply with the stop-work order. According to Caijing, in December 2007, Liu Yao and a group of villagers made two trips to the construction site to demand that Fuyuan cease construction, resulting in clashes and alleged property damage. Authorities took Liu into custody on December 18, 2007, and detained him at the Dongyuan County Detention Center until April 16, 2009.

First Trial (June 2008)
During his first trial in Dongyuan People's Court in June 2008, Liu argued that their efforts to stop the illegal construction was lawful "self-help" to protect the villagers' rights and thus did not constitute a crime, according to the February 1 VOA article. Liu's defense counsel also argued that the photographs of the construction site offered as evidence by the prosecution were neither dated nor verified and did not reflect the scene at the time of the alleged incidents, according to a July 29, 2008, article in Southern Metropolitan Daily. The article also states that Liu's counsel challenged the property damage appraisal document submitted by the prosecution. The trial court found that the total amount of damages suffered by Fuyuan exceeded 50,000 yuan (approximately US$7,300), according to Southern Metropolitan Daily. The article reports that Liu's trial lawyers stated that the appraisal document was key to the case, because, among other reasons, the amount of the alleged damages qualified as "very large" -- a determination relevant to the criminal charge and sentence. The Dongyuan court concluded that Liu had organized and incited the effort and sentenced him to 4 years in prison; his co-defendants, two villagers, received sentences of 9 and 10 months.

First Appeal (September 2008)
The Shenzhen Lawyers Association and lawyers elsewhere in China protested the original judgment and Liu's four-year sentence and successfully argued to the Heyuan Intermediate People's Court that it should hold a public hearing on Liu's appeal, according to an August 2008 letter (available on the Beijing Yirenping Center Web site) submitted to the Heyuan court by a group of more than 30 Chinese lawyers from several different provinces, and the February 1 VOA report. The Heyuan court concluded that a retrial was necessary due to "unclear facts and insufficient evidence," and on September 22 remanded the case to the trial court (Dongyuan People's Court), according to the Shenzhen lawyers' February 2009 petition.

Retrial (October 2008)
On October 17, 2008, the Dongyuan People's Court retried the case in open court. On December 17, the court issued its judgment upholding Liu's conviction for "intentional destruction of property" but reduced his sentence to two years. The judgment does not explain the reduction in sentence, but lowered the total amount of damages to 46,170 yuan (approximately US$6,750) and noted that the court's adjudication committee (a court's highest authority in deciding cases, comprised of the court president and other court officials) had discussed the case and decided the outcome. The Shenzhen lawyers stated in their February 2009 petition that no new evidence was presented on retrial and that the judgment lacked an adequate explanation of the "major flaws" in the evidence. Li Fangping said that the retrial was obviously unjust and the process used to assess the value of the alleged damage deeply flawed, according to the February 1 VOA article. A Guangzhou rights defense lawyer, Tang Jingling, who followed Liu's case from the beginning, stated that Liu's prosecution was a clear case of "political persecution," according to a January 23 Radio Free Asia article. Tang told RFA that the authorities were "using the law as a vehicle to block the lawyer from providing legal assistance to defend the land rights of the villagers."

Second Appeal and Final Judgment (April 2009)
In their petition, the Shenzhen lawyers called on the Heyuan Intermediate People's Court to hold an open court session to hear Liu's second appeal. On April 10, the Heyuan court did, in fact, hold an open hearing, which lasted a full day -- longer than any of the other proceedings in Liu's case. According to an April 11 Southern Metropolitan Daily article, more than 100 people attended the April 10 hearing, including Heyuan delegates of the National People's Congress and the provincial and municipal people's congresses, as well as representatives from the All-China Lawyers Association, the Guangdong Lawyers Association, the Shenzhen Lawyers Association, and the Heyuan Municipal Lawyers Association. Representatives from the Guangdong High People's Court, the provincial procuratorate, and the provincial justice bureau were also present. Three witnesses who had not testified in any of the previous hearings appeared and provided testimony. Liu Yao's attorneys again questioned the evidence offered by the prosecution and the procedure used for determining the value of the damages, according to Southern Metropolitan Daily. The Heyuan court issued the final judgment in Liu's case on April 16, further reducing the value of the damaged property to 23,798 yuan (approximately US$3,480), according to an April 17 Xinhua report. As noted above, Liu received a suspended sentence and was released from detention.

Following the April 16 verdict, Li Fangping told Caijing that the underlying cause of Liu Yao's case -- the unlawful seizure of the villagers' land -- still had not been resolved. Li Fangping also told Human Rights in China, "from the reduction of the sentence from 4 years to 2 years and then to 18 months with a 2-year suspension -- you can tell that the prosecution's case was problematic. I hope that the international community will continue to pay attention to this kind of case and the situation of rights defense lawyers in China," according to a statement issued by HRIC on April 17.

For additional information on Liu Yao's case, please see his record of detention, searchable through the Congressional-Executive Commission on China's (CECC) Political Prisoner Database. For more information on obstacles facing human rights lawyers in China, see Section III -- Access to Justice in the CECC 2008 Annual Report.

Source: -See Summary (2009-02-25 ) \| Posted on: 2009-07-02
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=118053

Demolition of Kashgar's Old City Draws Concerns Over Cultural Heritage Protection, Population Resettlement

Authorities in a city in western China have launched a demolition project that has undermined the preservation of a cornerstone of the Uyghur ethnic group's cultural heritage and will result in the resettlement of roughly half the city's population. Official Chinese media have described the project to "reconstruct" the historic Old City section of Kashgar, in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), as a way to address infrastructure shortcomings and to guard against risk of earthquake damage. Chinese sources indicate that most of the existing buildings in the Old City will be demolished rather than restored. Overseas media have reported that authorities have undertaken the project despite opposition from local residents and have compelled residents to leave their homes, with reported cases of inadequate compensation. While reflecting ongoing problems across China with property seizure, resettlement, and heritage protection, the Kashgar demolition project also reflects features unique to the region. The XUAR is a government-designated ethnic minority autonomous region with legal protections for ethnic minority rights, including protections for culture and cultural heritage, but in practice, central and local government authorities exert tight controls in the region that undermine the protection of residents' rights and also impede available avenues for challenging government actions. Implementation of the project, which had been in the planning stages for several years, also coincides with a period of heightened repression in the region since early 2008. See Section IV--Xinjiang in the Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC) 2008 Annual Report for general information on conditions in the region and see below for more information and analysis of the Kashgar project.

Chinese Government and Chinese Media Accounts of the Project--50,000 Households To Be Resettled
Under a 30 billion yuan (US$4.39 billion) project launched in late February with funds from the central and XUAR governments, authorities will "reconstruct" the Old City of Kashgar within a five-year period and resettle roughly 50,000 households, or more than 200,000 people, according to reports from Chinese government and media sources. Based on the reports, the number of people affected approaches half of the Kashgar city population. (For information on the planning stages of the project, see an August 13, 2008, report from the Kashgar district government Web site describing a meeting of government and Communist Party officials to address construction plans. For reports from the initial stages of construction and resettlement in February, see February 27 reports from Xinjiang Daily and Xinjiang News Net (1, 2), and a February 28 report from China News Net. For subsequent reporting, see a March 27 article from the Kashgar district government Web site, detailed report from Yaxin dated March 23, May 27 report from Xinhua Xinjiang, and June 8 Yaxin report. Figures on the exact number of people and households affected, as reported in these articles, varies.) According to the August report from the Kashgar district government, the project to "reconstruct" the Old City has received longstanding central government attention, and the impetus to implement it came after the May 2008 earthquake in Sichuan province. The Yaxin article reported that nearly 60% of the Old City houses, made of clay and wood, date from the 1950s and 1960s, and that poor construction has impeded infrastructure improvements and made the area vulnerable to earthquake damage. The information in the Yaxin report conflicts with earlier government reporting on the age of the buildings in the Old City. A 2007 report on the Kashgar district government Web site describes many of the buildings as older than 400 years old and describes most individual residences as more than 50 to 80 years old, with some as old as 150 years old.

Demolition and Resettlement Plans Linked to Ethnic Issues
In addition to stated concerns about earthquakes, the first February 27 Xinjiang News Net report said the dangers posed by the buildings also affected factors including "economic development, ethnic unity, and the reinforcement of Xinjiang's borders." In the August article, a government official also raised political concerns, describing Kashgar as an area where Uyghurs are most heavily concentrated and an area in the "front ranks" in the XUAR's fight against separatism, terrorism, and infiltration.

According to the February articles and March Yaxin article, the first group of residents affected by the initial stages of the project have been resettled in earthquake-proof high-rises in a suburb of the city. The Yaxin article reported that all the Old City families resettled as a result of the project will receive monetary compensation or replacement housing. Authorities will also take measures to establish businesses to help sustain the livelihoods of relocated populations, according to the report. The August 2008 article reported that some 23,000 subsistence-level and lower-income households affected by the project would "mainly be provided with low-cost rental housing or affordable housing to facilitate relocation," while residents "with resources but unwilling to leave" would receive subsidies for building new earthquake-proof housing on site or elsewhere. According to the August report, as of that date, the XUAR government already had re-designated townships in the Kashgar suburbs as towns and begun converting farmland in preparation for resettling affected populations. The report described efforts to distribute propaganda materials and launch "ideological mobilization" to garner support for the project. See also the March 23 Yaxin report for additional information on mobilizing support for the project by broadcasting images of the Sichuan earthquake. Overseas media reports, citing local residents, have challenged the adequacy of compensation and scope of local support for the project. See below for details.

Earlier plans to address infrastructure in the Old City date to a 2001 "Implementing Project for Safeguarding the Famous Historical and Cultural City of Kashgar and Taking Precautions to Quake-Proof the Old City" according to the Yaxin report. (See the 2007 Kashgar government report for additional information on earlier efforts to address the issue starting in 1999.) The 2001 project planned to invest 600 million yuan (US$87.8 million) into reinforcing and safeguarding key residences and relics, but came to a halt due to various factors including funding, according to the Yaxin report. Under existing efforts launched since 2001 to earthquake-proof the area, 2,500 households already have moved to earthquake-resistant housing, according to the second Xinjiang News Net report and a February 2 report from the Kashgar district government Web site. Authorities also have carried out other efforts to demolish and reconstruct parts of Kashgar. See, e.g., a July 16, 2005, Telegraph article on demolitions near the Id Kah mosque.

Preservation Efforts Minimal--Most Buildings To Be Demolished
Details of the Kashgar demolition project indicate shortcomings in both the project's capacity to protect the cultural heritage of the Old City as well as in the Chinese government's overall framework for cultural heritage protection, including as it relates to ethnic minorities' right to preserve their culture. At the August 2008 meeting to discuss the "reconstruction" of the Old City, as reported in the August 2008 article, officials indicated that efforts to preserve existing structures would be minimal. While authorities from various government agencies took part in the meeting, no officials from cultural heritage offices were reported to attend. Speaking at the event, the Kashgar district Communist Party secretary described the "reconstruction" of the Old City as a "human-centered" project and stressed that "what [the project] will protect is a construction style with ethnic features, and what it won't protect is dangerous old raw earth houses that endanger the people's safety." Noting that the Old City contained the world's largest complex of raw earth structures, a government official spoke of the importance of preserving the "historical style and regional features" of the Old City, but cautioned against wide-scale preservation:

The reconstruction of the Old City must take place under the premise of protecting historical and regional features, but some experts and scholars propose retaining the original appearance of Kashgar's Old City, and we think that [view] is out of touch with reality. Preservation of the people's lives, property, and safety must be placed first. Otherwise, if a fairly large earthquake strikes, not only will the people's lives and property receive damage, but the historic area will similarly be destroyed in a flash. Moreover, according to general surveys, buildings in the Old City with real historic preservation value are very few. We'll resolutely protect the buildings with historic preservation value, but we can't take every old and shabby building and keep them all. The facts will inevitably show that the Old City after its reconstruction not only will not have destroyed the Uyghurs' history and culture but will have inherited and developed the Uyghurs' history and culture. Using the excuse of protecting the history and culture of a famous old city to impede the Old City's restructuring shows extreme irresponsibility toward the safety of the lives of the 220,000 Old City residents of all ethnicities.

The official added that recently constructed buildings would be renovated to make them earthquake-proof, while the "few" buildings with preservation value would be repaired and reinforced. The official did not provide details on the process of determining which buildings have preservation value. According to a May 27 New York Times article, officials report that at least 85 percent of the area will be demolished. Authorities cited in the article said they would rebuild some parts of the Old City using a "Uyghur style" of architecture, in line with the Kashgar district Communist Party secretary's statement on using "a construction style with ethnic features." The statements did not provide additional information on how such "ethnic features" or "Uyghur styles" are defined. (For an example of interpretations of "Islamic-style" architecture and "ethnic character" within a reconstruction project in a Hui Muslim neighborhood in Beijing, see pp. 146-148 within Daniel B. Abramson, "The Aesthetics of City-scale Preservation Policy in Beijing," Planning Perspectives, Vol. 22, No. 2 (April 2007): 129-166.) According to a book cited in the New York Times article, describing Kashgar before the Old City demolition, "Kashgar is the best-preserved example of a traditional Islamic city to be found anywhere in Central Asia" (George Michell, Kashgar: Oasis City on China's Old Silk Road, Frances Lincoln, 2008, p. 79). The 2007 report from the Kashgar government Web site also stressed the historic character of the Old City and expressed support for preservation principles.

The government official did not address how the determination that few buildings hold preservation value relates to Kashgar's designation as a national-level historic and cultural city with historic districts within the Old City. Kashgar received the designation in 1986, as recorded in a government notice from that year. (See also the 2007 Kashgar government report for information on historic districts within the city.) The 1986 designation adheres to a 1982 notice on preserving cities with historic value or significance to China's modern revolutionary history. Since then, the Chinese government has codified its process for designating and protecting historic cities into a Regulation on the Protection of Famous Historic and Cultural Cities, Towns, and Villages (Historic Cities Regulation). Both the Historic Cities Regulation and article 14 of the broader Law on the Protection of Cultural Heritage call for preservation efforts for designated historic areas, and article 28 of the Historic Cities Regulation specifically forbids new construction or expansion in the centers of historic districts, with the exception of infrastructure installation. The article also details the procedures for gaining permission to carry out construction. Despite stipulating protections for historic areas, some provisions within the regulation are poorly defined, thus appearing to permit wide latitude in determining what kind of structures qualify for legal protections. For example, article 47(1) of the Historic Cities Regulation defines historic architecture (which is protected under the regulation) to mean certain structures designated by the government that "have definite preservation value and can reflect historical styles and regional features." The regulation does not detail how or by whom "preservation value" and ethnic and local "features" are defined, calling into question the capacity of Chinese law for effective cultural heritage preservation, including as it accords with ethnic minorities' right to define and protect their culture, and the state's obligation to secure this right.

In the case of the Kashgar project, ambiguities in the framework for heritage protection contribute to the formal leeway for authorities to take a narrow view of which structures have historic value and qualify for protection, thus removing most of the buildings in the Old City from the formal protections of the Historic Cities Regulation. Authorities also have excluded possible international mechanisms to preserve the Old City that would have come with its inclusion on a list of proposed Silk Road locations for entry in the UNESCO World Heritage List. (The Silk Road list's proposed sites include cities, but exclude locations within Kashgar except for the tomb of Mehmud Qeshqeri.) See the New York Times article for additional information. The Chinese government has formally committed itself to preserve its cultural heritage not only through its domestic legislation but also through its ratification of the UNESCO World Heritage Convention.

Details of the project also suggest that authorities have bypassed ways to protect Old City residents' safety while preserving existing buildings. Standards set by professionals in the field of cultural heritage preservation indicate compatibility between historic preservation and measures to guard against natural disaster. Articles 10 and 14 of the Charter for the Conservation of Historic Towns and Urban Areas, adopted by the non-governmental International Council on Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS) and available on its Web site, recognize the importance of introducing "contemporary elements" and preventative measures against natural disasters while ensuring they are "adapted to the specific character of the properties concerned." Scholar Ronald Knapp, cited in a May 3 National report, said that in the case of the 2008 earthquake in Sichuan province, problems came about “more from very poor ‘modern’ construction rather than the shortcomings of traditional practices.”

XUAR Residents, NGO, Overseas Observers Object to Project
Reports from overseas media have indicated opposition to the project from local residents and some local officials, as well as concerns from local residents and outside observers about housing resettlement and historic preservation. A report from a Beijing-based NGO also has expressed concern about historic preservation and raised questions about procedural aspects of the project. (See the May 27 New York Times article, May 3 National report, March 25 and April 2 reports from Radio Free Asia (RFA), a March 24 Washington Post article, March 24 Uyghur American Association (UAA) press release, March 26 South China Morning Post article (subscription required), April 3 article from openDemocracy, and undated report from the Beijing Cultural Heritage Protection Center.) An official from the Kashgar cultural relics management office, cited in the April 2 RFA report, said that the project was being implemented without adequate attention to historic preservation, and another official expressed concern about resettled residents' ability to sustain their livelihoods, many of which were tied to workshops within the Old City. The UAA press release raised concerns that the population resettlement would increase government capacity to "control and monitor Uyghur activity" and pressure Uyghurs to assimilate. The openDemocracy article questioned the nature of future reconstruction in the city given a track record of co-opting cultural practices and redeveloping ethnic minority areas elsewhere in China to boost tourism. Kashgar was designated one of "China's superior tourist cities" in 2004, according to a report that year from Tianshan Net. Authorities plan to rebuild part of the Old City as an "international heritage scenery" site to attract tourism, according to the National article.

Information from overseas reports also raise questions about the process of consulting with residents on the project and on adequate compensation. Two men cited in the National report said they had received no information about compensation and did not know where they would be relocated to, while other sources said that the government had not consulted with them about the demolition. Some Kashgar residents cited in the New York Times article said that compensation amounts were inadequate. Sources cited in both the Washington Post article and March 25 RFA report indicated dissatisfaction with the project but said they lacked the means to challenge the government. A source cited in the RFA article noted that people felt scared to voice their opinions. China's Historic Cities Regulation specifies that authorities must solicit opinions from the public for restructuring projects (article 29). International standards also carve out a role for public input in preservation projects. Article 17(c) of UNESCO's Recommendation Concerning the Safeguarding and Contemporary Role of Historic Areas calls for authorities to include the opinions and participation of the public. Article 3 of the ICOMOS Charter for the Conservation of Historic Towns and Urban Areas states, "The participation and the involvement of the residents are essential for the success of the conservation programme and should be encouraged. The conservation of historic towns and urban areas concerns their residents first of all." Article 5 states, "The conservation plan should be supported by the residents of the historic area."

The report from the Beijing Cultural Heritage Protection Center, a Beijing-based Chinese NGO, emphasized the preservation value of the Old City and expressed concern about procedural aspects of the project. The report noted the lack of detailed information on preservation efforts, including the full text of the city's preservation plan. Chapter 3 of the Historic Cities Regulation stipulates that the governments of areas designated as historic cities must prepare and implement a preservation plan. The regulation also details other procedural steps necessary to alter designated historic areas. See, for example, articles 28 - 32 on provisions regarding infrastructure construction in designated historic areas. A December 12, 2008, article from the Kashgar government reports that officials submitted plans for the current reconstruction project to examination by scholars, which adheres to article 29 of the regulation.

Shortcomings in Property Protection
The complaints by residents affected by the project reflect continuing problems with property seizure and resettlement in China. China's 2007 Property Law, which protects private property rights, addresses expropriation of and compensation for property (article 42). As noted in a recent examination of the law by legal scholar Mo Zhang, however, "the Property Law sets no standard or requirement to guarantee a fair and just process for the taking." (Mo Zhang, "From Public to Private: The Newly Enacted Chinese Property Law and the Protection of Property Rights in China," Berkeley Business Law Journal, Vol. 5, 2008, Temple University Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2008-39, p. 360, available through the Social Science Research Network Web site.) The Property Law also lacks a clear standard for "what constitutes the public interest to justify a taking" (p. 361). Among existing regulations that address takings, Zhang notes that the Urban Housing Demolition and Relocation Management Regulation "has a focus on the advancement of urban development, and as such it does not make the fair process for takings a priority. On the contrary, it has a bias against owners of households." (p. 360.)

Curbs Over Uyghurs' Rights
While underscoring shortcomings in cultural heritage preservation and continuing problems with property seizure and resettlement in China, the Kashgar demolition project also draws attention to broader problems in China's policies in ethnic minority areas and in the XUAR in particular. Although the XUAR is an officially designated ethnic minority autonomous region with legally stipulated guarantees for "ethnic minorities’ right to administer their internal affairs" (Preamble, Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law) and measures to protect ethnic minority culture and cultural heritage, the Kashgar project highlights the failure of the government to protect such rights in practice. (For specific Chinese legal provisions on ethnic minorities that focus on cultural heritage protection, see, e.g., article 38 of the Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law and article 25 of Provisions on Implementing the Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law.) The project, noted by a source in the New York Times article to have "unusually strong backing high in the government," accompanies longstanding policies of control over the Uyghur population, including harsh security measures and steps to dilute ethnic identity and promote assimilation, as noted in the Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2008 Annual Report and recent CECC analyses (1, 2, 3). The level of repression in the region undermines residents' ability to protect their rights, even as more space for challenging government abuses has opened up in China.

Additional Resources

For more information on responses within China to the project, see a survey posted on the Bulletin Board Service (BBS) of the Uyghur-language Web site Xabnam.com (also available in Latin script on the Uyghur American Association Web site's discussion forum). See also a discussion on the BBS of the Uyghur-language Web site Diyarim.
For more information on China's framework for historic preservation and an examination of preservation projects in Beijing, see Daniel B. Abramson, "The Aesthetics of City-scale Preservation Policy in Beijing," Planning Perspectives, Vol. 22, No. 2 (April 2007): 129-166 and Daniel B. Abramson, "Beijing's Preservation Policy and the Fate of the Siheyuan," Traditional Dwellings and Settlements Review, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Fall 2001): 7-22.
For more information on property rights, see the CECC Virtual Academy page on Property Rights Resources.
For more information on China's legal framework for ethnic minority rights, see the "Special Focus" section within the CECC 2005 Annual Report and Section II--Ethnic Minority Rights in the CECC 2007 and 2008 Annual Reports.
For information on conditions in the XUAR, see Section IV--Xinjiang, in the CECC 2008 Annual Report.

Source: -See Summary (2009-04-07 ) \| Posted on: 2009-07-02
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Employment Discrimination Persists During Implementation of the Employment Promotion Law

China's Employment Promotion Law (EPL) took effect on January 1, 2008. Provisions in the law prohibit discrimination based on factors including gender (Art. 27), ethnicity (Art. 28), disability (Art. 29), whether or not the job candidate is a carrier of an infectious disease (Art. 30), and whether or not the job candidate is a migrant worker (Art. 31). Article 62 of the law permits workers to initiate lawsuits in cases of alleged discrimination. While plaintiffs have seen increased success in civil litigation against employers since the EPL took effect, experts continue to press for special legislation on employment discrimination, and efforts by both government and civil society groups to address discrimination continue (according to a March 3 People's Daily interview [via Sohu] with National People's Congress representative, Zhou Hongyu, and China University of Political Science and Law professor, Cai Dingjian.)

Discrimination
Based on Health Conditions
Beijing Yirenping Center, an advocacy group that works to combat discrimination against individuals who are carriers of certain diseases, reported in its "2008 Discrimination Against Hepatitis B Virus Carriers Survey Report" that of 92 multinational corporations surveyed from October to December 2008, at least 84 percent required potential employees to take a Hepatitis B Virus (HBV) test, and 44 percent refused to hire HBV carriers.

Dahe Net reported on February 27 that a college graduate filed a lawsuit against a provincial rural credit union in Zhengzhou city, Henan province, for employment discrimination based on his colorblindness. This was the first lawsuit in China that dealt with employment discrimination based on colorblindness. The plaintiff asked the court to order the credit union to pay him 3,000 yuan (US$439) as compensation for economic losses and 50,000 yuan (US$7,315) for emotional damages.

Based on Gender
Sixty-five percent of female college graduates consider gender discrimination their greatest barrier to finding employment, according to a survey reported in a March 12 Dazhong Daily article (reprinted in Xinhua). On average, men were able to secure a job interview after 2 or 3 resume submissions, while women only secured interviews after 8 to 10 resume submissions, according to the report. An employee of a corporation's human resources department, on the condition of anonymity, admitted that even though they collected women's resumes at job fairs, either no one would review those applications, or, after interviews, they would discuss ways to rule out female job seekers. Companies also have "raised the employment threshold" by adding requirements for female candidates regarding height, appearance, age, and marital and child-bearing status to "naturally disqualify" female job seekers, the article reported. For example, many companies at a job fair required women to be "slender and in good disposition," "between 1.68 and 1.72 meters" (between 5 feet 6 inches and 5 feet 7 inches), or "between 45 and 55 kilograms" (between 99 and 121 pounds), according to a March 8 Sichuan News Net article (quoting a March 4 Beijing Evening News report). Some offices, including departments within the judicial system, even "brazenly" require that male employees be above 1.75 meters (5 feet 8 inches) and want to hire "no women" because employees are to "reflect the country's image," said National People's Congress representative Zhou Hongyu in the March 3 People's Daily interview cited above.

Tackling Employment Discrimination
Even though the EPL aims to promote equality in employment, it does not clearly define what actions constitute employment discrimination, nor does it fully detail penalties for those actions. The Congressional-Executive Commission on China reviewed a sample of over 30 other legal, regulatory, and supplemental documents issued at both the central and local levels that refer to the EPL, and found similar issues concerning clarity and detail in provisions regarding the definition of discrimination, enforcement, and relief to individuals subjected to alleged discrimination. According to an Internet survey reported in a January 17 Legal Daily article (via Xinhua), 90.1 percent of college students believe that discrimination exists in their chosen fields of employment; 82.7 percent express "dissatisfaction but have no options" when they face employment discrimination and therefore choose to forgo their legal rights for the sake of securing their employment.

Since 2004, National People's Congress representative Zhou Hongyu and other experts have been promoting an anti-employment discrimination law that would establish an equal opportunity employment committee. The proposal details the conditions, procedures, and burdens of proof involved in petitioning the committee, according to a March 7 Legal Daily report. Nevertheless, as argued in a March 9 Xinhua article, a law cannot solve a problem without tackling its root causes—which in this case includes corporations' lack of a sense of social responsibility. Companies "are not willing to hire disabled or disadvantaged workers for fear of hurting their economic performance,... especially under grim employment conditions," according to the March 7 report. In addition, some companies "find various excuses to create multiple barriers, legitimizing 'abnormal means' such as recruiting people solely based on their appearances or hukou status," says the same report. Ultimately, "discrimination is a social phenomenon" that requires people to change their traditional thinking, stated Zhou in the March 3 People's Daily interview.

For more information about employment discrimination, see Section II-Worker Rights-Employment Promotion Law and Section II-Public Health in the CECC 2008 Annual Report. See also a previous CECC analysis on ethnicity-based employment discrimination: Governments in Xinjiang Continue to Sponsor, Sanction Job Recruitment That Discriminates Against Ethnic Minorities.

Source: -See Summary (2009-03-13 / English) \| Posted on: 2009-07-02
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Recruitment for State Jobs in Xinjiang Discriminates Against Ethnic Minorities

Ethnic minorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) continue to face widespread discrimination in recruitment for state jobs, according to Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC) analysis of recent recruiting efforts for jobs in the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) and XUAR schools. The recent recruitment programs follow other examples of discriminatory job recruiting practices in the XUAR and come during a period of high unemployment for XUAR college graduates.

Discrimination in Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps Continues
The Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) has announced plans to recruit for 894 positions, of which 744 have been reserved for Han Chinese, according to rosters of available job openings. (See an index of job openings posted May 7 on the Bingtuan Personnel Testing Authority Web site to download the rosters.) Of the remaining positions, 137 are specified as unrestricted by ethnicity and thus are open to applicants of all ethnic groups including Han, while 11 positions are reserved for Uyghurs and 2 positions are reserved for Kazakhs. The job recruitment follows earlier discriminatory hiring practices in the XPCC documented by the CECC in 2006. All of the positions advertised in the 2009 XPCC recruiting program require at least a technical or college degree. The positions include jobs in employing agencies such as government bureaus, Communist Party committee offices, the XPCC court system, and prisons. All candidates must take the job recruitment exam in Mandarin Chinese, according to information on the job recruiting program posted May 7 on the Bingtuan Personnel Testing Authority Web site. (For additional information on the 2009 XPCC job recruitment, see also a brochure posted May 7 on the Bingtuan Personnel Testing Authority Web site and an article posted May 8 on the Kashgar district government Web site.)

As noted in previous analysis by the CECC, the Chinese government established the XPCC in 1954 as a means of settling demobilized soldiers and Han migrants to perform border defense functions and to support economic development. The central government's 2003 White Paper on the History and Development of Xinjiang says that the ranks of the XPCC are now "a mosaic of people from 37 ethnic groups, including the Han, Uygur, Kazak, Hui, and Mongolian." The White Paper describes the XPCC as "a special social organization, which handles its own administrative and judicial affairs" but "in accordance with the laws and regulations of the state and the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region." As noted by the CECC, Chinese law forbids discrimination based on ethnicity. Within this framework of non-discrimination, several provisions in Chinese laws stipulate measures to promote the hiring of ethnic minorities.

Teaching Positions Discriminate Against Ethnic Minorities
Recent job recruitment announcements from one district and one autonomous prefecture in the XUAR also indicate widespread discrimination against ethnic minorities during the recruitment process for jobs in XUAR schools. In Aqsu district, 347 of 436 open positions in district schools are reserved for Han Chinese, while the remaining 89 positions are reserved for Uyghurs, according to a roster of open positions. (See an announcement on the job openings posted May 8 on the Shayar county government Web site to download the roster of job openings.) In addition to the restrictions based on ethnicity, candidates must not believe in a religion or participate in religious activities, according to the May 8 announcement. In the Bayangol Mongol Autonomous Prefecture within the XUAR, 413 of almost 500 jobs in local schools are reserved exclusively for Han Chinese, according to a list of open positions. (See a May 4 brochure on the Southern Xinjiang Personnel Net to download the roster.) In addition, 37 positions are specified as unrestricted by ethnicity and thus are open to applicants of all ethnic groups including Han, while 26 positions are reserved for Uyghurs and 10 exclusively for Mongols. In addition, 5 posts are open either for Han or Mongol candidates.

Available information on the job recruitment in Aqsu and Bayangol indicates that the ethnicity-based categories are not proxies for language skills, as the positions contain separate stipulations regarding language capability, in addition to ethnicity-based restrictions. (XUAR schools traditionally have offered separate tracks of schooling in Mandarin and in ethnic minority languages, though such tracking has diminished with the implementation of Mandarin-centered "bilingual" education.) According to the recruiting announcement from Aqsu district, ethnic minority candidates must meet a minimum requirement on a national Mandarin Chinese exam. In addition, 56 of the 89 positions for Uyghurs are reserved for Uyghurs who received their schooling in Mandarin-language schools (minkaohan students), according to the roster of open positions in Aqsu. The announcement on job recruitment in the Bayangol Mongol Autonomous Prefecture specifies that ethnic minorities whose native language (mother tongue, or muyu) is Mandarin Chinese may apply for positions reserved for Han Chinese, thereby appearing to exclude ethnic minority candidates who are fluent in Mandarin (such as minkaohan students who learned Mandarin in school), but do not speak it as their native language.

Graduates Face High Unemployment Rates
The barriers to employment for ethnic minority job candidates come during a period of high unemployment in the XUAR. XUAR authorities have pledged to boost employment and to focus on increasing job prospects for ethnic minorities, but the evidence of ongoing discriminatory practices, along with limited information on implementation of policies to promote employment of ethnic minorities, call such a stated focus into question.

According to a March 2 article from the XUAR Ethnic Affairs Commission (via the State Ethnic Affairs Commission) and March 10 China Daily report, the government has pledged to sustain an employment rate of over 70 percent for recent XUAR college graduates through measures including programs that send medical and educational workers to rural areas and through the establishment of job training bases. The rural jobs and training bases will focus on hiring and training ethnic minorities, according to the reports. Since making the pledge, authorities have reported on efforts to create new jobs for college graduates, though some information has had limited or no information on increasing job prospects for ethnic minorities. An April 16 article from Xinhua Xinjiang reported that the region has established over 7,000 spots for university graduates in the job training bases. The article did not include information on efforts to encourage training of ethnic minority graduates. A May 18 article from Xinhua Xinjiang noted that as of the end of April, only 22.1 percent of college graduates in the XUAR had signed employment contracts, down 1.49 percent from the previous year. The article reported that a government official outlined steps to spur employment, including through job recruitment for positions in the government and XPCC. (The government has also filled XPCC positions with people from outside the XUAR. See information on efforts to recruit approximately 4,400 college graduates from Gansu province for XPCC jobs, as reported in an April 10 China Ethnicities News report, via the State Ethnic Affairs Commission. The percentage of college graduates who signed employment contracts in the XUAR compares with an unofficial estimated nationwide figure for college graduates of 33 percent as of March 2009, according to an April 3 report posted on the Xinyang, Henan province, Personnel Bureau Web site.) At the same time it reported on job opportunities in the XPCC, shown by the CECC to exclude most ethnic minority candidates, the May 18 article said the government would focus employment assistance work on giving priority to hiring and providing benefits to ethnic minority graduates and graduates with difficulties finding employment. An April 15 government notice, posted May 22 on Tianshan Net, provided information on a program to send graduates to work in rural areas, but neither the notice nor accompanying materials provided information on promoting the hiring of ethnic minorities. Information on civil servant hiring in the XUAR has given some information on ethnicity-based restrictions and efforts to promote the hiring of ethnic minorities. Of 6,558 open civil servant positions in the XUAR government, the government has both left "the majority of positions unrestricted by ethnicity," thereby open to candidates of all ethnic groups including Han, and has "reserved a set amount of positions" for ethnic minorities, according to a May 12 report from the Xinjiang Personnel Department.

The continuation of government-sponsored discriminatory job recruitment practices in the XUAR accompanies broader policies in the region that also violate the rights of ethnic minority citizens. For more information on conditions in the XUAR, see Section IV--Xinjiang in the CECC 2008 Annual Report.

Source: -See Summary (2009-05-26 / English) \| Posted on: 2009-07-02
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Officials Extend Liu Xiaobo's Residential Surveillance Beyond Legal Time Limit

Chinese officials continue to hold prominent intellectual and Charter 08 signer Liu Xiaobo even though the six-month limit for residential surveillance as provided for in China's Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) has expired. Article 58 of the CPL allows officials to place someone under residential surveillance for up to six months. Police reportedly took Liu into custody on December 8, 2008, meaning the period of his residential surveillance should have expired on June 8, 2009, and officials would have had to provide another legal basis for holding him, according to a June 8 Dui Hua Human Rights Journal analysis issued by the Dui Hua Foundation, a non-profit organization that seeks to promote universal human rights through dialogue between China and the United States.

Liu's lawyer, Mo Shaoping, said police told Liu's wife that Liu would remain under residential surveillance while they continued to investigate his case, according to a June 9 Agence France-Presse (AFP) article (via Google). "They said that new measures in his case would be taken, but they did not specify what these measures were," Mo said. "Basically, his entire residential surveillance has not conformed with laws and regulations."

Officials have kept Liu at an undisclosed location in Beijing even though Chinese law would appear to require that residential surveillance be carried out at Liu's home in Beijing and not another location. Officials have also denied Liu access to his lawyer, despite provisions under Chinese law that give a person under residential surveillance the right to meet with his lawyer without permission.

"His residential surveillance should be carried out at his home -- his family should live with him and his lawyers should be able to freely visit. None of this has happened," Mo told AFP. Mo said he sent a letter to the procuratorate in Beijing asking officials to free Liu or issue formal charges, according to a June 9 Times Online article.

The Dui Hua analysis noted:

Though more attention has been paid in recent years to abiding by certain provisions of the CPL, Chinese law-enforcement authorities have in the past frequently ignored legally established rights and time limits, especially in cases like this one that appear to be of a political nature.

Officials took Liu into custody a day before more than 300 Chinese citizens issued Charter 08, a document which they signed and which calls for political reform and greater protection of human rights in China. The charter was posted on the Internet and allows additional persons to sign the document via e-mail. As of April 17, 8,484 persons had signed the charter, of which about 80 percent reside in mainland China, according to the book "Charter 08," published by Open Books (Hong Kong) in May. Charter 08 is inspired by a 1970s charter issued in the former Czechoslovakia.

For more information, see a previous CECC analysis of official harassment of Charter 08 signers, censorship of Charter 08 on the Chinese Internet, and the legality of Liu's residential surveillance, and a previous CECC analysis of the Charter 08 document and initial reports of Liu's detention.

Source: -See Summary (2009-06-09 / English / Free) \| Posted on: 2009-07-02
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Xinjiang Authorities Block, Punish Free Expression

Authorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) continued in 2009 to engage in censorship campaigns and punish people for peaceful expression and assembly. Authorities outside the XUAR also participated in the censorship of a Web site devoted to Uyghur issues. The measures continue a longstanding trend in blocking and punishing free expression in the XUAR, especially among the Uyghur ethnic group. The continued controls also come amid a year of heightened government repression in the region. See below for information on recently reported government efforts to block and penalize free expression and assembly, as well as for a newly reported development in the case of imprisoned Uyghur writer Nurmemet Yasin.

Censorship Campaigns
In 2008, XUAR authorities made "illegal" political and religious publications the focal point for that year's campaign to "Sweep Away Pornography and Strike Down Illegal Publications." In late 2008 and early 2009, authorities reported on the continuation of censorship campaigns that included focus on "illegal" political and religious publications.

A district in Qaramay municipality reported in late November 2008 that the municipal government had issued a "notice on confiscating Muslim books such as 'The Truth About the Holy Teachings' and 'The Call to Orthodoxy,'" according to a November 29 report on the Jerenbulaq district (Baijiantan), Qaramay municipal government Web site. Authorities investigated local book and music sellers in accordance with the notice, the article reported.
In an inspection of the cultural market in the XUAR capital of Urumqi, authorities reported confiscating 175 copies of "illegal religious pictures," according to a February 10 report from the Urumqi municipal government Web site.
XUAR authorities will coordinate with propaganda departments from provinces including Gansu, Qinghai, Shaanxi, and the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region to establish a cross-provincial mechanism to stop the printing and sales of "illegal" religious materials, according to a March 2 Xinjiang Daily report about a meeting to enlarge the law enforcement teams that monitor cultural markets in the XUAR. The article also reported that in 2009, XUAR authorities established a fund to reward efforts to "purify" the cultural market, with focus on "illegal" religious and political publications.
As part of a campaign to curb "illegal religious activity" in Hoten district, authorities reported finding large amounts of "illegal propaganda materials such as books, handwritten texts, CDs, and tapes," according to a March 4 article on the Xinjiang Peace Net. See a related Congressional-Executive Commission on China analysis for more information about the steps to fight "illegal religious activity" in Hoten.
Authorities in the XUAR will implement a special system of oversight for bookstores, newspaper stands, audio and video suppliers, and similar vendors that are located within 500 meters of schools, according to a March 18 report from Tianshan Net. The report also provided statistics on the number of books confiscated in 2008. Of a total of 877,193 copies of items confiscated in 2008, 29,905 were "illegal" political materials. The article did not report the number of "illegal" religious items confiscated.

Repeated Shutdown of "Uyghur Biz" Web site, Webmaster Questioned
In March, authorities repeatedly shut down the multi-language Web site Uyghur Biz (also known as Uyghur Online) and interrogated Beijing-based Uyghur scholar Ilham Toxti, who runs the site, according to reports from Radio Free Asia (RFA). (See March 6, March 26, and May 12 English-language reports and March 5, 6, and 24 Uyghur-language reports.) Ilham Toxti reported that authorities accused him of separatism, according to the May 12 report. Authorities initially shut down the site in early March, after Ilham Toxti gave an interview criticizing government administration in the XUAR. Based on CECC monitoring, the Mandarin-language version of the Web site was available again on March 9 and the Uyghur-language version on March 10. CECC monitoring found that the site was again closed on March 20, one day after the site hosted an article by Ilham Toxti stating that XUAR government chairperson Nur Bekri was unfit for his job. The Internet censorship follows the closure of Uyghur Biz in mid-2008, as reported in a June 12, 2008, RFA article, and also follows the closure of some Uyghur-language bulletin board services during the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympic Games. According to the March 26 RFA article, the Uyghur Biz Web site has been shut down a total of six times since Ilham Toxti first started the site in 2006.

Penalizing Free Expression and Assembly
Several reports from March and April 2009 described steps to punish people for exercising their right to distribute information or organize protests:

According to April reports from Radio Free Asia (RFA), authorities in Turpan municipality detained Ekberjan Jamal, a young Uyghur man, on December 25, 2007, after he had used his cell phone to make audio recordings of November 2007 shopkeepers' demonstrations in Turpan and sent the recordings to friends overseas. (See an April 15 English-language report and April 13 and 14 Uyghur-language reports.) His friends gave the recordings to Hong Kong-based Phoenix News and to RFA. (See 2007 RFA articles about the demonstrations dated November 1, 2, and 26.) Ekberjan Jamal later posted on his own Web site the news based on his audio recordings. The Turpan Intermediate People's Court sentenced Ekberjan Jamal to 10 years in prison on February 28, 2008, for splittism and revealing state secrets, crimes under articles 103 and 111 of the Criminal Law. He is being held in the Xinjiang Number 4 prison in Urumqi, according to the RFA reports.
Chinese state-run media reported in March that procuratorate officials approved the arrest of and initiated prosecution against a young man, identified only as "Ya," after he allegedly "spread rumors" on the Internet about a clash that broke out in January at an Internet Café in Shayar county, Aqsu district. (See a March 16 report from Tianshan Net and a March 17 report from Xinhua, via China Daily.) The reports said that "Ya" fabricated the nature of the clash, reporting that Han Chinese had beaten and killed a Uyghur youth, describing police indifference to the matter, and reporting that over 500 Uyghurs took to the streets to demonstrate. The Tianshan Net report said that "Ya's" article was then used by "separatist" Web sites overseas that aimed to "disrupt ethnic unity" and "influence social stability." (For reports on the incident by RFA after the clash broke out in late January, see a February 6 article as well as RFA Uyghur-language articles from January 30, February 3, and February 4. See also a January 31 report from the East Turkistan Information Center.)
Also in March, official media reported that in June 2008, authorities from Hoten district intercepted and arrested people described as members of Hizb ut-Tahrir who planned to "sabotage" the Olympic torch relay. A report posted March 3 on the Hoten Peace Net (from the Hoten Frontier Defense Detachment) said that authorities found the group traveling in a vehicle carrying a computer, printer, and "reactionary" leaflets. The report did not provide additional details about the case.
The Uyghur American Association reported in a March 16 press release that a court in Hoten municipality, Hoten district, sentenced Abdukadir Mahsum on February 26 to 15 years in prison for his activities organizing peaceful demonstrations in Hoten in March 2008 to protest government human rights abuses. The news follows other steps in the XUAR to punish people who plan or participate in demonstrations. In December 2008 public security offices took two young men into detention after they tried to organize a demonstration on the campus of Xinjiang University.

New Report Provides Update on Imprisoned Writer
According to information reported in a March 17 Radio Free Asia (RFA) article, prison authorities have taken repercussions against imprisoned writer Nurmemet (Nurmuhemmet) Yasin since he met with UN Special Rapporteur on Torture Manfred Nowak in late 2005 and reported mistreatment to Nowak. According to the RFA article, authorities have reduced Nurmemet Yasin's family visits from every two months to twice a year and have restricted Nurmemet Yasin's activities within prison as punishment for having not "reformed his views." Nurmemet Yasin is serving a 10-year prison sentence for "inciting splittism," based on a short story he wrote about a pigeon that chooses suicide over life within a cage.

For more information on freedom of expression in the XUAR, see the following CECC analyses:

For more information on conditions in the XUAR, see Section IV--Xinjiang, in the CECC 2008 Annual Report.

Source: -See Summary (2009-03-30 ) \| Posted on: 2009-07-02
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China Requires Journalists To Obtain New Press Cards To Practice Profession

Journalists and editors at Chinese news organizations are required to possess a government-issued press card in order to legally practice their profession. This requirement differs from more limited forms of press accreditation, such as press badges required for access to certain places or events. Under China's press card system, the government has complete discretion to determine who may or may not legally practice journalism. As detailed below, such a licensing scheme does not conform to international human rights standards for freedom of expression. Every five years journalists already possessing a press card must apply for a new card, at which time the government may deny renewal. 2009 marks five years since the government last renewed press cards in 2004. Press cards currently held by journalists will expire on July 1, 2009. The government has given journalists and editors until June 30 to obtain new cards.

China's Licensing Scheme Does Not Conform to International Standards

China's general press card requirement does not conform to international standards for freedom of expression. Under the Measures for the Administration of Journalist Accreditation Cards, all journalists are required to possess the press card and cardholders must meet government-imposed qualifications including a minimum level of education and adherence to a vague "professional ethics" requirement. International experts have criticized a general licensing requirement for journalists which allows the government discretion to refuse registration and imposes substantive conditions on print media. Such schemes are unnecessary and may be abused, according to a 2003 joint declaration issued by the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Representative on Freedom of the Media, and the Organization of American States (OAS) Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression. "Individual journalists should not be required to be licensed or to register. There should be no legal restrictions on who may practice journalism," the declaration said, adding that press accreditation is "appropriate only where necessary to provide [journalists] with privileged access to certain places and/or events." Such an interpretation of the appropriateness and scope of accreditation requirements for journalists is consistent with international human rights standards for freedom of expression, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which require that restrictions on freedom of expression be limited to those which are necessary to protect the rights or reputations of others, national security, public order, or public health or morals. China has signed and committed to ratify the ICCPR.

Chinese officials have used the general press card requirement to harass unlicensed journalists who report on politically sensitive topics. In 2007, for example, police in Nanjing accused Sun Lin (pen name Jie Mu), a reporter for the U.S.-based news Web site Boxun News, of working for an illegal news organization and reporting without an official press card, according to a June 4, 2007, Committee to Protect Journalists article. Sun had reported on property disputes and other politically sensitive topics as well as Boxun's failure to gain accreditation to cover the 2008 Olympic Games and officials had warned him to stop reporting, the article said.

2009 Accreditation Card Renewal

The General Administration on Press and Publication (GAPP) has announced that journalists and editors working for Chinese news organizations must exchange their current press cards for new ones by June 30, 2009, and that the validity of their old cards will expire on July 1, according to the Circular Regarding the 2009 Exchange and Issuance of Press Cards (Circular) issued on January 20, 2009. The renewal will affect approximately 260,000 news personnel, according to a February 11 People's Daily article. GAPP is the administrative agency in charge of regulating the news publishing business, including the licensing of news publications and journalists. Every five years journalists must exchange their cards for new ones, according to Article 16 of the 2005 Measures for the Administration of Journalist Accreditation Cards.

According to the Circular, GAPP and local press and publication bureaus under GAPP will be responsible for approving and issuing the cards. The Circular provides that these government agencies and news organizations should "strictly examine and verify the press card applicant's qualifications, be stringent with the scope of distribution of press cards, and firmly expunge those not meeting the requirements from the journalists' ranks."

2009 Campaign to Strengthen Oversight

The new press cards are linked to a broader set of GAPP measures in 2009 to "strengthen oversight of news personnel and news reporting and editing activities," according to GAPP Deputy Director Li Dongdong as reported in a February 13, 2009, China Press and Publication Journal report. These measures include:

Creation of a black list. Journalists who "violate laws and regulations" will have their press cards revoked and names placed on a black list of journalists with "bad records."
Amendment of the Measures for the Administration of Journalist Accreditation Cards to "strengthen the regulatory system relating to applying for, examining and verifying, and granting press cards."
New measures to strengthen oversight over reporting and editing activities to "regulate order in news reporting and curb fake reports."

Chinese Government Justifications for Policy

The Chinese government claims that government licensing and supervision of journalists and editors is needed to prevent corruption and protect journalists. In March 2009, GAPP Director Liu Binjie said a spate of cases involving extortion among "fake" journalists in 2008 had "impacted commercial and social stability" and that "attacking fake journalists" would be a government priority this year, according to a March 4 Jinghua Times report (via Xinhua). The preamble to the Circular claims, as Chinese officials have in the past, that the exchange and issuance of press cards will strengthen the rights of news reporters. Officials this year point to new language printed on the press card as further ensuring journalists' access to government officials. The new language will say: "governments at all levels should facilitate the reporting of journalists who hold this card and provide necessary protection," according to a February 10 China Youth Daily report.

For additional analysis of China's licensing system for journalists under international human rights standards, see The Mechanics of Censorship, A Report on the Regulations for Print Media of the People's Republic of China, issued in September 2007 by Article 19, a human rights organization that promotes freedom of expression.

For more information on the Chinese government and Party's censorship of Chinese media generally, see Section II - Freedom of Expression, in the Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2008 Annual Report.

Source: -See Summary (2009-03-18 / English / Free) \| Posted on: 2009-07-02
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China's Responses at the UN Human Rights Council's Universal Periodic Review

During the recent Universal Periodic Review of China's human rights record before the UN Human Rights Council, China denied the existence of human rights issues such as censorship, abuse of state secrets laws, and black jails, defended its reeducation through labor system and registration requirements for religious activity, and asserted that its laws protect workers, lawyers, and ethnic minorities. China did not support Member States' recommendations in many of these areas and called such concerns “politicized.”

On February 9, 2009, the UN Human Rights Council Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) held a three-hour session to review China's human rights record. The UPR, which was created in 2006, is a new mechanism under which the UN Human Rights Council reviews the human rights records of all UN Member States once every four years. (See previous Congressional-Executive Commission on China analysis for background information on the review process.)

The three-hour review session began with a presentation by Li Baodong, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations, who provided an overview of China's social, economic, and human rights developments and reiterated China's position on a number of human rights issues. An "interactive dialogue" followed during which delegations from 60 Member States commented on China's human rights situation and offered specific recommendations. Fifty-five other Member States were not able to make their statements due to time constraints. The Chinese delegation responded to some of the comments by highlighting China's progress on human rights and rejecting certain concerns raised at the session by a number of countries, calling such criticisms "politicized," according to the Draft Report of the Working Group on the UPR of China.

On February 11, the Working Group adopted the Draft Report, which summarized the February 9 session and set forth China's official response to the recommendations made by Member States. The final report will be adopted at an upcoming regular session of the UN Human Rights Council. The state under review may choose to support or not support a recommendation, or indicate that a recommendation has already been implemented. Accepted recommendations are not legally binding. The state under review has the primary responsibility for implementation and must provide information on its progress at a follow-up review. China's follow-up review will take place during the second cycle of the UPR (2012-2015). For more information on the UPR process, please see a fact sheet available on the Web site of the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.

The language below is based on or taken directly from the Draft Report. Please note the Draft Report paraphrases and summarizes, rather than directly quotes, statements made at the session. Any language that appears in quotation marks in the chart below is taken verbatim from the Draft Report. Also note the chart highlights only a selection of the many issues discussed at the session. Please see the Draft Report for the full summary of China's session.

Issue	China's Responses to Concerns Raised	China's Responses to Recommendations
Freedom of Expression	China's Response: -"There is no censorship." -"No individual or press has been penalized for voicing their opinions or views." -Obstacles faced by journalists do not come from the government. -Laws prohibiting the creation of rumors or subversion on the Internet conform with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.	China Did Not Support: -Extend relaxed restrictions for foreign journalists to Chinese journalists. -Revise laws and practices that violate free expression and release prisoners held for such crimes (including those held in connection with Charter 08). -Accept differences of opinion "expressed by human rights defenders through peaceful demonstration."
Treatment of Human Rights Advocates	China's Response: -State secrets laws are not abused to punish human rights defenders. -Law on protection of state secrets clearly defines "state secrets."	China Did Not Support: -Reform state secrets laws and definitions of crimes such as incitement of subversion to prevent the abuse of such laws to punish human rights defenders. -"Investigate reports of harassment and detention of human rights defenders." China Supported: -Guard against those "who are qualifying themselves as human rights defenders with the objective of attacking the interests of the state and the people of China."
Freedom of Assembly	China's Response: -Rights to freedom of assembly, association, procession, and demonstration are protected and citizens may apply to engage in such activities under law.	China Did Not Support: -"Ensure protection of the right of peaceful assembly and release all persons arrested in this connection."
Freedom of Religion	China's Response: -Registration requirements for religious organizations are "minimum" and "family gatherings" of Christians do not require registration.	China Did Not Support: -Review approach to religious groups, including unofficial ones. -Guarantee religious freedom, freedom of belief, and the freedom to worship in private. -"Simplify requirements for official approval of religious practices[.]"
Reeducation Through Labor (RTL) (system allowing for up to four years detention outside of judicial system and Criminal Procedure Law)	China's Response: -"The Chinese system of reeducation through labor is similar to that of correctional service in other countries and is applied to persons who have committed crimes that do not warrant criminal sentence. There are 320 such centres in China with 190,000 inmates."	China Did Not Support: -Abolish the RTL system. China Supported: -Reform RTL "according to its national realities."
Extra-Legal Detention Facilities or "Black Jails"	China's Response: -"There are no black jails in the country."	China Did Not Support: -Abolish black jails.
Rights of Lawyers and Detainees	China's Response: -Recently amended law on lawyers clearly protects "[lawyers'] rights, their personal liberty and immunity from sanctions for speeches defending legally their clients in criminal proceedings." In state secrets cases, it is normal to place restrictions on lawyer-client meetings.	China Did Not Support: -Ensure lawyers "can defend clients without fear of harassment and can participate in the management of their own professional organizations." -"Ensure the independence of [the] judiciary and lawyers." -Ensure detainee's rights to see visitors and have "permanent access to legal counsel and effective complaint mechanisms."
Ethnic Minorities (Tibetans, Uyghurs)	China's Response: -Religious beliefs and culture of ethnic minorities are respected and protected. -Ethnic minorities are allowed to fully exercise their human rights. -"[A] few people with the support of foreign forces try to split Tibet and Xinjiang from China and they by no means represent the governing majority of Tibetans and Uighurs as Tibet and Xinjiang are inseparable parts of China's territory and the Government will not allow any attempt to split China to succeed."	China Did Not Support: -Review laws and practices to ensure protection of ethnic minorities' freedom of religion (1),(2), movement, culture, and language. -End the "strike hard" campaign in Tibet associated with numerous rights violations. -Increase access to Tibetan areas for the Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights (OHCHR), other UN bodies, diplomats, and international media. China Supported: -Continue "efforts to further ensure ethnic minorities the full range of human rights including cultural rights."
Death Penalty Statistics		China Did Not Support: -Make death penalty statistics public.
Worker Rights	China's Response: -Constitution and trade union law provide that workers may "organize and join trade unions and carry out activities entirely free."	China Did Not Support: -Lift reservation to Article 8.1(a) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), "which ensures the right of everyone to form trade unions and join the trade union of his or her choice."
North Korean Refugees	China's Response: -China has acceded to the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees and its Additional Protocol and follows the principle of non-refoulement (non-repatriation) in accordance with the convention. -China is working on refugee legislation to further clarify screening procedures. -"Some people who illegally entered China because of economic reasons are not "refugees" but illegal immigrants."	China Did Not Support: -Implement the November 2008 recommendations of the Committee against Torture, "particularly on ... the non-refoulement of refugees from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea."

Source: -See Summary (2009-03-18 / English / Free) \| Posted on: 2009-07-02
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Two Men in Inner Mongolia in Detention for Involvement in Mongolian Organization and for Planned Protest

Authorities in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region (IMAR) have detained two Mongol men on charges of involvement with a pan-Mongolian organization and for attempting to organize a protest, according to a May 3 report from the U.S.-based Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center (SMHRIC). State security personnel detained Almas in the IMAR capital of Hohhot on April 30, 2009, while authorities detained Baoyu in Bogt (Baotou) city on the same day. According to the report, authorities detained them for involvement or alleged involvement in the "Pan-Mongolia Association," which authorities label as a separatist organization, as well as for alleged attempts to arrange a protest in Hohhot on the 62nd anniversary of the IMAR's founding on May 1. SMHRIC reported that Almas is the secretary of the Pan-Mongolia Association and that authorities alleged Baoyu was also involved in the organization. According to SMHRIC, sources reported that a call to hold a protest and an announcement about a conference to address ethnic issues in the IMAR, both written in the name of the Pan-Mongolia Association, were distributed through the Internet and text messages. Further details about the cases, including the men's current whereabouts, are unknown.

Also on April 30, security officials in Naiman banner, Tongliao city, detained businessman Arslan, one of Almas' friends, according to the SMHRIC report. They questioned him about his association with Almas, about the Pan-Mongolia Association, and about Arslan's Internet publications, which they charged harmed ethnic harmony. Authorities held him in three periods of detention for three days before releasing him.

The detentions follow other measures to punish ethnic Mongols for promoting Mongols' rights or for their links or perceived links to overseas ethnic rights organizations. As noted in the Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC)2008 Annual Report, in July 2008, authorities in the IMAR detained businessman Burildguun for alleged ties to an overseas Mongolian political group. In March, authorities detained writer Naranbilig for 20 days in connection with his plans to attend the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues and with his broader activities advocating for the rights of ethnic Mongols. The same month, authorities also detained activist Tsebegjab for his alleged ties to overseas activists. Authorities later placed both Naranbilig and Tsebegjab under confinement in their homes.

The detentions come as the government continues to implement policies in the IMAR that have undermined the protection of Mongols' rights. As noted in the CECC 2008 Annual Report, longstanding government policies have disrupted traditional pastoral livelihoods, forced resettlement and assimilation, and reduced the use of the Mongolian language. Authorities have taken some steps in recent years to revive the use of Mongolian, with mixed results, but elsewhere authorities have targeted some Mongolian language Web sites for closure. For more information on conditions in the IMAR, see Section II--Ethnic Minority Rights in the CECC 2008 Annual Report.

Source: -See Summary (2009-05-15 ) \| Posted on: 2009-06-24
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=122238

Xinjiang Authorities Announce Heightened Security Threat, Strengthen Security Capacity, and Continue Propaganda Campaigns

Authorities throughout the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) have continued in late 2008 and early 2009 to implement harsh security controls and widespread propaganda campaigns in the name of preserving stability, while a top official in the region said in March 2009 that the XUAR will face a more serious security terrain in the coming year.

Official: More Serious Security Issues for XUAR in 2009
Speaking at a press conference on March 6, XUAR government chairperson Nur Bekri said that the region's battle against separatism would be "more severe, the task more strenuous, and the conditions for battle more intense," according to a March 6 Xinhua article and March 7 Tianshan Net report. Nur Bekri attributed security threats to "Western hostile forces" and to the "three forces" of terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism, which he said would continue to carry out activities to "divide" and "sabotage" the region, according to the Tianshan Net report. He said all threats to the region would meet with "hard strikes" and "firm opposition" from the people. In January 2009, a national White Paper on China's national defense (via the Chinese government Web site) included supporters of "East Turkistan independence"--a reference to perceived separatist movements directed toward the XUAR--as one of three threats to "China's unity and security." As described in the Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC) 2007 and 2008 Annual Reports, authorities have used security campaigns in the XUAR as a pretext for squelching peaceful dissent and controlling expressions of ethnic and religious identity, especially among the ethnic Uyghur population.

Nur Bekri's remarks come during a period of heightened security controls within the region. Authorities increased controls in 2008 amid preparations for the Olympic Games, intensified anti-terrorism campaigns in the region, and in response to protests among Uyghurs and Tibetans in China. (See the CECC 2008 Annual Report for more information.) In the aftermath of these events, authorities continued throughout fall 2008 to enforce harsh security measures and widespread ideological campaigns, efforts which have continued into late 2008 and 2009. Recently reported measures include:

Increased Capacity by Security Forces
The central and XUAR governments reported on measures in recent months to bolster overall security capacity throughout the region, according to reports from late 2008 and 2009. At a region-wide meeting held on March 5 and 6, XUAR public security officials pledged to strengthen stability measures, according to a March 6 report from the Xinjiang Daily. While the measures address the central government's general directive to "protect growth, the people's livelihood, and stability" throughout China (see, e.g., a March 4 China News Net article and February 14 Xinhua article), the meeting also singled out strengthened security measures in order to defeat the threat of the "three forces" within the XUAR. The Xinjiang Daily report also described police measures in January to root out "illegal" religious instruction classes, which led to over 20 detentions. The news follows the Central Military Commission's upgrade of the status of the Xinjiang people's armed police force in November in a measure described as increasing the force's capacity to respond to threats to stability, as reported in a November 27, 2008, Tianshan Net report (via NetEase), November 28 Xinhua article, and January 12, 2009, Tianshan Net article.

Local governments within the XUAR also reported on strengthening security measures. In March, authorities in Poskam (Zepu) county, Kashgar district, described measures to strengthen security work through measures that include mobilization of public security, procuratorate, court, and justice department staff to conduct nightly patrols, and a rapid response system to summon the public security bureau, people's armed police, and people's militia, according to a March 12 report from the Kashgar district government Web site. A month earlier, an official from the Aqsu district government outlined four broad measures for ensuring stability that included calls for a strengthening of intelligence networks, stepped-up controls over religious activity, and an increase in ideological propaganda, according to a February 23 report from the Aqsu District Environment Protection Bureau (via the XUAR Environmental Protection Bureau). The official also called for building off the successful experiences in Olympics security arrangements to tighten the district's "prevention and control" system within society.

Continued Ideological Campaigns
Authorities continue to implement widespread ideological campaigns targeting various communities within the XUAR. The educational campaigns as described in some reports have included sharp rhetoric against peaceful human rights activities.

Wide-scale Campaigns Target Students, Other Groups. Government Reports High Participation Rate
Authorities in Kashgar city, Kashgar district, outlined work on anti-separatism reeducation that has divided the education into three phases, extending through April 2009, according to a December 22 report from the Kashgar district government Web site. The three phases will include a period of study, a period of "exposing and criticizing," and a period of "self-examination and rectification," according to the report. The report described plans to form teams of cadres and religious personnel to bring anti-separatism education to groups including religious adherents, workers, youth, students and teachers, and migrants. Describing anti-separatism education for students as a "long-term and arduous job," an official in Ghulja (Yining) city, Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, outlined plans to strengthen anti-separatism education in schools, including through mandatory classes on patriotism and ethnic unity that exceed national requirements and through oversight measures implemented for the winter vacation, according to a February 5 report on the Ili News Net. The measures include arranging for teachers to visit students in their homes during vacation, requiring students to visit campus twice a month, and requiring students to do assignments seen as promoting ethnic unity, according to the report. During a three-month period of anti-separatism reeducation starting in October, authorities in Hoten district reported that 300,000 people directly received anti-separatism education and that in total, propaganda efforts reached more than 95 percent of the population, according to a February 8 report from the Xinjiang Daily. In addition to educating the public on stability threats, the activities also spread information on Communist Party policies in areas including religion, population planning, and "bilingual" education, according to the report.

Anti-Separatist Campaigns Target Rebiya Kadeer and Overseas Organizations
Two reports from the Qizilsu Kyrgyz Autonomous Prefecture (Qizilsu KAP) described anti-separatist propaganda campaigns that included harsh attacks against Rebiya Kadeer and groups including an organization that promotes human rights for Uyghurs. Rebiya Kadeer, a former political prisoner in China, is a U.S.-based civic leader and activist who has advocated for human rights for Uyghurs. Since Rebiya Kadeer's release from prison in 2005, authorities have harassed her family members remaining in the XUAR, culminating in prison sentences given to two of her sons in 2006 and 2007.

According to a report from the Qizilsu Anti-Separatism Office posted December 19 on the Xinjiang Peace Net, officials from the Qizilsu KAP traveled to an impoverished area to deliver anti-separatism propaganda education to 6 impoverished households and over 30 cadres. The report said that the education clarified the "reactionary fallacies" spread by the likes of Rebiya Kadeer and the "three forces." The report also singled out groups including the World Uyghur Congress (WUC), a Germany-based organization headed by Rebiya Kadeer that promotes human rights and democracy for the Uyghur people. A village cadre said officials would strengthen anti-separatism education and focus especially on religious figures, women, and youth, according to the report. In a prefecture-wide effort to focus on specific populations during anti-separatism propaganda education activities launched throughout the Qizilsu KAP, the Communist Party-led Qizilsu Women's Association issued a "Letter to Women of the Prefecture" to mobilize them to participate in anti-separatist propaganda education activities, according to a report from the Qizilsu Anti-Separatism Office posted December 19 on the Xinjiang Peace Net. According to the report, the letter educated women in seeing that Rebiya Kadeer was a "running dog" for anti-China sentiment in the West and a common enemy of the people, as well as a "bad woman" unable to "even properly educate her own children." The letter also denounced groups including the "three forces," the WUC, and "Tibet Independence." The letter called on women to be good wives, mothers, and daughters, and expose the "true evil intent" behind Rebiya Kadeer's calls for human rights and democracy. (For additional information on anti-separatism campaigns, including in the Qizilsu KAP, see a March 5 report on the Xinjiang Peace Net, providing more information on the scope and content of anti-separatism education in the Qizilsu KAP, as well as a December 15 report from the Xinjiang Legal Daily describing anti-separatist education activities among officials. For a detailed example of the content of anti-separatism propaganda education, see a question-and-answer sheet used in anti-separatism reeducation, dated November 12 from the Kelpin (Keping) county, Aqsu district, government Web site, available as a cached page.)

Controls Over Religion
Authorities have tightened control over religious activity as part of heightened security measures. See a related CECC analysis for information on measures recently reported by local governments, including carrying out a campaign aimed at "weakening religious consciousness," implementing rules to expel religious leaders for missing political study classes, monitoring students' activities during school vacations, and holding open trials to punish "illegal religious activity" and demonstrate its consequences to the public.

For more information on conditions in the XUAR, see Section IV--Xinjiang, in the CECC 2008 Annual Report.

Source: -See Summary (2009-03-17 / English) \| Posted on: 2009-06-24
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China Issues New Hukou Policies To Promote Employment; Discrimination Continues

In January and February, the Chinese government issued new policies to lift certain restrictions on household registration (hukou), allowing citizens who meet specified criteria to obtain local hukou. Having local hukou is effectively a prerequisite for securing employment, healthcare, social insurance, education, and other government benefits; this has been the case since the issuance of the Regulations on Household Registration in 1958. The new policies aim to promote employment as authorities recently acknowledged rising unemployment of college graduates and migrant workers during the current economic downturn. Even though the new policies may benefit those with higher education and special skills, they continue the trend to exclude the majority of Chinese migrant workers. (For a discussion of China's household registration system, see section II--Freedom of Residence in the CECC 2008 Annual Report, including the Addendum: Recent Hukou Reforms (pp. 105-112); for a broader retrospective, see also the CECC October 2005 CECC topic paper on China's household registration system, and a chart on Chinese Hukou reforms as of 2004.)

National Policy
Article 2 of the State Council General Office's Circular Regarding Strengthening Employment for College Graduates issued January 19 (January 19 Circular) encourages college graduates to work in small- or medium-sized and non-state enterprises. According to the article, "each locality and city should abolish restrictions on local hukou" (excluding four municipalities: Beijing, Chongqing, Shanghai, and Tianjin) to encourage firms to hire college graduates without local hukou. The January 19 Circular also states that China's employment situation is "very grim" due to the current international financial crisis, and "each locality and relevant department should put the employment of college graduates as the top priority in the work of employment." Two weeks later, the State Council's Circular Regarding Completing Employment Work in the Current Economic Situation issued on February 3 referred to the January 19 Circular again when emphasizing college graduates' employment as a top priority for the government.

Shanghai Policy
Shanghai, as one of the four municipalities excluded from the January 19 Circular, issued the Trial Measures Regarding "Shanghai Residence Permit" Holders' Application for Shanghai Permanent Hukou (Trial Measures) on February 12. Article 5 stipulates that the applicant satisfy the following requirements: (1) hold a Shanghai residence permit for at least seven years; (2) participate in the city's social security system during the seven years while holding a Shanghai residence permit; (3) pay income tax during the seven years while holding a Shanghai residence permit; (4) have been employed as mid- or higher level professionals in the city; (5) and have had no violations of national or the city's population planning policy, administrative punishment or more severe criminal record, or other bad behavior. Even though Article 1 of the Trial Measures states that their purpose is to "deepen the city's household registration management reform," "perfect the residence permit system," and "attract talent," it appears that only fewer than 3,000 residents out of the 4,115,000 Shanghai residence permit holders may qualify and thus benefit from the new policy, according to a February 24 Xinhua report and a February 18 Beijing News report.

Reform with Discrimination
The Chinese government's new hukou policies come at a time when the government's primary concerns are the economic downturn and related social issues, including unemployment and "social stability." Even though the new policies aim to create employment, they exclude most migrant workers who do not have a college education or special skills, and are unlikely to bring fundamental change to the discriminatory nature of China's hukou system, according to Xinhua and People's Daily (via Xinhua) reports on February 17. As noted in the CECC 2008 Annual Report, China's hukou reforms have continued the trend to classify citizens into those with better education and skills and those with less education and fewer job skills, largely migrants or the so-called "floating population." For example, the Guangzhou city government in Guangdong province announced in February a new plan to manage the "floating population" in three categories for "public security," according to a February 21 Southern Metropolitan Daily report. This new plan drew criticism from the public for labeling the "unemployed" and the "poor" as "high risk populations" and thus in need of "strict management until [they] die," according to quotes from netizens reported in a February 23 Voice of America article. In the meantime, many local hukou reforms have taken place in other cities in Guangdong province, according to a February 24 Southern Daily report. There are also concerns about whether the new policies will be implemented because they are not compulsory, as a February 17 South China Morning Post (registration required) article and a February 18 National Business Daily article reported.

For more discussion on unemployment and hukou, see a previous CECC analysis Officials' Early Response to Unemployment and "Social Unrest" During Downturn, and section II--Freedom of Residence in the CECC 2008 Annual Report, including the Addendum: Recent Hukou Reforms (pp. 105-112).

Source: -See Summary (2009-03-17 / English) \| Posted on: 2009-06-24
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Xinjiang Authorities Strengthen Controls Over Religion

Local governments in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) reported throughout early 2009 on measures to strengthen control over religious activity. Measures include carrying out a campaign aimed at "weakening religious consciousness," implementing rules to expel religious leaders for missing political study classes, monitoring students' activities during school vacations, and holding open trials to punish "illegal religious activity" and demonstrate its consequences to the public. (See below for more details). The reports indicate a continuing trend in heightened repression over religion in the region, which according to official statistics has a majority Muslim population. The measures also form part of broader efforts in the XUAR to strengthen security and guard against perceived threats to stability. The XUAR government identifies "religious extremism" and "illegal religious activity" as key threats to the region. (See the Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2008 Annual Report for additional details.) The tightened controls follow heightened security measures in the XUAR implemented in 2008 amid preparations for the Olympic Games, intensified anti-terrorism campaigns in the region, and in response to protests among Uyghurs and Tibetans in China. Authorities continued to enforce harsh security measures and implemented widespread ideological campaigns throughout fall 2008 and into 2009. The steps to tighten control over religion also come as authorities have launched a third round of political training for "patriotic religious personnel" in an effort to enforce the notion that "stability is above all else" and to bolster support for policies on stability and economic development. According to a February 26 report from the Xinjiang Daily, the XUAR government will carry out training for 29,000 religious figures between 2009 and 2012. In a September 2008 speech, Nur Bekri announced plans to launch this training in 2009 and said it would be directed at Muslim religious personnel, according to a copy of the speech posted September 11 on Tianshan Net. Previous training has reached 43,700 participants--the figure refers to renci, which includes the possibility of repeat participants represented in this figure--in two rounds of sessions launched since 2001, according to the Xinjiang Daily report.

Recently reported measures by local governments to strengthen religious controls include:

Tightened Controls in Hoten
The Hoten district government announced plans to strengthen measures to deal with "illegal religious activities," according to a February 27 report on the Hoten Peace Net. The report described five measures:

Strengthening leadership and deployment of work on religion, including through the establishment of leading groups on "illegal religious activity," the use of accountability systems among officials, and through strengthened supervision over government work in this area.
Increasing warnings against "illegal religious activity" and increasing propaganda on issues such as Communist Party policy toward religion and the nature of the "three forces" of terrorism, separatism, and extremism; using media like art and broadcast communications to spread propaganda and using artistic performances and recreational activities to weaken religious atmospheres; and carrying out activities such as events for people to sign their names to show resistance to "illegal religious activities."
Deepening capacity to investigate and detect "illegal religious activity," including by mobilizing the support of local organizations and schools.
"Strengthening management and purifying the environment" through five steps: strengthening management of religious activities; strengthening oversight of students during vacation periods through a system of both fixed and unscheduled contact with students; strengthening the management of the "cultural market," an activity that has been tied to censorship campaigns in the region; strengthening "inspection and control" over floating populations; and strengthening capacity for management.
Stopping violations of the law and attacking crimes through measures including: carrying out public education and punishment of participants in "illegal religious activities"; penalizing and holding accountable heads of households, religious leaders, and other responsible people for the acts of students in "illegal" scripture classes; and holding open arrests and trials at the sites of illegal activity to send a message to the public about the consequences of such activity.

A March 4 report from the Xinjiang Peace Net reported positively on the Hoten district government's work to control "illegal religious activities," noting that authorities had already investigated and prosecuted "illegal religious activities," and had found large amounts of "illegal propaganda materials such as books, handwritten texts, CDs, and tapes," as well as ammunition and explosives. (A less detailed mention of this is also in the February 27 Xinjiang Peace Net report.) The March 4 report did not provide additional details on what made the religious activities and publications illegal nor on how the ammunition and explosives were related to religious activity. (For an example of how some "illegal religious activity" may be defined, see a question-and-answer sheet used in anti-separatism reeducation, dated November 12 from the Kelpin (Keping) county, Aqsu district, government Web site, available as a cached page, and a document providing a regional government definition of 23 kinds of illegal religious activity posted February 2, 2008, on the Chinggil (Qinghe) county, Altay district, Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture government Web site.) An overseas organization reported that the campaign in Hoten has included house-to-house inspections, along with closures of unauthorized religious schools and detentions of those involved, according to a March 30 Associated Press report (via Yahoo).

Increased Oversight to Address Outstanding Problems in Yeken County
Government, Communist Party, and county Islamic Association officials in Yeken (Shache) county, Kashgar district, organized a meeting for religious figures on February 16 to address a series of "outstanding problems" within religious circles and discuss steps to deal with the management of religious affairs, according to a February 24 Xinjiang Peace Net article. "Outstanding problems" included:

The discovery of scripture instruction sites at mosques within the scope of a few religious leaders' jurisdiction.
"Illegal religious activity" extending across multiple localities.
The discovery of "illegal tabligh activities" and people suspected of membership in Hizb ut-Tahrir.
Failure to curb or report the presence of illegal propaganda.
Inadequate enthusiasm among some religious figures toward contributing to the development of the rural economy.

The official also expressed concern about religious figures who did not participate in political education and who have a "half-baked" understanding of interpreting scripture. He called on Islamic Association officials to sharpen their sense of responsibility toward their work. In addition, the official outlined a series of measures for strengthening religious work in the county. The measures included implementing a detailed system of oversight to enforce political training among religious leaders and expelling religious leaders who miss a total of three study sessions. The official also called for using Friday prayers to convey information to worshipers on government policy on economic development, and for requiring religious leaders to report to authorities at least twice a month.

Campaign to "Weaken Religious Consciousness" Among Ethnic Minority Women and Young People in Ghulja
Authorities have launched a series of talks as part of Communist Party- and government-led propaganda education activities to "weaken religious consciousness and uphold a civilized and healthy life" among ethnic minority women and young people in Ghulja city, Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, according to a March 18 report on the Fazhi Xinjiang Web site. The talks spread knowledge on legal topics such as the marriage law and thereby "weakened religious consciousness" among ethnic minority women and young people of the whole city, according to the report.

Using Intelligence Networks to Find Illegal Religious Activity in Awat
As part of steps to expand intelligence information networks in Awat county, Aqsu district, authorities have mobilized religious leaders and other groups to expand information gathering activities, according to a March 17 report on the Xinjiang Peace Net. As a result of intelligence leads, authorities have investigated and prosecuted four instances of underground scripture readings, investigated four instances of suspected participation in "illegal religious activity," and stopped one case of "religious interference into matrimony." The report also described two "masked" individuals, in a possible reference to efforts to investigate women wearing full head coverings.

Anti-Separatism Education Against Religion for Teachers in Bortala
A middle school in the Bortala Mongol Autonomous Region organized reeducation activities in the "battle against separatism" that referred to the importance of teachers refraining from participating in any religious activity, according to a January 14 report from the Xinjiang Peace Net. Past reports (1, 2) on measures directed against teachers, who are state employees, indicate such statements include teachers' activities outside of working hours.

Detaining Students Involved in "Illegal" Religious Classes in Lop and Awat Counties
XUAR public security officials reported banning three "illegal" sites of religious instruction in Lop county, Hoten district, and Awat county, Aqsu district, and detaining over 20 people involved as part of efforts to "strike hard" against the activities of the "three forces" and "cults" like Falun Gong, according to a February 3 report from the Xinhua Bingtuan Web site and a March 6 report from the Xinjiang Daily.

For more information on conditions in the XUAR, see Section IV--Xinjiang, in the CECC 2008 Annual Report.

Source: -See Summary (2009-03-12 ) \| Posted on: 2009-06-24
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Governments in Xinjiang Continue to Sponsor, Sanction Job Recruitment That Discriminates Against Ethnic Minorities

Hiring practices that discriminate against ethnic minorities have continued in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), according to Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC) monitoring of job recruiting announcements from the past year. The CECC found employment advertisements posted on government Web sites that reserved positions for Han Chinese in civil servant posts, state-owned enterprises, and private posts, indicating direct government involvement in discriminatory practices, as well as implicit government endorsement of and failure to prevent discriminatory practices in private hiring. The practices contravene provisions in the PRC Constitution and in Chinese laws that forbid discrimination. See, for example, Article 4 of the Constitution and Article 9 of the Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law (REAL), both of which forbid discrimination based on ethnicity. Article 12 of the Labor Law and Article 3 of the Employment Promotion Law state that job applicants shall not face discrimination in job hiring based on factors including ethnicity, and Article 28 of the Employment Contract Law states that all ethnicities enjoy equal labor rights. Within this framework of non-discrimination, Article 14 of the Labor Law allows for separate legal stipulations to govern the hiring of ethnic minorities, and Article 28 of the Employment Promotion Law says that employing units shall give appropriate consideration to ethnic minority workers in job hiring. In addition, Article 22 of the REAL provides that ethnic autonomous government agencies shall give appropriate consideration to ethnic minorities in job hiring. Article 28 of the Implementing Provisions for the REAL also provides that ethnic autonomous areas give appropriate consideration to ethnic minorities in the job hiring process for government positions and includes provisions for their participation in higher levels of government.

The job recruitment programs observed by the CECC continue a trend in discriminatory hiring practices in the XUAR reported by the Commission in 2006 and 2005. Recent recruitment programs include:

Four schools recruiting teachers within the Shihezi municipal education system have reserved all open positions exclusively for Han Chinese, and one school has reserved three of four open positions exclusively for Han Chinese, according to a job announcement issued January 24, 2009, by the Shihezi 8th Division Personnel Bureau, available as a download from the Shihezi Education Net and online from a page posted January 28 by the Shihezi Number 10 Middle School. In total, the positions form 17 of 69 open positions available in schools within the Shihezi education system. The remaining 52 slots are specified as unrestricted by ethnicity and thus are open to applicants of all ethnic groups including Han. On February 6, the Shihezi Personnel Bureau amended the announcement to remove two other hiring restrictions in the job recruitment, according to a February 10 Xinjiang Daily report, but left the restrictions on ethnicity in place.
Jing (Jinghe) township, in Jing (Jinghe) county, Bayingol Mongol Autonomous Prefecture (XUAR), has advertised 11 open community public welfare positions, 6 of which are reserved for Han Chinese, 1 for an ethnic Uyghur, 2 for ethnic Kazakhs, and 2 for ethnic Mongols, according to a January 16 announcement posted January 21 on the Jing county government Web site. The announcement specifies that ethnic groups including Hui, Manchu, Xibo, and Zhuang may apply for the positions open to Han Chinese.
The Turpan District Tobacco Monopoly Branch Office is recruiting for two positions, both reserved for Han Chinese, according to an announcement posted January 14 on the XUAR Personnel Department Web site.
A mining company advertised only for Han Chinese to fill 18 open positions, according to a September 16, 2008, job announcement posted the following day on the Koktoqay (Fuyun) county government, Altay district, Web site.
A new store advertised for 30 employees, specifying that 20 positions were for Han Chinese and 10 for ethnic minorities, according to a September 4 announcement posted on the Jing county government Web site.
Job openings publicized as part of government-organized job recruiting activities in Jing county included 17 positions explicitly reserved for Han Chinese, according to a May 16 announcement on the Jing county government Web site. (See also a May 12 description of the job recruiting activities posted May 15 on the same Web site.) Descriptions of the remaining 100-plus positions either did not mention ethnicity or specified that there were no restrictions based on ethnicity. Employers listed appeared to include private employers alongside state-owned enterprises.
The Aqsu District (XUAR) Human Resources Department visited the Xi'an Jiaotong University in Shaanxi province to recruit personnel for jobs in Aqsu hospitals and an agricultural technology center, reserving 18 of 43 positions for Han Chinese, according to an April 16 posting on the Xi'an Jiaotong University Web site. The Aqsu District Human Resources Department job announcement specified the remaining slots as unrestricted by ethnicity, thereby leaving them open to applicants of all ethnic groups including Han.

The discriminatory recruitment falls among other labor policies and practices in the XUAR that also restrict the job prospects of ethnic minorities. For example, measures to promote Mandarin-focused "bilingual" education in XUAR schools have resulted in language requirements that disadvantage ethnic minority teachers. Such job hiring and labor practices are part of broader policies in the region that also restrict ethnic minority rights. For additional information, see Section IV--Xinjiang in the CECC 2008 Annual Report.

Source: -See Summary (2009-02-09 ) \| Posted on: 2009-06-10
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Ahead of Sensitive Dates, Lhasa Officials Add "Strike Hard" to Crackdown

Officials in Lhasa city, the capital of the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), have implemented a "strike hard" anti-crime campaign running from mid-January until late March 2009—a period of time that brackets a series of dates that many Tibetans consider to have a high level of cultural and political sensitivity. The campaign aims to "strike hard according to law against all kinds of illegal criminal activity and to vigorously uphold the city's social order and stability," according to a January 23 report (in Chinese) published in the Communist Party-run Lhasa Evening News (LEN).

The "strike hard" campaign took effect as Lhasa residents entered the 11th month of a well-entrenched security crackdown that People's Armed Police (PAP) and public security officials established following the cascade of Tibetan protests that began in Lhasa on March 10, 2008, and by April had reached across the TAR and Tibetan autonomous areas located in Qinghai, Gansu, and Sichuan provinces. Tibetan protesters resorted to rioting on March 14-15 in Lhasa and other nearby locations. The Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC) reported in its 2008 Annual Report that as a result of the Chinese government crackdown on Tibetan communities, monasteries, nunneries, schools, and workplaces following the wave of Tibetan protests, Chinese government repression of Tibetans' freedoms of speech, religion, and association had increased to what may be the highest level since approximately 1983, when Tibetans were able to set about reviving Tibetan Buddhist monasteries and nunneries. (See International Campaign for Tibet (ICT), "Tibet at a Turning Point, 6 August 08, for more information on the crackdown.)

LEN reported that the "strike hard" campaign during its first week deployed a substantial amount of security resources—a force certain to attract residents' notice—but information in the report shows that "strike hard" personnel detected relatively little alleged criminal activity. More than 600 personnel using more than 160 vehicles were mobilized by January 21, according to the January 23 LEN report. On January 25, LEN reported (in Chinese) that in the first week security officials conducted checks on a total 8,424 persons at 3,813 rented residences, 33 hotels and guest houses, 56 bars and Internet cafes, and 30 residential courtyards. Police detained a total of 51 of the 8,424 persons (0.6 percent) on suspicion of criminal activity, including 30 on suspicion of theft, burglary, and prostitution. Two of the detainees had "reactionary discussion" and "reactionary songs" on their cell phones, the LEN report said.

"Strike hard" officials checked whether or not each of the 8,424 persons they examined had a permit to be in Lhasa—only 148 persons (1.8 percent) did not. NGOs and media organizations have reported that officials have intensified such checks since the early stages of the crackdown (see, e.g., China Digital Times, 30 April 08; Radio Free Asia (RFA), 5 November 08; and ICT, 13 November 08). Persons visiting Lhasa for as little as four days must register with public security officials, according to a January 23 Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy report.

The "strike hard" campaign will be in force during a 70-day period that brackets a series of dates that Tibetans regard as sensitive. The campaign will not expire until March 29 if measured from the January 18 launch date announced in the LEN report, or until March 31 if measured from a January 20 "comprehensively launched" date that LEN provided in a second January 23 report (in Chinese). The campaign will be active during the following observances and anniversaries.

Tibetan New Year (Losar), February 25, 2009. Some Tibetans living in Tibetan autonomous areas of China intend to express in a passive manner their discontent with developments over the past year, including the death and imprisonment of Tibetan protesters, by foregoing the usual celebration of Losar. Reuters reported from Lhasa on February 12 that "many Tibetans" are boycotting Losar celebrations "in quiet defiance of the crackdown." A February 11 Xinhua report said that Nyima Tsering, Vice Chairman of the TAR People's Congress Standing Committee (TAR PCSC), at a February 10 press conference in Lhasa urged Tibetans to continue with Losar celebrations "in response to an underground campaign by some secessionists to boycott the festival." "Tibetan people are enjoying a good life now," Nyima Tsering said, "there is no reason for them to forgo celebrating their traditional holiday this year." If Chinese government officials choose to characterize Tibetan non-celebration of the New Year as an expression of "splittism," a crime under Article 103 of the Criminal Law, then authorities could pressure Tibetans to choose between celebrating Losar or facing the possibility of punishment that could include criminal prosecution.
Fiftieth anniversary of March 10, 1959, the date when tens of thousands of Tibetans in Lhasa gathered outside the Dalai Lama's Norbulingka residence because they feared a People's Liberation Army plot to harm him. The Dalai Lama escaped from Lhasa a week later and fled into exile. On March 10 of every year since 1960 the Dalai Lama has made a formal statement to the Tibetan people. (See the Web site of the Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama for a chronology, biographical information on the Dalai Lama, and an archive of March 10 statements.)
First anniversary of March 10, 2008, the start of the wave of Tibetan protests. The protests resulted in a large number of Tibetan deaths, detentions, and disappearances according to reports by media and NGOs, but Chinese government measures to prevent information from leaving China have prevented a complete and accurate accounting of the consequences. Chinese officials blamed "the Dalai Clique" for "masterminding" the 2008 protests and rioting, and did not acknowledge the role of rising Tibetan frustration with Chinese policies. (See the CECC 2008 Annual Report for information on the Tibetan protests and their consequences. See Tibet: Special Focus for 2007 of the 2007 Annual Report, and Section VIII—Tibet of the 2006 Annual Report for additional information on Chinese government and Communist Party policies that deprive Tibetans of rights and freedoms nominally protected under China's Constitution and legal system.)
First observance of "Serfs Emancipation Day", March 28, 2009. The TAR People's Congress established the holiday on January 19, 2009, to commemorate the March 28, 1959, Chinese government decree that dissolved the Dalai Lama's Lhasa-based Tibetan government. Legchog (Lieque), the Chairman of the TAR PCSC, said on January 16, 2009, that Serfs Emancipation Day would "strengthen Tibetans' patriotism," according to a January 16 Xinhua report. RFA reported on January 16 that TAR prefectural and county officials had met to "ensure that all people mark the occasion with festivities." Chinese government measures to pressure Tibetans into celebrating the end of the Dalai Lama's government (and, by association, the departure of the Dalai Lama), have already provoked protests. For example, about 300 Tibetans, including monks, protested on January 10 in Jiangda (Jomda) county, Changdu (Chamdo) prefecture, TAR, in an attempt to dissuade local officials from sending a Tibetan dance troupe to Lhasa to participate in Serfs Emancipation Day celebrations, according to a February 9 Phayul report. Officials forced the dance troupe to depart for Lhasa on January 15 and authorities detained at least seven monks on January 24, the report said.

A Lhasa government official and the Dalai Lama have said in separate statements that current tensions could result in further protests. Lhasa Deputy Mayor Cao Bianjiang referred to the Dalai Lama at a February 10 press conference in Lhasa and said that "some people . . . do not want to see the peaceful development of Lhasa's economy," according to a Reuters report that day. "So it cannot be entirely avoided that some people continue to cause disturbances," Cao said. The Dalai Lama said on February 11 while visiting Germany that there is "too much anger" in Tibet and that "[a]t any moment an outburst could happen," according to Telegraph (U.K.) and Voice of America reports the same day.

According to information accessible by the public in the CECC Political Prisoner Database (PPD) as of February 17, 2009, security officials detained 24 Tibetans during January 2009 for political protest activity—more than during January in any other year since Tibetans resumed political activism in September 1987. The average number of political detentions of Tibetans during January in the years 1988 through 2008 was 3.7, based on information accessible by the public in the PPD. The increase in 2009 is consistent with statements anticipating a sustained increase in Tibetan protest activity noted above. The January 2009 detentions also are noteworthy for several other reasons.

The actual number of detentions during January may continue to increase beyond what has been reported thus far as additional information continues to come to light.
The Jiangda county protest was forward-looking, focusing on March 28 "Serfs Emancipation Day" ceremonies, rather than reactive, such as Tibetan protests against anti-Dalai Lama and "patriotic education" campaigns.
All 24 of the January 2009 detentions recorded in the PPD took place in Changdu prefecture or Ganzi (Kardze) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (TAP), Sichuan province. The two prefectures border each other, with the Yangzi River forming a boundary.
January has concluded only recently—the actual number of January protests and detentions may surpass what has been reported so far.

International media organizations have reported that Chinese authorities are closing Tibetan areas to foreign travelers in advance of the sensitive dates. According to a February 18 Telegraph (U.K.) report, officials in the TAR told tourist agencies not to accept tour groups for an unspecified period of time expected to last at least until the end of March. According to a February 12 Associated Press (AP) report (reprinted in Washington Post), several unidentified foreign journalists reported being expelled from unspecified Tibetan-populated areas of China during the week preceding the report. A tourism official in Gannan (Kanlho) TAP said that Gannan would be closed to foreigners until late March, according to the same report. Officials had closed parts of Ganzi TAP that had been open in late January, and only 3 counties (of 18) in the prefecture would remain open, AP said.

Ganzi and Gannan TAPs have been especially active protest areas since March 2008, based on information available in the CECC PPD. Ganzi TAP has been the site of more detentions of Tibetan protesters (not rioters) than any other prefectural-level Tibetan area during the period of protest that began on March 10, 2008. None of the 12 county-level areas where China's state-run media reported Tibetan rioting are located in Ganzi TAP (see Section V—Tibet, CECC 2008 Annual Report, endnote 6). As of February 23, 2009, the PPD contained information on 528 Tibetan protesters detained on or after March 10, 2008. Security officials detained 213 (40 percent) of the 528 protesters in Ganzi TAP. Authorities detained the next largest number of Tibetan protesters—82 persons—in Gannan TAP. PPD information on the detention of Tibetan protesters since March 10, 2008, is far from complete. Chinese government efforts to prevent information about the detention and imprisonment of Tibetan protesters from leaving China have prevented a complete and accurate accounting of the cases.

Source: -See Summary (2009-02-18 ) \| Posted on: 2009-05-15
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TAR Creates March 28 Holiday To Celebrate 1959 Dissolution of Dalai Lama's Government

Deputies to the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) People's Congress voted on January 19, 2009, to establish "Serfs Emancipation Day," a public holiday celebrating the March 28, 1959, Chinese government decree that dissolved the Dalai Lama's Lhasa-based Tibetan government, according to two January 19 Xinhua reports (1, 2 (translated in OSC, 22 January 09). Karma (Gama), Vice Chairman of the TAR People's Congress Standing Committee, explained at a January 19 press conference that Premier Zhou Enlai signed the State Council decree on March 28 "declaring a disbandment" of the Tibetan government after "the reactionary clique at the upper levels of Tibet led by the Dalai launched an all-round armed rebellion on 10 March, 1959, aimed at splitting the motherland." Legchog (Lieque), the Chairman of the Standing Committee, said Serfs Emancipation Day would "strengthen Tibetans' patriotism," according to a January 16 Xinhua report. TAR prefectural and county officials have met to "ensure that all people mark the occasion with festivities," according to a January 16 Radio Free Asia (RFA) report filed three days before the holiday was formally established. The report cited a TAR official who asked not to be identified and acknowledged that Tibetans are unwilling to celebrate the anniversary.

On March 10, 1959, tens of thousands of Tibetans in Lhasa gathered outside the Dalai Lama’s summer residence (the Norbulingka Palace), where he was residing at the time, because they feared a People's Liberation Army (PLA) plot to harm the Dalai Lama, according to biographical information available on the Web site of the Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama (OHHDL). Tension increased and on March 15 PLA artillery shells struck outside the Norbulingka, according to a chronology on the OHHDL Web site. The Dalai Lama escaped from Lhasa in disguise and under the cover of darkness on March 17, 1959. Earlier that day, PLA artillery shells exploded outside one of the Norbulingka gates, according to the Dalai Lama's autobiography, Freedom in Exile (p. 149). Speaking from India where he lives in exile, the Dalai Lama has on March 10 of every year since 1960 made a formal statement to the Tibetan people. (The Dalai Lama's 1961-2008 March 10 Statements are available on his official Web site.)

Most Tibetan Buddhists regard the Dalai Lama as their spiritual leader despite Party and government campaigns that seek to vilify and discredit him. Tibetan calls for the Dalai Lama to return to Tibet were widespread during the 2008 Tibetan protests (see below). The absence of any progress during the seventh and eighth rounds of the China-Dalai Lama dialogue in 2008 has deepened Tibetan frustration with the Chinese government. (See the Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC) 2008 Annual Report; Tibet: Special Focus for 2007 of the 2007 Annual Report; and Section VIII—Tibet of the 2006 Annual Report for more information on the status of negotiations between the Chinese government and the Dalai Lama's representatives, and the Chinese government and Party's anti-Dalai Lama campaign.).

Establishing "Serfs Emancipation Day" and requiring Tibetans to participate in celebrations of the end of the Dalai Lama's government (and, by association, the departure of the Dalai Lama), is provocative at a time of heightened Tibetan sensitivity, possibly increasing further the risks to what Chinese officials call "social stability." March 10 is also the one-year anniversary of the start in Lhasa in 2008 of a cascade of Tibetan protests that by April 2008 had reached across the TAR and the Tibetan autonomous areas located in Qinghai, Gansu, and Sichuan provinces. The protests resulted in a large number of deaths, detentions, and disappearances according to reports by media and non-government organizations, but Chinese government measures to prevent information from leaving China have obstructed a full or accurate accounting of the consequences. The Lhasa Intermediate People's Court handed down seven sentences in October and November 2008 ranging from eight years in prison to life imprisonment to Tibetans who allegedly provided information about events in Lhasa to Tibetan organizations based in India. Chinese officials blamed "the Dalai Clique" for "masterminding" the 2008 protests and rioting, and did not acknowledge the role of rising Tibetan frustration with Chinese policies. (See the CECC 2008 Annual Report for more information on the Tibetan protests and their consequences.)

Some Tibetans living in Tibetan autonomous areas of China intend to express in a passive manner their discontent with developments over the past year, including the death and imprisonment of Tibetan protesters, by foregoing the usual celebration of Losar, the Tibetan lunar New Year (February 25 in 2009), according to the January 16 RFA report, a January 27 International Campaign for Tibet (ICT) report, and a January 29 Washington Post (WP) report. A Tibetan source in Aba (Ngaba) county, located in Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture, Sichuan province, told RFA that Tibetans in the county are "observing a year of mourning in memory of those who were killed, tortured, and jailed during the protests in Tibet." The ICT report noted that "many Tibetans posted blogs and comments mostly opposing any celebration" of the New Year. A monk in Qinghai told the WP that instead of celebrating the Tibetan or Chinese New Year, he and other monks would not eat "good food" or set off firecrackers.

Tibetans in Lhasa adopted non-celebration of Losar to express collective dissatisfaction in 1992, the first Tibetan New Year following a 14-month period of martial law imposed on March 8, 1989, after three days of protests and rioting in Lhasa. According to one eyewitness account:

"That year, the first day of the Tibetan New Year, called Losar, fell on March 5, the anniversary of the demonstrations in 1988 and 1989. Many Lhasa residents had decided to acknowledge the coincidence of Tibetan New Year and March 5 not by doing, but by not doing. Contrary to tradition, tattered window-awnings, dirty door-hangings, and faded whitewash remained untouched, greeting the New Year with utter cheerlessness." (Steven Marshall, "Prisons in Tibet," in Elliot Sperling, Steven Marshall, Orville Schell, and Mickey Spiegel, Tibet Since 1950: Silence, Prison, or Exile, Aperture and Human Rights Watch (New York: Aperture, 2000), 144-149.

Source: -See Summary (2009-01-29 ) \| Posted on: 2009-05-10
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State Security Cases From Xinjiang Appear to Surge in 2008

Courts in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) completed trials in 2008 for a total of 268 cases involving crimes of endangering state security (ESS), a number that appears to represent a surge over previous years, based on available data. (See analysis below for more details.) The XUAR High People's Court announced the number of cases during a report made at a January 9, 2009, meeting of the XUAR People's Congress, according to a January 10 report on the Xinhua Xinjiang Web site. Crimes of ESS (also translated as "endangering national security") are defined in articles 102-113 of the Chinese Criminal Law to include acts such as separatism, espionage, and armed rebellion. Many of the ESS crimes carry the possibility of life imprisonment and capital punishment. The apparent rise in ESS cases came during a year in which authorities implemented harsh security measures throughout the XUAR amid preparations for the Beijing 2008 Summer Olympic Games and protests in Uyghur and Tibetan areas of China. The figure's release also comes after limited official reports in 2008 of terrorist activity in the region, although the figure may not reflect all cases of alleged terrorism pursued by authorities. In December, a XUAR court found that two men had engaged in terrorist activity earlier in the year and sentenced them to death for "intentional homicide" and "illegally producing guns, ammunition and explosives," crimes outside the ESS category. See December 17 Xinhua reports in English and Chinese (via Xinjiang Peace Net) for more information. In 2008, procuratorate offices in the XUAR capital of Urumqi approved arrests of 133 people in 51 cases involving crimes carried out by the "three forces," including ESS crimes along with other "crimes of serious violence" such as carrying out explosions, murder, plunder, and kidnapping, according to a January 23 report from Urumqi Online. The government uses the term "three forces" to designate what it deems as terrorist, separatist, and "extremist" threats to the region's stability. The Urumqi Online article reported that the number of cases and people involved represented increases of 64.5 percent and 75 percent, respectively.

Official information on the number of completed ESS trials in the XUAR follows data released in December 2008 showing that, as of November 2008, XUAR procuratorate offices had issued indictments in 204 such cases that year, involving 1,154 people, according to a Procuratorial Daily report posted January 4 on the Xinjiang Peace Net. In total, the procuratorates approved the arrests of 1,295 people suspected of ESS crimes as of November, according to the report. The information on the total number of ESS trials concluded in 2008 did not include the number of people involved.

Number of People Indicted in the XUAR Eclipses Nationwide Totals for Previous Years, Trial Figures Appear to Surge
The XUAR ESS indictment figures for January through November, 2008, are almost as high as nationwide ESS indictment totals in 2007 in terms of number of cases involved and are approximately double in terms of individuals involved. The number of people indicted in the XUAR is also double or more the number of people indicted nationwide in 2006 and 2005. In 2007, procuratorates nationwide issued indictments in 231 cases involving 619 people, according to China's National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) figures for that year. The previous year, there were indictments nationwide in 258 cases involving 561 people, according to NBS figures for 2006. The figure in 2005 was 185 cases and 349 individuals, according to a compilation of national data on arrests, indictments, and trials in The Dui Hua Foundation's Winter 2009 Dialogue Newsletter. Available data, including a comparison with total numbers of ESS cases tried nationwide in the past five years through 2007 (see The Dui Hua Foundation's compilation of figures) and information from the XUAR on ESS cases accepted by XUAR courts since 2003, also suggests that ESS trial figures in the XUAR in 2008 may have increased significantly from previous years. The head of the XUAR High People's Court reported in 2007 that since 2003, the XUAR court system has accepted an average of roughly 150 ESS cases per year, according to an August 14, 2007, article from the Xinhua Xinjiang Web site.

XUAR Justice System Places Stability "Above All Else"
The apparent surge in ESS cases from the XUAR comes amid information from XUAR procuratorate and court officials emphasizing their offices' roles in upholding stability. The January 4 Procuratorial Daily article reported, "Since 2008, all levels of the XUAR procuratorate have from start to finish taken safeguarding social stability as the utmost political task for strengthening legal supervision." The January 23 Urumqi Online article used similar language to describe procuratorial work in that city. At a meeting on "struggle against separatism" reeducation held by the XUAR procuratorate on December 1, a procuratorial official called on officials to recognize that stability "is above all else," according to a December 3 article from the Xinjiang Legal Daily. In August 2008, the head of the XUAR High People's Court "said [that XUAR courts] at all levels will always maintain high vigilance against ethnic separatism and illegal religious activities to safeguard the motherland's unity and national security and will give top priority to the trial of crimes endangering national security," according to a description of his remarks reported in an August 15, 2008, China News Service article (via Open Source Center, subscription required).

For more information on conditions in the XUAR, see section IV--Xinjiang in the CECC 2008 Annual Report.

Source: -See Summary (2009-01-15 / English) \| Posted on: 2009-04-16
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Propaganda Officials Censor Coverage of Beijing Fire

Propaganda officials in Beijing ordered Chinese Web sites to delete blogs and discussion groups about a fire at a hotel under construction on the grounds of China Central Television's (CCTV) headquarters that began on the evening of February 9, 2009, according to a February 11 Los Angeles (LA) Times article. The officials also ordered Chinese media not to publish photos, videos, or in-depth reports about the fire, which took place in Beijing, and to run only official stories issued by the Xinhua News Agency instead of their own reports, the article said. Other foreign and Hong Kong media reported the existence of a propaganda order whose description closely matches the description in the LA Times article, including a February 11 Agence France-Presse (AFP) report (via Straits Times), a February 11 Times of London report, a February 10 New York Times (NYT) report, and a February 10 Apple Daily (Hong Kong) report (subscription required).

The fire, which reportedly began at 8:27 pm, quickly engulfed the 30-story hotel, and was allegedly caused by an illegal fireworks show arranged by CCTV employees for the last day of China's Lunar New Year holiday, according to a February 11 Xinhua article. The timing of the propaganda order is unclear. Apple Daily, citing the Hong Kong-based Information Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, reported that at 11:15 pm on the night of the fire, the Network News Management Department of the Beijing Municipal Internet Propaganda Management Office under the Beijing Municipal Government issued the propaganda order. LA Times reported that by the next morning the "Beijing propaganda ministry" issued the order.

The impetus behind the order is also unclear, although a flood of comments on the Internet after the fire reflected public anger toward CCTV and may have prompted the order, according to AFP and LA Times. LA Times reported that the fire "laid bare simmering anger and resentment toward the network both for spending public money on grand construction projects and for continuing to broadcast government propaganda." The state-run CCTV is China's sole national television network and reaches more than a billion viewers, according to an August 21, 2008, NYT article. According to the network's Web site, CCTV serves as "an important mouthpiece for the Communist Party, government, and people."

Propaganda officials, led by the Communist Party's Central Propaganda Department (CPD), frequently issue orders to Chinese media intending to ensure that news coverage is consistent with the Party's political agenda. Prior to last year's Beijing Olympics, propaganda officials issued a number of orders to journalists, banning coverage of politically sensitive topics such as food safety issues and directing them on how to cover controversies arising before and during the Olympics. In December 2008, the CPD reportedly issued two orders instructing domestic news organizations to stop reporting on a CCTV reporter who had been arrested at her home in Beijing by officials from Shanxi province and to run only Xinhua versions of the story, according to a December 12 South China Morning Post (Hong Kong) article (subscription required). Propaganda officials often direct media to run only Xinhua stories following events deemed politically sensitive. Xinhua is an institution directly under the control of the State Council, China's central government, according to the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China's Web site. In January 2009, top Party officials said the propaganda agenda for 2009 would focus on safeguarding economic development and social stability.

Reporting by Xinhua and other official outlets appeared to dominate initial coverage of the fire although news outlets were observed later to publish their own photos and stories. State media did not report the fire until 10 pm, with Xinhua leading the way with just a one-sentence brief, according to a February 12 South China Morning Post article (subscription required). (According to Xinhua's Web site, at 10:07 pm the news agency issued a one-sentence story and at 10:14 pm published several photos.) According to the Beijing Youth Daily's Web site, the paper posted pictures and a brief story from the official Chinanews.com on February 9. Early on February 10, the paper published its own story that reported similar content as Xinhua reports printed elsewhere (see, e.g., February 10 Beijing Daily article), including the report that top Chinese officials, among them CPD Director Liu Yunshan, had rushed to the scene. On February 11, the paper issued a lengthier report including its own photos. The extent to which such reporting was consistent with the propaganda order reported here or other orders not known to the public is unclear. A previous Congressional Executive Commission on China analysis reported that in May 2008 many Chinese journalists ignored an order prohibiting them from traveling to Sichuan province to cover an earthquake.

The geographic scope of the order is also unclear. In Beijing, residents had difficulty finding images of the fire in the city's newspapers, on the Internet, or on television, according to the February 10 NYT article. Outside of Beijing, however, "photos and giant headlines about the fire were splashed across the front pages of newspapers throughout the country," according to a February 10 report on the Danwei Web site, which issues commentary on media, advertising, and urban life in China.

For more information on the Chinese government and Party's censorship of Chinese media, see Section II - Freedom of Expression, in the Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2008 Annual Report.

Source: -See Summary (2009-02-17 ) \| Posted on: 2009-03-12
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Officials' Early Response to Unemployment and "Social Unrest" During Downturn

Since late 2008, Premier Wen Jiabao and other high level officials have made public statements acknowledging rising unemployment in China and the new challenges to "social stability" posed by unemployed migrant workers, according to a January 28 BBC report and a February 2 Financial Times report. (For more discussion of "social stability" and "social unrest," see the Preface and General Overview in the Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2008 Annual Report.)

Lower Economic Growth and Higher Unemployment
Chinese officials have stressed that 8 percent is the minimum needed to create enough jobs to avoid unrest, according to a January 29 Economist report. The latest economic figures may add to the leadership's concern. China's gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate slowed to 6.8 percent in the fourth quarter of 2008, marking the lowest growth rate since 2002, according to a January 22 China Daily report citing an official from China's National Bureau of Statistics.

Among the challenges associated with the downturn, two issues related to employment--migrant workers' returning home and employment of college graduates--remain the most worrisome to Chinese leaders despite new measures to sustain economic growth and restrain inflation, as Premier Wen Jiabao has indicated, according to a December 20, 2008, China News report. According to Wen, employment of college graduates is a top priority for the government because 6.5 million college graduates are expected to join the workforce in 2009, and even if China's economy attains the 8 percent target growth rate in 2009, it can provide at most 9 million jobs.

Furthermore, an estimated 20 million migrant workers throughout China either have lost jobs or returned home without employment due to the global financial crisis, according to Chen Xiwen, a rural issues expert who serves as director of the Office of the Central Leading Group on Rural Work and deputy director of the Office of the Central Leading Group on Finance and Economics, as quoted in a February 2 Caijing report. Chen also stated that unemployment among migrant workers may deteriorate during the first half of 2009 before the financial crisis "hits the bottom."

Concern over "Social Unrest"
In response to rising unemployment among migrant workers and the possibility of "mass incidents" related to social problems exacerbated by the economic downturn, the government has issued new policies, including the State Council Circular Regarding Handling Current Migrant Worker Affairs (State Council Circular) on December 20, 2008, PRC Central People's Government Opinions Regarding Promoting Agricultural Development and Increasing Farmers' Income (Or the so-called "No. 1 Document") on December 31, 2008, and Guiding Opinion Regarding Handling Current Economic Situation and Stabilizing Labor Relations on January 23, 2009. These three documents place emphasis on migrant workers, farmers, and laborers respectively, but they all make reference to "maintaining social harmony and stability" during the financial crisis.

Labor disputes nearly doubled in the first 10 months of 2008 compared to the same period of 2007, according to Wang Shenqjun, president of the Supreme People's Court, as quoted in a December 22, 2008, Radio Free Asia report. The Sunday Times documented numerous protests by farmers, factory workers, and teachers against their employers and government offices in Guangdong, Zhejiang, and Jiangsu provinces in December 2008 and January 2009, according to its February 1, 2009, report.

Officials have identified sensitive issues such as confiscation of rural land, environmental pollution, citizen relocation and resettlement, and handling of collective properties that may trigger "mass incidents," according to a February 2, 2009, Xinhua report. In response to a question regarding how local governments should handle protests, Chen Xiwen explained:

"If 'mass incidents' happen, leaders at all levels must be at the front line to explain to the people and persuade them face-to-face. Leaders cannot hide behind public security or the police, thus causing conflicts. Except for those unfortunate situations where there is beating, attacking, robbing, or burning, in principle, no police should be deployed. Leaders at all levels should go to the front line to solve problems."

Chen also cited 'mass incidents' in Guizhou and Yunnan provinces in 2008 as examples of local authorities' "poor handling" of protests and harming the people's interests as a result.

Migrant Workers and Hukou
The economic downturn, the concern over unemployed migrant workers, and official unease about "social unrest" also have rekindled discussion of how to implement long-term protections for migrant workers effectively, and of the possible abolition of the household registration (hukou) system. (For a discussion of China's household registration system, see section II--Freedom of Residence in the CECC 2008 Annual Report, including the Addendum: Recent Hukou Reforms (pp. 105-112); for a broader retrospective, see also the CECC October 2005 CECC topic paper on China's household registration system, and a chart on Chinese Hukou reforms as of 2004.)

China has 950 million citizens who hold rural hukou, including 130 million migrant workers who have rural hukou but work and live in urban areas, according to a January 19, 2009, Caijing report. Migrant workers without urban hukou are more vulnerable to exploitation. The economic downturn risks "amplifying rights violations" linked to China's discriminatory hukou system, which denies migrant workers the social welfare benefits available to those who hold urban hukou, according to a Human Rights Watch statement on January 23. Many unemployed migrant workers without urban hukou choose to return home after losing jobs. However, disputes occur when migrant workers return home to find that their land has been either "collectively contracted" without their consent by local officials for other commercial purposes or contracted to other farmers, according to the January 19 Caijing report. For the longer-term protection of migrant workers and to prevent "social instability," experts have called for accelerating hukou reforms that would allow migrant workers to integrate fully into the urban system, according to a January 25, 2009, Xinhua report, and Caijing reports on December 18 and 23, 2008.

For more information on the economic downturn and "social instability," see a previous CECC analysis: Officials To Strengthen Security Before Anniversaries and During Economic Downturns.

Source: -See Summary (2009-02-19 / English) \| Posted on: 2009-03-12
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Government Calls for Strengthening Propaganda on Ethnic Policy

Two central government agencies recently issued an outline to strengthen propaganda education on the government and Communist Party's policy on ethnic issues, according to reports from Chinese media. The undated Outline Concerning Propaganda Education on the Party and State's Ethnic Policy (Outline) was issued by the Central Propaganda Bureau and State Ethnic Affairs Commission and publicized in early February. (See, e.g., a February 4 Xinhua article describing the Outline.) The Outline follows other efforts in recent months to bolster state policy on ethnic issues, in areas including the promotion of "ethnic unity education" and the advancement of science and technology development among ethnic minorities. The policy guidelines come in the aftermath of demonstrations in spring 2008 by Tibetans and Uyghurs protesting government policies toward these groups. Tibetans and Uyghurs are among the 55 groups designated as "minority ethnicities" (shaoshu minzu, also translated as "minority nationalities") by the Chinese government.

The recent Outline on propaganda education affirms state policy toward ethnic minority groups and ethnic relations, provides a description of specific measures to address ethnic issues, and outlines methods for enhancing policy implementation. Specific features include:

Affirming the Importance of Ethnic Unity

Several points within the Outline provide an overview of China's status as a multiethnic country and describe the recent state of ethnic relations.

According to the Outline, China's multiethnic status "has been the determinant that strengthening ethnic unity, in the final analysis, is a major task affecting the unification of the motherland, territorial integrity, and consolidating frontier defense." (Point 1)
While affirming that all ethnic groups are equal and are "masters of their own affairs" within the socialist system, the Outline also notes outstanding problems remain as a result of factors such as inadequate mutual understanding among ethnic groups, discrepancies in economic and cultural development, a historical legacy of ethnic bias and estrangement among ethnic groups, and poor understanding of the legal structure affecting ethnic groups. (Point 3)
The Outline also notes that "international hostile forces" continue to carry out the "political schemes" of "westernization" and "separatism." According to the Outline, these "hostile forces" coordinate with "domestic ethnic separatist forces" to use "so-called ethnic, religious, and human rights issues" to carry out activities such as "infiltration" and "subversion." The Outline describes March 2008 protests in Tibetan areas as an "alarm bell" in this respect. (Point 3)

Affirming State Policy as a "Lifeline" for Ethnic Unity

The Outline affirms the state's existing model for dealing with ethnic issues, noting that Party policy "has concentrated the wisdom and painstaking effort of several generations of Party figures in their dealing with ethnic issues, and it is an important component of the Party's basic theories, basic vocabulary, basic programs, and basic experiences[.]" (Point 5)
It also highlights the importance of strengthening ethnic relations and ethnic unity in order to realize full implementation of Party policy, while also noting that improving ethnic relations and unity can only be truly achieved under Party policy. (Point 6)

Describing State Policy

Several points within the Outline provide a general overview of Party policy on ethnic issues.

The Outline describes equality among ethnic groups as a cornerstone of Party policy and describes legal protections for ethnic minorities within the PRC Constitution and laws. It adds that the state guarantees equal rights in areas including employment and that each ethnic group has the right to use and develop its own language. (Point 8) (The Congressional-Executive Commission on China has observed job hiring practices in both government and private sectors that discriminate against ethnic minorities. See analyses from 2005, 2006, and 2009. It has also tracked policies that undercut protections for ethnic minority languages stipulated in Chinese law.)
While acknowledging that problems remain in ethnic relations and ethnic unity, the Outline attributes them to "contradictions among the people" and calls for promoting "principles, legal institutions, policies, and strategies" to remedy this. It also calls for resisting "international hostile forces raising the banner of such things as 'ethnicity,' 'religion,' and 'human rights' to carry out westernization and separatist activities toward our country." In addition, it calls for striking against the "infiltration and sabotage" of "ethnic separatist forces, religious extremist forces, and violent terrorist forces." (Point 9)
The Outline describes its system of self-government in designated ethnic minority areas as a basic policy that promotes ethnic minorities' right to autonomy. At the same time, the Outline stresses the role of autonomous governments in guaranteeing the fundamental policies of the Party and central government. (Point 10)

Strengthening Implementation of State Policy

The Outline concludes with a call for propaganda education on the state's policy on ethnic issues, calling for education among both ethnic minorities and "especially" among Han Chinese, and education of both the public and "especially" of cadres. (Point 13)
The Outline also calls on service providers, employers, and other groups to observe legal provisions that protect equality among ethnic groups. In addition, it calls for preventing situations that "hurt the feelings of ethnic groups and injure ethnic unity" (Point 14), sentiments that have been used in the past to promote publishing restrictions.

Although it attributes outstanding problems to "contradictions among the people" rather than shortcomings in state policy, the Outline's attention to existing problems underscores the barriers that ethnic minority citizens of China continue to face in protecting their rights. As noted in the CECC 2007 and 2008 Annual Reports, ethnic minorities in China do not enjoy the "right to administer their internal affairs" as guaranteed to them in Chinese law. Overarching Party and government policy limits the scope of China's regional ethnic autonomy system and places curbs on autonomous governments' legislative powers. Although the Chinese government protects some aspects of ethnic minority rights and is more tolerant of ethnic minority communities not perceived to challenge state policies, shortcomings in both the substance and the implementation of Chinese policies toward ethnic minorities prevent ethnic minority citizens from enjoying their rights in line with domestic Chinese law and international legal standards.

For additional information, see the "Special Focus" on ethnic minority issues within the CECC 2005 Annual Report, Section II--Ethnic Minority Rights and Section IV--Tibet in the 2007 Annual Report and Section II--Ethnic Minority Rights, Section IV--Xinjiang, and Section V--Tibet in the 2008 Annual Report.

Source: -See Summary (2009-02-17 ) \| Posted on: 2009-03-12
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Chengdu Court Postpones Trial of Activist Huang Qi

The Wuhou District People's Court in Chengdu, Sichuan province, postponed the trial of rights activist Huang Qi after initially notifying Huang's wife and his lawyer on February 2, 2009, that the trial would be held the next day, according to February 2 articles in the Washington Post (WP) and Associated Press (AP, via WTOP.com). Huang's wife, Zeng Li, said the court called her twice on February 2, first informing her of the trial date on the next day, and later telling her the date had been postponed and that she would receive three days' notice before the trial. No new date has been announced. Huang, founder of the rights advocacy Web site, 64tianwang.com, has been detained since June 2008 on charges of illegally possessing state secrets. Prior to his detention, Huang had traveled to areas affected by the May 2008 Sichuan earthquake and posted articles on his Web site about demands by parents for compensation and an investigation into school collapses that killed thousands of children.

The court's original one-day notice would have violated Chinese law had it been carried out. Article 151(4) of the Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) requires the court to notify the defendant's counsel and representatives no later than three days before the opening of the court session. Furthermore, Article 151(2) requires the court to deliver the indictment to the defendant no later than 10 days before the opening of a court session. One of Huang's lawyers, Mo Shaoping, called the one-day notice "a totally illegal process," according to the AP article. According to Mo, the judge blamed the short notice on difficulties reaching Huang's lawyer and family. Mo and Zeng told AP that their addresses and phone numbers were contained in court documents. Moreover, Zeng said she had been trying to reach the court for weeks to no avail. Prosecutors and court officials told WP they were not permitted to speak to foreign media, and the AP's calls to the court on February 2 went unanswered.

The underlying activity giving rise to the state secrets charge is unclear. Mo told Agence France-Presse (AFP) last September that authorities had questioned Huang about interviews he conducted while visiting areas affected by the Sichuan earthquake, according to a September 24 AFP article. "They also asked him about issues regarding his charge of illegally possessing state secrets," Mo told AFP. Mo was not able to disclose further information about the state secret Huang is alleged to have possessed. The Chinese government takes a broad interpretation of what constitutes a state secret that potentially includes essentially any matter of public concern. "There's an expansive definition of state secrets, and the problem is it cannot be challenged, and very often the courts don't see the documents that are allegedly state secrets," Nicholas Bequelin, a China researcher for Human Rights Watch, told the New York Times in a February 2 article about Huang's case. "There's no mechanism under Chinese law to challenge something that the prosecution says is a state secret. So basically, if you're charged with state secrets, it's unlikely you can shake the charges," Bequelin said. Furthermore, by alleging that a defendant's case involves state secrets, authorities may deny the defendant access to a lawyer. In a March 10, 2006, report (searchable by date on the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights Web site) based on visits to China, the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment noted that China's vaguely defined crimes of endangering state security, splittism, subverting state power, and supplying state secrets left "their application open to abuse particularly of the rights to freedom of religion, speech, and assembly," and recommended the abolition of such "political crimes."

Plainclothes police took Huang into custody on June 10, 2008. Chengdu public security officials formally arrested him on July 18 on the state secrets charge. Under Article 96 of the CPL, lawyers in state secrets cases must obtain the approval of investigating authorities before meeting with a client. Mo was not able to meet with Huang until September 23, according to the September 24 AFP article. Huang's lawyers have criticized their lack of access to the police's evidence and case files, according to the AFP article and a November 12 Radio Free Asia (RFA) article (in Chinese). According to the RFA article and a November 14 Voice of America (VOA) article (in Chinese), prosecutors have returned the case to police for supplementary investigation on two occasions, the second occurring in November. VOA quoted one of Huang's lawyers as saying the supplementary investigations indicated that the state's evidence was insufficient.

Huang previously served a five-year sentence from 2000 to 2005 for "inciting subversion of state power." The court in that case cited articles Huang posted on his Web site dealing with topics such as "democracy," "June 4," and "Falun Gong."

For more information on Huang's case, please see his record of detention, searchable through the Congressional-Executive Commission on China's Political Prisoner Database.

Source: -See Summary (2009-02-06 ) \| Posted on: 2009-03-12
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Top Officials Say Propaganda in 2009 To Focus on Economy and Stability

In early January 2009, top Chinese Communist Party officials outlined a propaganda agenda for the year that focuses on safeguarding economic development and social stability. Li Changchun, a member of the Party's Politburo Standing Committee, and Liu Yunshan, Director of the Party's Central Propaganda Department (CPD), a department responsible for censorship of China's media, outlined the agenda during the National Propaganda Directors' meeting in Beijing on January 4-5, according to a January 5 Xinhua article.

Saying there had been "new, complex changes in the domestic and international situation," Li named safeguarding "economic development" and "social stability" as two of the four most important tasks for the year. Li told officials to improve their guidance of public opinion. They should provide "a favorable public opinion environment for maintaining the calm, steady, and relatively fast development of the economy and society," "vigorously promote social stability," and "maintain the favorable situation of unity, harmony, and stability," Li said. He also said that officials should "vigorously highlight that the Communist Party is good, socialism is good" and promote the celebration of the 60th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China.

Liu announced a "concrete agenda for propaganda, ideological, and cultural work in 2009" that included "integrating a heightened sense of crisis with shoring up confidence" and "integrating insistence on positive propaganda with defusing public emotion." He also said that officials should "seize the critical links" to promote propaganda overseas and through the press, and literature and art publications.

Li and Liu's statements regarding the direction of the Party's propaganda agenda are in line with concerns expressed recently by other Chinese officials over increasing "social unrest" in 2009, amid the country's economic downturn and the run-up to several significant anniversaries. Propaganda officials had already received instructions to put a positive spin on China's economy. In November 2008, Liu Yunshan called on them to prioritize "economic propaganda work," with "positive propaganda" as their guiding principle.

Propaganda officials, led by the CPD, monitor and censor domestic news to ensure consistency with the Party's political agenda. Li and Liu's statements may indicate the targets for censorship this year. Over the last several months, officials have targeted a number of news organizations for economic reports perceived to be "negative."

The Hong Kong-based Information Centre for Human Rights and Democracy reported that authorities in Shanxi province suspended two journalists and two editors for producing a television episode on the potential bankruptcy of a Linfen textile mill and the uncertain future of the mill's 6,300 workers, according to a January 6 Associated Press/Kyodo article (via Breitbart.com) and a January 6 Radio Free Asia article. The episode, which was to air on the program "Concern" [Guanzhu] in December 2008, was never broadcast after Linfen officials reviewing the episode canceled the program for "serious political error." The clips reportedly showed workers protesting at the Linfen government building.

In September 2008, the Inner Mongolia Press and Publication Bureau ordered the three-month suspension of the China Business Post after it published a report in July critical of the Agricultural Bank of China, which at the time was preparing for a stock offering.

In September 2008, propaganda officials ordered major financial Web sites to remove "negative" reports regarding China's stock markets, according to a September 10 South China Morning Post article (subscription required).

The Party's propaganda agenda does not mean that China's state-controlled media will entirely avoid stories relating to the economic downturn. China's media, for example, have reported on the government's acknowledgement of rising unemployment and slowing economic growth (see, e.g., a February 2, 2009, Caijing article, on a government official's estimates that 20 million migrant workers are unemployed, and a January 22, 2009, China Daily article, on the decrease in GDP growth in the fourth quarter of 2008). Such stories are not necessarily inconsistent with the Party's agenda. Commentators have noted that the Internet has forced government officials to respond more quickly and openly to news developments in order to maintain control of the agenda, according to a November 18, 2008, Bloomberg report (reprinted in International Herald Tribune).

For more information on how the Chinese government and Party censor China's media, see Section II - Freedom of Expression, in the Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2008 Annual Report.

Source: -See Summary (2009-02-05 ) \| Posted on: 2009-03-12
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Uyghur Historian Released From Prison

Uyghur historian Tohti Tunyaz completed his 11-year sentence for "inciting splittism" and "unlawfully obtaining state secrets" on February 10, 2009, according to information accessible to the public in the Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC) Political Prisoner Database, and he has since been released from prison, according to February 10 reports from the Sankei and Mainichi (via Yahoo) newspapers, based on information from sources close to the case. According to the reports, after being met by his sister at the prison in Urumqi, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), Tohti Tunyaz traveled to a relative's home. The Sankei report said it is unclear whether Tohti Tunyaz will be allowed to return to Japan, where he had previously lived. According to the Mainichi report, his wife and two children reside in Japan.

As noted in the CECC Political Prisoner Database, on February 11, 1998, Chinese authorities detained Tohti Tunyaz, an ethnic Uyghur citizen of China based at Tokyo University in Japan, while he was visiting the XUAR to conduct research on Uyghur history. On March 10, 1999, the Urumqi Intermediate People's Court sentenced him to 11 years’ imprisonment for "inciting splittism" and "unlawfully supplying state secrets to entities outside China," crimes under Articles 103 and 111 of the Criminal Law. On February 15, 2000, the Xinjiang High People's Court rejected his appeal, but it changed the charge of "unlawfully supplying state secrets" to foreign entities to the charge of "unlawfully obtaining state secrets," a crime under Article 282 of the Criminal Law. Sources close to the case said the alleged "state secrets" were a list of documents from an official librarian and sources said that Tohti Tunyaz had not published a separatist book, though the trial court alleged he had. On May 17, 2001, the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention found his imprisonment to be arbitrary and in violation of his right to freedom of thought, expression, and opinion (decision via University of Minnesota Human Rights Library). Tohti Tunyaz served his sentence in the Xinjiang Number 3 Prison in Urumqi.

Authorities in the XUAR continue to hold other Uyghurs in detention for exercising their right to free expression, based on information accessible to the public in the CECC Political Prisoner Database. Cases include:

Miradil Yasin and Mutellip Téyip. Xinjiang University (XU) security staff detained Miradil (Mir'adil) Yasin and Mutellip Téyip on December 20, 2008, for distributing leaflets on campus calling on students to hold a demonstration. XU staff notified public security offices, which took the two young men into detention.

Mehbube Ablesh. An employee in the advertising department at the Xinjiang People's Radio Station, Mehbube Ablesh was fired from her job in August 2008 and detained in apparent connection to her writings for the Internet that were critical of government policies, including "bilingual" education.

Nurmemet Yasin. A XUAR court sentenced writer Nurmemet (Nurmuhemmet) Yasin to 10 years in prison in 2005 for "inciting splittism'' after he wrote a story about a caged bird who commits suicide rather than live without freedom. Korash Huseyin, chief editor of the journal that published Nurmemet Yasin's story, received a three-year sentence in 2005 for "dereliction of duty." Korash Huseyin completed his sentence in February 2008 and is presumed to have been released from prison.

Abdulla Jamal. Authorities arrested teacher Abdulla Jamal in April 2005, after he submitted for publication a manuscript that authorities claimed incited separatism. The arrest followed his detention a month earlier, along with the detention of 3 other teachers and 17 or 18 students, ostensibly for involvement in a fight between ethnic Uyghur and Han Chinese students.

Abdulghani Memetemin. A XUAR court sentenced journalist Abdulghani Memetemin to nine years' imprisonment in 2003 for providing information on government repression against Uyghurs to an overseas organization that reports on human rights abuses in the XUAR. Authorities characterized this act as "supplying state secrets to an organization outside the country."

The CECC reported in its 2008 Annual Report that repression in the XUAR increased in 2008 amid preparations for the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympic Games, limited official reports of terrorist activity, and protests among Uyghurs and Tibetans in China. Authorities implemented harsh security measures, especially among the ethnic Uyghur population, including wide-scale detentions, inspections of households, restrictions on Uyghurs' domestic and international travel, restrictions on peaceful protest, and increased controls over religious activity and religious practitioners. The government also continued to strengthen policies aimed at diluting Uyghur ethnic identity and promoting assimilation. Since publishing its 2008 Annual Report, the CECC has observed a continuation of harsh security measures and policies that place assimilation pressures on ethnic minorities.

For additional information about conditions in the XUAR, see the CECC 2008 Annual Report.

Source: -See Summary (2009-02-03 ) \| Posted on: 2009-03-12
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Restrictions on Information Access in Tibetan Areas Increase

Internet and cell phone text messaging services in Tibetan areas of western China reportedly have been disrupted, according to a March 10, 2009, Associated Press (AP) article and a February 22, 2009, Reuters article. While access to the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) itself has remained severely restricted, foreign journalists recently reported greater harassment in Tibetan areas in neighboring provinces outside the TAR, according to a March 9 statement of the Foreign Correspondents Club of China (FCCC), an association of Beijing-based journalists. The communications disruptions and harassment of foreign journalists coincide with a series of dates that many Tibetans consider to have a high level of cultural and political sensitivity, and have made it difficult to access and verify information about reported increases in security measures implemented by Chinese officials, and the impact of such measures on Tibetans and other residents in those areas.

AP reported that Internet and cell phone text messaging services in the region were "spotty" and that residents of Lhasa, the capital of the TAR, had received a text message from cell phone service provider China Mobile warning of disruptions to phone calls and text messages between March 10 to May 1 "due to networks improvements." A China Mobile customer service representative reportedly confirmed the message's existence to AP. The Reuters article reported that unnamed residents across the region said they were not able to send or receive text messages or to access the Internet. Chinanews.com, an official state news agency, said that cell phones were operating normally in Lhasa and cited reports from cell phone stores in Lhasa that there had been no noticeable rise in complaints about cell phone users not being able to dial out or receive text messages, according to a March 10 article

The popular Tibetcul.com Web site reportedly has been shut down since the afternoon of March 5. According to a March 5 statement on the Web site and a March 7 Reuters article, the Web site closed for repairs on March 5 and would be inoperable for about a week. The site featured news from China's state-controlled media as well as cultural and Buddhist content, according to the Reuters article.

FCCC's March 9 statement urged the Chinese government to "halt a wave of detentions of journalists and open Tibetan areas for news coverage." The association reported that in the previous week officials detained, turned back, and confiscated the tapes of, reporters from at least six media organizations attempting to visit Tibetan areas in the provinces of Gansu, Sichuan, and Qinghai. Under foreign reporting regulations issued in October 2008, foreign reporters are generally allowed to report without restrictions, although officials made clear at the time that foreign reporters would still require special permits to travel to the TAR. FCCC reported that in the recent instances officials gave no legal basis for the restrictions outside the TAR. AP reported on February 12 that local officials have been barring foreigners not only from the TAR, but from other parts of western China with large Tibetan populations. Furthermore, on March 11 AP reported that the travel ban had been extended to Jiuzhaigou valley in Sichuan province. Jampa Phuntsog (Xiangba Pingcuo), Chairman of the TAR government, recently described the conditions foreign reporters should meet in order to be allowed into the TAR, saying that the TAR's "door is always open" to foreign journalists "as long as the reporters conduct their coverage in a just and objective way that is conducive to Tibet's social and economic development," according to a March 6 Xinhua report.

The FCCC statement also said that the journalists reported official intimidation of their Chinese co-workers, with one suggesting that officials were targeting Chinese counterparts who could not benefit from any protection the new regulations might afford.

The series of sensitive dates in 2009 includes the Tibetan New Year (Losar) on February 25, the fiftieth anniversary of March 10, 1959, the date when tens of thousands of Tibetans in Lhasa gathered outside the Dalai Lama's Norbulingka residence because they feared a People's Liberation Army plot to harm him, and the first observance of "Serfs Emancipation Day" on March 28, a government-established holiday marking the end of the Dalai Lama's government. Officials in Lhasa, the capital of the TAR, have launched a "strike hard" anti-crime campaign involving stepped up checks on residents. Foreign media accounts of the period note an increase in police and military presence in Tibetan areas, but that verifying the situation is difficult. (See, e.g., March 10 AP article). Similar communications disruptions and harassment of foreign journalists were evident following a series of protests in Tibetan areas that began on March 10, 2008, in Lhasa and spread to the Tibetan areas of Sichuan, Gansu, and Qinghai provinces. (For CECC analysis of these protests, click here.)

For more information on the Chinese government's attempts to control media coverage and access to information about the Tibetan protests in 2008, see Section II - Freedom of Expression, in the Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2008 Annual Report.

Source: -See Summary (2009-03-11 ) \| Posted on: 2009-03-12
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Chinese Government Mandates "Ethnic Unity Education" to Promote Party Policy on Ethnic Groups

The Chinese government has directed schools throughout the country to implement "ethnic unity education," in a stated effort to promote Communist Party policy on ethnic minorities. The trial Guiding Program on Ethnic Unity Education in Schools, issued November 26, 2008, by the Ministry of Education and State Ethnic Affairs Commission (SEAC) and publicized in December (see a December 15 Xinhua report on the Central People's Government Web site), calls for "ethnic unity education" starting in grade three of elementary school and extending to high school and vocational schools. Describing work to promote ethnic unity as an "inevitable demand" for strengthening "socialist ethnic relations" and safeguarding stability and unification of the country, the program requires schools to guarantee teaching 10-12 hours a year of "ethnic unity education" in elementary and junior high school, 8-10 hours in high school, and 12-14 hours at the vocational school level. The content of the classes, which must use government-approved teaching materials, includes general information on China's ethnic groups and adds a focus on issues including "safeguarding the unification of the motherland" and "opposing separatism" starting in the upper levels of elementary school. Students in high school also study other multiethnic countries and learn the "superiority of the Communist Party's and [Chinese] state's ethnic minority policy." The "ethnic unity education" curriculum also includes topics such as the state's "guarantee of ethnic minorities' freedom of religious belief" and their rights to "preserve and reform" their customs and "use and develop" ethnic minority languages.

The November 2008 program comes after Tibetans and Uyghurs held demonstrations earlier in the year challenging the Chinese government's ethnic minority policies, though the program also builds on earlier efforts to promote ethnic unity education. (For more information, see previous CECC analyses on the Tibetan and Uyghur demonstrations. For information on older central and local government attention to the promotion of "ethnic unity education," see, for example, article 6 of the 1995 Education Law, a 2004 report on the Tonghai county, Yunnan province, government Web site, and a 2005 report (estimated date) from the Henan province Ethnic Affairs Commission Web site.) The Uyghur and Tibetan demonstrators in 2008 had protested issues including government restrictions on religious practice and controls over cultural expression. Following the demonstrations, local governments in Uyghur and Tibetan areas have reported on wide-scale education campaigns in local schools that include focus on "ethnic unity" and anti-separatism. (See a previous CECC analysis for more information on campaigns in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. For information on campaigns in Tibetan areas, see, e.g., an April 30, 2008, report on the Tibet Autonomous Region government Web site and a June 27 report on the Lhasa municipal government Web site.)

The program also comes amid central government statements emphasizing the broad promotion of ethnic unity. See, e.g., a November 4 report on the Central People's Government Web site, a December 24 Xinhua report, and a December 31 People's Daily report by the SEAC Leading Party Group (via Xinhua).

For more information on conditions for ethnic minorities in China, see Section II--Ethnic Minority Rights, Section IV--Xinjiang, and Section V--Tibet, in the Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2008 Annual Report, as well as the Special Focus on ethnic minorities in the 2005 Annual Report.

Source: -See Summary (2008-12-19 / English) \| Posted on: 2009-02-03
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Lhasa Court Sentences Tibetans for Sharing Information With "The Dalai Clique"

A Communist Party-run newspaper has provided the first detailed information about Tibetans convicted and sentenced to terms of imprisonment for nonviolent activity that authorities link to rioting on March 14, 2008, in and near Lhasa, the capital of the Tibet Autonomous Region. The November 8, 2008, Lhasa Evening News (LEN) report asserted that the defendants had "endangered state security." China's state-run media has previously provided legal process information about the cases of only a few dozen Tibetan "rioters," but almost no information about the large but unknown number of Tibetans believed to have been detained in connection with peaceful protest activity. (See the CECC 2008 Annual Report for more information on the 2008 Tibetan protests and their consequences.)

The LEN article (translated in a December 22 International Campaign for Tibet report) described "four 'March 14 incident' cases" involving a total of seven Tibetans who allegedly provided information ("intelligence") to Tibetan organizations based in India that are part of what the Chinese government and Communist Party refer to collectively as "the Dalai Clique." The report did not, however, mention the Dalai Lama himself or provide any information directly linking any of the four cases to the March 14 protests and rioting. The Lhasa Intermediate People's Court sentenced one Tibetan to life imprisonment and six Tibetans to fixed terms of imprisonment ranging from 8 to 15 years on charges of "espionage" (Criminal Law, Article 110) or "illegally sending intelligence abroad" (Article 111).

The court accused six of the defendants of activity "concerning the security and interests of the state" and one defendant of activity "harming the security and interests of the state," according to the LEN report. China's Constitution (Article 54) states that Chinese citizens "must not commit acts detrimental to the security, honor, and interests of the motherland." The Criminal Law chapter on "Crimes of Endangering National Security" (Articles 102-113), however, mentions the “security” of the state only once (Article 102) and only with respect to colluding with a "foreign State," a description that is not applicable to "the Dalai Clique." The chapter does not mention the "honor" or "interests" of the state or link them to specific crimes. As a result, law enforcement and judicial officials exercise broad discretion in identifying and punishing behavior that they deem to "concern" or "harm" China's security, honor, and interests. The table below summarizes the information provided in the LEN report.

Lhasa Intermediate People's Court: Punishing Tibetans for Sharing Information With "The Dalai Clique"

Pinyin Name Tibetan Name	Alleged Activity	Criminal Charge	Criminal Law	Sentence Date	Sentence Length
Wangdui Wangdu	Copied "splittist" CD-ROMs and leaflets; sent "intelligence" to "the Dalai Clique"	"Espionage"	Art. 110	October 27, 2008	Life imprisonment
Mima Dunzhu Migmar Dondrub	Distributed "splittist" CD-ROMs and leaflets; sent "intelligence" to "the Dalai Clique"	"Espionage"	Art. 110	October 27, 2008	14 years
Pingcuo Duojie Phuntsog Dorje	"Collected intelligence;" "illegally sent intelligence abroad [to "the Dalai Clique"] via Wangdu"	Unlawfully provided "intelligence" to an organization or individual outside of China	Art. 111	October 27, 2008	9 years
Ciwang Duoji Tsewang Dorje	"Collected intelligence;" "illegally sent intelligence abroad [to "the Dalai Clique"] via Wangdu"	Unlawfully provided "intelligence" to an organization or individual outside of China	Art. 111	October 27, 2008	8 years
Suolang Zhaba Sonam Dragpa	Joined "the Dalai Clique's 'Tibetan Youth Congress';" collected and sent "intelligence" to the TYC	Unlawfully provided "intelligence" to an organization or individual outside of China	Art. 111	October 27, 2008	10 years
Yixi Quzhen Yeshe Choedron	Received "financial aid" from "the Dalai Clique's 'Security Department'" for providing "intelligence and information"	"Espionage"	Art. 110	November 7, 2008	15 years
Suolang Cidian Sonam Tseten	Collected and provided "intelligence" to "the Dalai Clique's '9, 10, 3' [Gu Chu Sum] splittist organization"	Unlawfully provided "intelligence" to an organization or individual outside of China	Art. 111	November 7, 2008	10 years

The LEN report did not provide any details about the type of information that any of the defendants allegedly provided to entities outside of China. The report did not identify the group or individual deemed to be part of "the Dalai Clique" that allegedly received information from the four defendants accused of acting together: Wangdu, Migmar Dondrub, Phuntsog Dorje, and Tsewang Dorje. One of the other defendants, Sonam Dragpa allegedly provided information to the Tibetan Youth Congress (TYC), a non-governmental organization (NGO) that seeks Tibetan independence according to the TYC Web site; Yeshe Choedron allegedly provided information to the Tibetan government-in-exile; and Sonam Tseten allegedly provided information to Gu-Chu-Sum, an NGO that Tibetan former political prisoners established to work on behalf of Tibetan political prisoners, according to the group's Web site.

At least two of the Tibetans, Wangdu and Phuntsog Dorje, have served previous sentences as political prisoners. Wangdu was detained on March 8, 1989, the day martial law took effect in Lhasa after three days of protests and rioting. According to the CECC Political Prisoner Database, Wangdu's initial three-year sentence was extended by five years to a total of eight years' imprisonment after he and at least 10 other Tibetan political prisoners signed (in prison) a petition stating that the 1951 17-Point Agreement between the Chinese government and the Tibetan government in Lhasa was forced on an independent Tibet. Wangdu, who had learned English, was a monk and tour guide at Lhasa's Jokhang Temple before the 1989 detention. Prior to detention from his home on March 14, 2008, Wangdu worked in Lhasa for the Australia-based Burnet Institute as a project officer for the institute's HIV Prevention in Lhasa Project, according to information in the ICT report, a December 22 Associated Press report (reprinted in Fox News), and an October 9 Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy (TCHRD) report. Information about the project is available on the Burnet Institute's Web site.

Phuntsog Dorje, a former employee of the Snowlands Hotel in Lhasa, served a 10-year sentence after detention in 1990, according to the 1994 Human Rights Watch report, "Detained in China and Tibet: A Directory of Political and Religious Prisoners." Authorities suspected Phuntsog Dorje of having links to a pro-independence group. In 1993, Phuntsog Dorje was suffering from kidney problems attributed to "extraordinarily heavy labor," the report said, citing an October 19, 1993, Tibet Information Network report (TIN ceased operations in 2005).

The Commission is aware of only one other official Chinese report of detention of Tibetans for peaceful protest activity during the wave of protests that began on March 10, 2008, the anniversary of the 1959 Lhasa uprising. The report concerns one of the two protests reported to have occurred in Lhasa on March 10. A March 25 China Tibet News report (translated in OSC, 27 March 08) stated that on March 24 the Lhasa People's Procuratorate authorized public security officials to formally arrest on charges of "illegal assembly" 13 of 15 monks whom police detained on March 10 for "chanting reactionary slogans" and carrying home-made Tibetan flags near the Jokhang Temple. The report did not name any of the monks charged with "illegal assembly," but named another of the monks, Lodroe (Luozhui), as the leader of the protest and the first to display the Tibetan flag. The report did not provide any information about the charges against Lodroe. No information is available about whether or not a court tried and sentenced the monks. All of the monks were temporary students at Sera Monastery in Lhasa but who hailed from other monasteries located in Tibetan autonomous prefectures in Sichuan and Qinghai provinces, according to March 10 and March 12 Radio Free Asia (RFA) reports and two March 12 TCHRD reports (1, 2).

Hundreds of Drepung Monastery monks staged the other March 10 peaceful protest in Lhasa by attempting to march from the monastery to the city center, where the Potala Palace and the Jokhang Temple are located, according to the RFA reports and a March 11 TCHRD report. According to information and analysis provided in Section V, Tibet, of the CECC 2008 Annual Report, Tibetan protests spread quickly through more than 50 county-level areas in the Tibetan autonomous areas of China. Protesters resorted to rioting in a total of 12 county-level areas, according to official Chinese media reports, but generally peaceful Tibetan protests took place in more than 40 additional county-level areas. China’s leadership blamed the Dalai Lama and "the Dalai Clique" for the Tibetan protests and rioting, and did not acknowledge the role of rising Tibetan frustration with Chinese policies that deprive Tibetans of rights and freedoms nominally protected under China’s Constitution and legal system. Chinese authorities released by June 2008 more than 3,000 of the more than 4,400 detained Tibetans whom officials characterized as "rioters" and who had surrendered or been detained by April 9, based on CECC analysis of a June 21, 2008, China Daily report and previous Chinese state-run media reports.

Source: -See Summary (2009-01-23 ) \| Posted on: 2009-02-03
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UN Human Rights Council To Review China's Human Rights Record

On February 9, the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva will review China's human rights record under a new mechanism known as the Universal Periodic Review (UPR). The UPR was created on March 15, 2006 by United Nations General Assembly Resolution 60/251 (A/Res/60/251), which established the 47-member Human Rights Council (Council), replacing the Commission on Human Rights. The UPR mechanism "involves a review of the human rights records of all 192 UN Member States once every four years." (UN Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights (OHCHR), Basic Facts About The UPR). OHCHR describes the UPR as "one of the key elements of the new Council which reminds States of their responsibility to fully respect and implement all human rights and fundamental freedoms. The ultimate aim of this new mechanism is to improve the human rights situation in all countries and address human rights violations wherever they occur." (OHCHR, Fact Sheet: Human Rights Council-Universal Periodic Review).

The Working Group on the UPR will meet in a three-hour session on February 9 to review China's human rights record. Each review is facilitated by a group of three rapporteurs (referred to as "troikas"), who are drawn by lot from Council members and from different Regional Groups. Canada, India, and Nigeria will serve as the troika for China's review. They will facilitate the "interactive dialogue" portion of the Working Group session and will prepare the report of the Working Group. (Human Rights Council Res. 5/1, "Institution-building of the United Nations Human Rights Council," sections D.2.18(d), and 21 (18 June 2007).) Participation in the review is not limited to Members of the Council; any Member State may be involved, including in the interactive dialogue, during which they may ask questions, make comments and/or offer recommendations. (Human Rights Council Res. 5/1, sec. D.2.18 (b); OHCHR, Basic Facts About The UPR). Representatives of NGOs may also attend the review. (HRC Resolution 5/1.)

The review will be based on:

"The Charter of the United Nations
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
Human rights instruments (covenants, conventions and other treaties) to which [China] is a party
Voluntary pledges and commitments made by [China]
Applicable international humanitarian law" (OHCHR, Fact Sheet)

The documents that will be considered for the review are:

China's National Report;
A compilation of information contained in human rights-related UN reports, prepared by OHCHR;
A summary of information provided by other relevant stakeholders, prepared by OHCHR (primarily non-governmental organizations (NGOs)).

For more information on China's compliance with its international human rights obligations and commitments, see the Congressional-Executive Commission on China's 2008 Annual Report. For more information on the UPR review process, see China's National Report (in Chinese only), the "compilation of UN information" and the "summary of stakeholders' information" prepared by the OHCHR (in English), and the original submissions of 46 stakeholders . The final report (referred to as "outcome") of China's review, once released, will be available here. Click here for a list of representative cases to use as a resource for formulating questions, comments, and/or recommendations pertaining to the release of citizens detained or imprisoned for advocating greater human rights guarantees in China, including citizens who engage with the international community to address human rights abuses.

Source: -See Summary (2009-01-21 ) \| Posted on: 2009-02-02
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Officials To Strengthen Security Before Anniversaries and During Economic Downturns

Chinese officials have warned of increasing "social unrest" in 2009 and have called for strengthening public security in the run-up to several significant anniversaries and amid the country's economic downturn. Security officials reportedly plan to use the "valuable" and "successful" experience of security measures deployed during the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympic Games to increase security controls in 2009, according to a January 6 People's Daily article and a January 13 South China Morning Post report (subscription required). Minister of Public Security Meng Jianzhu called on public security officials to acknowledge the "grave challenge of maintaining national security and social stability" ahead of the 60th Anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China in October this year, as reported in the People's Daily article. Chen Jiping, director of the Central Committee for Comprehensive Management of Public Security, was quoted in an interview with the state-run magazine Outlook Weekly as saying that authorities will deploy new measures such as a neighborhood watch program and the creation of special departments modeled on those used during the Olympics that mobilized and used volunteers to help police maintain public order, according to the South China Morning Post report.

In addition to the 60th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China in October, 2009 also marks several sensitive anniversaries, including the 50th anniversary of the March 10, 1959, Lhasa uprising, and the 20th anniversary of the June 4, 1989, peaceful democracy protest at the Tianamen Square. A January 6 Associated Press report writes that "opponents of the authoritarian regime could seize on [anniversaries] as symbolically rich opportunities to stage demonstrations or issue calls for political reform." The Chinese government and Communist Party have used campaigns to strengthen security measures and crack down on "social unrest" and dissent in the name of maintaining social stability during other "sensitive" times, including most recently before and during the Beijing Olympics and during the Olympic torch relay. (See the Preface of the CECC 2008 Annual Report and a previous CECC analysis for more information.)

The recent high-level official statements on maintaining "social stability" also come at a time when official statistics paint a grim economic picture and as the media and government officials have warned of potential mass protests resulting from high unemployment rates and increasing social discontent. Reuters reported on December 17, 2008, that up to 1.5 million graduates may face difficulty finding employment in 2009, that at least 4 million unemployed migrant workers have left cities to find jobs in large towns or counties, and that the urban unemployment rate is at 9.4 percent, according to estimates by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. The first issue of the Outlook Weekly in 2009 also reported that nearly 10 million migrant workers have lost their jobs, according to an estimate by China's National Bureau of Statistics. The same article said the economic downturn has led to greater social instability, including increasing incidents of unemployment-related labor disputes, land disputes, "highly sensitive" taxi strikes, and financial crimes. The article said experts have called for "proper handling" of mass incidents through prevention and mediation, to "keep conflict resolution at the local level," to "solve problems locally," and to "eliminate hidden danger at the initial stage."

For more discussion on "social instability" and "social unrest," see the Preface and General Overview in the Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2008 Annual Report.

Source: -See Summary (2009-01-30 / English) \| Posted on: 2009-02-01
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Yunnan To Establish Anti-Trafficking Office To Focus on Women and Children

The Yunnan provincial government issued the Yunnan Province Implementing Opinion on the National Action Plan on Combating Trafficking in Women and Children (2008-2012) (Yunnan provincial implementing opinion) for the National Action Plan on Combating Trafficking in Women and Children (2008-2012) (National Action Plan) on November 21, 2008, calling for the establishment of an anti-trafficking office to coordinate the province's anti-trafficking efforts. The implementing opinion, like the National Action Plan, focuses on women and children. Yunnan is the fourth province to issue an implementation plan after the State Council issued the National Action Plan in December 2007. Guizhou province issued an implementing opinion in May 2008, followed by Hainan and Fujian provinces in June 2008.

Similar to Guizhou, Hainan, and Fujian's implementing plans, Yunnan province will:

Establish an anti-trafficking "leadership committee" with an office located within the provincial public security department. The "leadership committee" will implement, organize, and coordinate cross-regional, inter-governmental, inter-agency, and cross-provincial (district and city) anti-trafficking efforts.

Include funds in the annual budget required by each locality and department to ensure the development and implementation of anti-trafficking work.

Investigate and punish, according to law, illegal employers and employment of child labor, and ban illegal employment or marriage brokerage agencies or their Internet sites.

Strengthen the provision of social welfare and assist with victim reintegration for rescued women and children, including appropriate arrangement for children without guardians, school enrollment for children who have reached appropriate age, as well as occupational training and employment assistance.

Create special files for rescued women and children to track their living conditions and to coordinate relevant departments and organizations' efforts to resolve problems faced by those who have been rescued.

Enhance international and cross-provincial cooperation.

The Yunnan provincial implementing opinion also includes a new measure allowing rescued women who cannot or are unwilling to return home to remain in Yunnan, subject to the approval of the relevant department(s). For those rescued women who are allowed to stay in Yunnan, the Yunnan Provincial Population and Family Planning Commission will regard them as "permanent residents" (changzhu renkou), instead of as migrants or members of the so-called "floating population" who do not have a local household registration (hukou). (For a discussion of China's household registration system, see section II--Freedom of Residence in the CECC 2008 Annual Report, including the Addendum: Recent Hukou Reforms (pp. 105-112); for a broader retrospective, see also an October 2005 CECC topic paper on China's household registration system, and a chart on Chinese Hukou reforms as of 2004.) The significance of the new policy is twofold:

Trafficked Chinese women without a local hukou may avoid involuntary repatriation, thus minimizing the risks of facing danger, such as threats from their traffickers, or re-trafficked once returned home.

For non-Chinese women trafficked into Yunnan, neither the National Action Plan nor the Yunnan provincial implementing opinion distinguishes between foreign and Chinese victims, and the measures do not specify that this new policy is applicable only to Chinese citizens. If interpreted in this way, the Yunnan provincial implementing opinion's policy of allowing non-Chinese women to remain in Yunnan would comply with the international standard set forth in Article 7 of the United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking In Persons, Especially Women and Children. This Protocol states that "each State Party shall consider adopting legislative or other appropriate measures that permit victims of trafficking in persons to remain in its territory, temporarily or permanently, in appropriate cases." However, it remains to be seen how the new policy will be implemented in practice.

Even though the Yunnan provincial implementing opinion appears to provide better protection and prevention measures to trafficked women and children, there remain several weaknesses:

The measures do not include language about men identified as trafficking victims.

Authority coordinating the inter-agency anti-trafficking effort is assigned to the provincial public security department. Generally speaking, public security departments may favor a "law and order" approach to anti-trafficking, rather than a human rights approach that favors prevention and addresses the root causes of human trafficking.

See the following Commission analyses for a discussion of China's anti-trafficking efforts: China's Anti-Trafficking Efforts Remain Inadequate One Year After Government's Release of National Action Plan, Infant Trafficking From the Earthquake Zone and Other Cases Reflect Anti-Trafficking Challenges, China's Long-Awaited Action Plan on Trafficking Aims To Provide "Sustainable Solutions". See also Section II-Human Trafficking in the CECC 2008 Annual Report.

Source: -See Summary (2009-01-29 / English) \| Posted on: 2009-02-01
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Chinese Media Censor Parts of President Obama's Inauguration Speech

An official "full text" Chinese language translation of President Barack Obama's January 20, 2009, inauguration speech that appeared in major state-controlled Chinese news media omitted two paragraphs and the words "and communism," according to a review of the translation as it appeared on the Web sites of those media organizations on January 21. In addition, after President Obama said the word "communism," China's national television station, China Central Television (CCTV), cut away from live coverage of the speech, as shown in a video posted on the CCTV Web site on January 21. (The full text of the speech is available on the Presidential Inaugural Committee Web site; a transcript of the speech as delivered by President Obama is available on the New York Times Web site.)

[UPDATE, January 26, 2009: On January 22, the People's Daily, the Communist Party's flagship newspaper, posted its own "full text" translation of President Obama's speech. The Congressional-Executive Commission on China retrieved that translation from the People's Daily Web site on January 23 and saved a copy here. At the time, the People's Daily translation included the words "and communism" as well as the omitted paragraphs. On January 26, the CECC accessed the same link and found that the words "and communism" had been omitted, even though the original post date of January 22, 2009, 15:48, remained unchanged.]

Omitted Passages; "Silencing of Dissent"

The following two paragraphs, which appear about two-thirds into President Obama's 18-minute speech, were omitted from the "full text" Chinese translation prepared by the official China Daily and reprinted on the Web sites of CCTV (omitted paragraphs should have appeared on page 4), Xinhua, China's central news agency, Sina.com, a popular domestic news and information portal (omitted paragraphs should have appeared on page 2), and People's Daily (omitted paragraphs should have appeared on page 4):

To the Muslim world, we seek a new way forward, based on mutual interest and mutual respect. To those leaders around the globe who seek to sow conflict, or blame their society's ills on the West - know that your people will judge you on what you can build, not what you destroy. To those who cling to power through corruption and deceit and the silencing of dissent, know that you are on the wrong side of history; but that we will extend a hand if you are willing to unclench your fist.

To the people of poor nations, we pledge to work alongside you to make your farms flourish and let clean waters flow; to nourish starved bodies and feed hungry minds. And to those nations like ours that enjoy relative plenty, we say we can no longer afford indifference to suffering outside our borders; nor can we consume the world's resources without regard to effect. For the world has changed, and we must change with it.

Sina.com also posted a video with Chinese subtitles of President Obama's entire speech on the Web page where the "full text" Chinese translation begins. As of January 22, the subtitles do not omit the passages above.

"Communism"

About 11 minutes into President Obama's speech, he said: "Recall that earlier generations faced down fascism and communism not just with missiles and tanks, but with sturdy alliances and enduring convictions." The words "and communism" were omitted from the official China Daily translation (omitted words should have appeared on page 3) and its reprint on the Web sites of CCTV (omitted words should have appeared on page 3), Xinhua, Sina.com (omitted words should have appeared on page 2), and People's Daily (omitted words should have appeared on page 3).

As shown in the CCTV video, the station muted audio of the simultaneous interpreter shortly after she translated the word "communism." The screen then cut to the anchor hosting the coverage. It is unclear whether the anchor was caught off guard. (See January 21 BBC report for 30-second clip of this portion of CCTV's live coverage.) The anchor responded by turning to a CCTV reporter in Washington, DC and asking her about the challenges President Obama faces in dealing with the economy. While the station had earlier cut away about five minutes into the speech for three minutes of analysis by the Washington reporter (while the speech ran in the background in English for much of this time), it is unclear whether the later cut away was planned. The latter cut away, which included a background segment on President Obama, lasted for about seven minutes before simultaneous translation resumed with about one minute left in the speech.

Chinese subtitles that appear at the bottom of the video on Sina.com on January 21 also omit the reference to "communism."

English Text Reprinted in Chinese Media

The reference to "communism" and the passages noted above were not removed from the English text of the speech as reprinted on the China Daily Web site (communism, passages) on January 21, as reprinted on CCTV's Web site (communism, passages) on January 21, and as reprinted on Xinhua's Web site on January 21.

Past Censorship of U.S. Officials

Chinese media have censored the remarks of top American officials in the past. According to an April 20, 2004, New York Times (NYT) report, the official "full text" of then Vice President Dick Cheney's 2004 speech in Shanghai that appeared on major Chinese Web sites omitted references to political freedom, Taiwan, North Korea, and other topics that propaganda officials deemed politically sensitive. The NYT report also said that a CCTV broadcast of a 2003 interview with then Secretary of State Colin L. Powell left out references to human rights abuses and other issues despite a diplomatic agreement to broadcast the interview unedited.

For other accounts of the omissions from full text versions of President Obama's speech in Chinese media, see, e.g., a January 21 NYT report and a January 21 Times of London report.

For more information on how the Chinese government and Communist Party's policies toward China's media lead to censorship of information considered politically sensitive, see Section II - Freedom of Expression, in the CECC 2008 Annual Report.

Source: -See Summary (2009-01-27 / English / Free) \| Posted on: 2009-02-01
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Officials Increase Censorship of Foreign and Domestic Web Sites

Chinese authorities appear to have stepped up censorship of the Internet in recent weeks with increased reports of foreign- and Hong Kong-based Web sites being blocked and the closure of a popular domestic blog hosting site for posting "harmful" political information.

Foreign and Hong Kong Web Sites

In December 2008, foreign and Hong Kong media reported that access from within China to several foreign- and Hong Kong-based news Web sites had been blocked after having been temporarily unblocked last August around the time of the 2008 Beijing Olympics, according to a mid-December Yazhou Zhoukan (Asiaweek) report (in Chinese), a December 16 BBC report, and a December 17 South China Morning Post report (subscription required). The blocked Web sites include the Chinese-language sites for the BBC, Voice of America, and Deutsche Welle, YouTube's Hong Kong and Taiwan sites, and the Web sites for the Hong Kong-based news organizations Ming Pao, Asiaweek, and Apple Daily. Access to some of these sites subsequently was restored, according to a December 19 New York Times (NYT) article. Citing reports from users in Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou, the NYT said that access to its own Web site from within China had been blocked for more than three days, noting the absence of technical issues with the site, and no problems with accessibility from Hong Kong, Japan, and the United States, according to the December 19 article and a December 22 article. Amnesty International (Amnesty) reported on January 12, 2009, that authorities had resumed blocking its site in China after allowing access for the Olympics.

Chinese officials are able to block domestic access to foreign Web sites because they control the gateway connection between mainland China and the global Internet. Official involvement in the blocking of any particular site is difficult to confirm because officials provide little information about which sites are blocked and why a specific site has been blocked or unblocked. Sites that are blocked often report accessibility outside of mainland China and no technical issues. In response to questions about blocked Web sites, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) spokesperson Liu Jianchao said at a December 16 press conference (Chinese, English) that he was "not aware of the specifics" but that "it is undeniable that some websites do violate the Chinese law." Liu cited as an example Web sites that "publicly stage 'two Chinas' by putting the mainland China and China's Taiwan Province into two independent categories," in violation of the Anti-Secession Law. On January 13, 2009, MFA spokesperson Jiang Yu denied allegations that Chinese officials were blocking the Amnesty Web site ahead of a series of politically sensitive anniversaries in 2009, according to a January 13 Agence France-Presse article (via France 24). The same article quoted Jiang as saying that Amnesty "has always been biased toward China." Chinese and English transcripts of Jiang's January 13 press conference on the MFA's Web site do not mention the denial, but indicate that Jiang reiterated China's position that it manages the Internet according to Chinese laws and legally-binding regulations, which "prohibit the spreading of illegal information through the Internet, such as advocating cults and separatism."

Mainland Web Sites

Southern Metropolitan Daily, a newspaper based in Guangdong province, reported on January 12 that the Beijing Municipal Government's Information Office had ordered the closure of the blog hosting Web site Bullog (www.bullog.cn) after the site failed to remove large amounts of "harmful information" relating to current events and politics as authorities had requested, according to the Web site's administrator and founder, Luo Yonghao. Luo said that the site's service provider informed him by e-mail on January 9 that the provider received the shutdown order from the Beijing Communications Administration. Attempts by the Congressional-Executive Commission on China to access the Bullog Web site on January 27 were unsuccessful, yielding only browser-generated messages that the address could not be found. According to a January 12 Sydney Morning Herald article, Bullog has become a popular site for Chinese intellectuals and commentators to discuss politics and policy, registering more than one million daily viewers in April 2008. A January 13 Reporters Without Borders report said that at least nine contributors to Bullog had signed Charter 08, an open statement calling for political reform in China that has attracted the attention of authorities. Chinese officials have harassed signatories and censored references to Charter 08 on the Internet.

The reported shutdown of Bullog comes amidst a government campaign to remove "vulgar content" on the Internet. The campaign began on January 5 and will continue until early February, according to a January 6 People's Daily article (in Chinese). The campaign's primary target appears to be pornography, but employees at Web sites attempting to carry out the government's directive have noted "increased pressure to control political content as much as smut" as well as the vagueness of what the government considers unacceptable content, according to a January 12 Guardian article and a January 6 Straits Times article (via AsiaMedia). "We are just feeling our way in the dark now and going by intuition, deleting whatever we think might not be deemed proper by the government," one senior manager of a Chinese Web site told the Straits Times on the condition of anonymity.

As the CECC noted in its 2008 Annual Report, China's Internet laws and the interpretation and application of such laws by Chinese officials violate international human rights standards because they target content that the Chinese government and Communist Party deem politically sensitive. For more information on Internet censorship in China, see "Internet Censorship" in Section II - Freedom of Expression, in the CECC 2008 Annual Report.

Source: -See Summary (2009-01-27 / English / Free) \| Posted on: 2009-02-01
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Authorities Target Protestant House Churches for Harassment, Detentions in December

Authorities disrupted several Protestant house church gatherings in December 2008, in some cases detaining church leaders, according to reports from the China Aid Association (CAA), an organization that monitors conditions for religious freedom in China. The reports come amid calls from local governments in late 2008 to stem Protestant house church gatherings and meetings of other unregistered religious groups. The CAA also issued a report in December on the demolition of a registered church and provided information on new developments in ongoing cases.

Recent reports include:

The Zhoukou municipality Reeducation Through Labor Committee (RTL) in Henan province issued a decision on December 16, 2008, sentencing three church leaders to one year of RTL for their involvement in "illegal proselytizing" and an "illegal gathering," according to a January 6 CAA report and a copy of the RTL decision posted January 6 on the CAA Web site. Authorities initially detained the three church leaders, Tang Houyong, Shu Wenxiang, and Xie Zhenqi, on December 3 at a house church gathering. CAA reported that authorities detained other attendees and sentenced 20 of them to 15 days of administrative detention. According to CAA, authorities alleged the church members belonged to the "Shouters," a group deemed a cult by authorities, but CAA said the church members were not associated with the group. The wife of one of the men sentenced to RTL has since pursued legal action in the case, including filing an administrative lawsuit and a motion to dismiss a judge involved, according to a January 26 CAA press release and copy of a court filing posted the same day on the CAA Web site.

On January 2, public security officers in Urumqi, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), disrupted a house church meeting and detained 51 attendees. Authorities held 3 of the 51 in public security bureau custody, one of whom was sentenced to 10 days of administrative detention, according to a January 5 report from CAA.

On December 17, police officers in Yancheng, Jiangsu province, demolished a registered church, according to a December 22 report from CAA. The CAA said sources described the demolition of the Chengnan Christian Church as the result of collusion between the Yancheng government and real estate developers. The demolition came despite a December 16 court ruling in favor of the church, CAA reported.

Among reports from CAA are also several incidents which took place during the Christmas season, a period also targeted in past years.

Authorities disrupted Christmas eve and Christmas day gatherings in Bozhou, Anhui and Yucheng county, Shangqiu, Henan provinces and Qitai county, Changji Hui Autonomous Prefecture, in the XUAR, according to CAA reports from December 26 and December 30. Officials took into detention two church leaders from the Anhui gathering, seven church leaders from the XUAR, and nine people from Henan. Authorities later released five of the nine detained in Henan and sentenced the remaining four to 15 days of administrative detention, according to a December 27 report from Monitor China, a Web site affiliated with the CAA.

Earlier in the week, authorities targeted other house church Christmas celebrations in Anhui and in the XUAR, according to a December 25 CAA report via the Christian News Wire. Authorities disrupted a Bible training class in Dongzhi county, Chizhou, Anhui province, on December 22, interrogated the 19 students and 2 church leaders in the class, and sealed off the building where the classes were held. On December 22, authorities warned a house church leader in the Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, XUAR, to stop holding services.

On December 24, police disrupted a group of people, including Protestant volunteers, who had gathered to rebuild housing for victims of the May 12, 2008, earthquake in Sichuan province, according to a December 27 CAA report. Authorities confiscated the group's property and took some of the group members into detention. CAA reported that authorities had targeted the group because of the presence of the Protestant volunteers.

Also in December, the CAA reported on developments in ongoing cases.

On December 15, a court in Qorghas (Huocheng), XUAR, tried the case of church leader Lou Yuanqi, detained since May 17, 2008, for “inciting separatism,” in connection to interviews he gave about his prior detentions for leading house church services. Authorities formally arrested him on June 20, on charges of using superstition to undermine implementation of state law, a crime under Article 300 of the Criminal Law, stemming from his church activities and from reporting abuses to overseas groups. See a CAA December 15 report and the Congressional-Executive Commission on China Political Prisoner Database for more information.

On December 21, 2008, public security officers detained Beijing-based house church leader Zhang Mingxuan in Ulanhot, Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, while he was there to preach, according to a December 22 CAA report. He was sentenced to 15 days of administrative detention for "operating an illegal organization for religious activities." International pressure prompted his early release on December 22, CAA reported. Authorities harassed Zhang on multiple other occasions in 2008, as noted in previous CECC analyses (1, 2) and the CECC Political Prisoner Database.

For more information, see section II--Freedom of Religion in the CECC 2008 Annual Report.

Source: -See Summary (2009-01-26 ) \| Posted on: 2009-02-01
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Officials Harass Charter 08 Signers; Liu Xiaobo Under Residential Surveillance

Chinese authorities have harassed at least 101 signatories of Charter 08 and placed signer and prominent intellectual Liu Xiaobo under residential surveillance at an unknown location in Beijing in apparent violation of Chinese law following his detention on December 8, 2008, according to Chinese Human Rights Defenders (CHRD) reports on January 2 and January 9. The Central Propaganda Department has warned domestic reporters not to write about or interview any of the charter's signers, while references to the charter appeared to have been removed from the Internet, according to a January 4 Guardian report and a December 15-31 CHRD report. On the eve of December 10, 2008, the 60th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, more than 300 Chinese citizens signed and posted online Charter 08, which calls for political reform and greater protection of human rights in China and is inspired by a 1970s charter issued in what was then Czechoslovakia. The January 9 CHRD article said that more than 7,200 people have signed the document.

Harassment of Signers

The January 9 CHRD article said that the human rights organization had documented 101 cases in which police sought to question, formally summoned, or otherwise harassed a Charter 08 signer. The article said the cases occurred in 17 provinces and three municipalities and provided a list of people who had been harassed. Those harassed have reported that officials warned them not to give media interviews to promote Charter 08, sought to determine the main authors of the document and how it was disseminated, and demanded public retractions of signatures and support for the document, according to the CHRD article and a January 7 Christian Science Monitor (CSM) article. The prominent intellectual Zhang Zuhua was summoned on December 8 and again on December 26 by the Beijing Public Security Bureau's Domestic Security Protection Unit, the latter occurring shortly after Zhang gave an interview to CSM, according to the December 15-31 CHRD article and the CSM article. In another reported case of harassment, police in Hangzhou city, Zhejiang province, questioned writer Wen Kejian for several hours on December 25 in connection with his signing of the charter, according to a December 29 CHRD article.

Liu Xiaobo

Liu Xiaobo, who was taken into custody on December 8, has been placed under residential surveillance at an undisclosed location in Beijing by the Domestic Security Protection Unit under the Beijing PSB, according to the January 2 CHRD article. The restrictions on Liu's freedom not only appear to violate international human rights standards for free expression and association and China's Constitution, but to also violate China's procedural provisions since officials have placed Liu under residential surveillance at a location outside of his own residence. Article 57(1) of the Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) provides that a criminal suspect under residential surveillance may not leave his domicile without permission, and contemplates that the suspect may be placed under residential surveillance at a designated location outside his domicile if that person "has no fixed domicile." Article 98 of the Procedural Provisions for Public Security Agencies Handling Criminal Cases (1, 2, 2007 Amendment), issued by the Ministry of Public Security in 1998 to aid implementation of the CPL, defines "fixed domicile" as the "legal residence where the criminal suspect lives within the city or county of the agency handling the case." Since Liu has a home in Beijing and the case is being handled by Beijing officials, the law would appear to require that residential surveillance be carried out at Liu's home and not another location. Furthermore, Article 98 of the Procedural Provisions prohibits public agencies from setting up special places for "residential surveillance" that in effect subject the suspect to detention "in disguised form."

The January 2 CHRD article said that police allowed Liu to meet with his wife on January 1 but have not informed either Liu or his wife of the charges that led to his residential surveillance. According to a source close to the Liu family, the meeting took place at a secret location near Beijing, Times Online reported on January 6. The source said that Liu did not know the location of his residential surveillance. It is unclear what access Liu has to his lawyer, Mo Shaoping, who in recent years has represented a number of journalists, writers, petitioners, and other citizens accused of state security and public disturbance crimes. According to Article 24 of the Provisions Concerning Several Issues in the Implementation of the Criminal Procedure Law, a person under residential surveillance does not need permission to meet with his lawyer.

It is unclear when Liu's period of residential surveillance began. Article 58 of the CPL allows officials to place someone under residential surveillance for up to six months.

Internet Censorship

As noted in its December 15-31 report, CHRD conducted searches of Baidu, Sina, and Google in late December and found that information about Charter 08 appeared to have been blocked or deleted.

For additional information, including an overview of free expression and free association issues related to Charter 08, and additional background information on the subject, please visit the Commission's Web site. For information on freedom of expression issues in China generally, see Section II - Freedom of Expression, in the Congressional-Executive Commission on China's 2008 Annual Report.

Source: -See Summary (2009-01-14 ) \| Posted on: 2009-02-01
Link directly to this item with: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=116085

Manipulation of the Criminal Law to Penalize "Cults" Continues in Case of Painter and Popular Musician

Continuing a trend in which the PRC Criminal Law is used to persecute Falun Gong practitioners, a Beijing court sentenced a 40-year-old award-winning artist to three years in prison late last year on account of her association with the banned spiritual movement. On November 25, 2008, the Beijing Chongwen District People's Court sentenced Xu Na to three years in prison for "using a cult organization to undermine the implementation of the law," according to Xu's attorney as reported by the Associated Press (AP) (reprinted in the International Herald Tribune), Agence France-Presse (AFP) (reprinted in Yahoo! News), and Radio Free Asia (RFA) on November 25. The AP reporter spoke with a clerk at the Chongwen court who confirmed that a verdict against Xu was issued, but refused to disclose the details of her sentence.

In an interview with AFP, Xu's attorney indicated that she was convicted on the basis of "possessing and intending to distribute" 53 documents and 8 computer disks containing information about Falun Gong. Xu pleaded not guilty to the charges against her, and in her defense, appealed to Article 36 of the PRC Constitution, which provides for citizens' freedom of religious belief. The verdict was handed down after a 15-minute hearing, which for reasons that are unclear, was closed to some who sought to observe the proceedings, according to a November 26 report by the Falun Dafa Information Center (FDIC). Xu's lawyer told the AFP that she intends to appeal her sentence.

10-Month Pre-Trial Detention

Xu had been detained by police for 10 months in the lead-up to her recent sentencing. Authorities initially took Xu and her husband, folk musician Yu Zhou, into custody at a police checkpoint while they were driving to their Beijing home after a concert on the night of January 26, 2008. The couple's detention coincided with a pre-Olympics crackdown that resulted in the detention of more than 8,000 Falun Gong practitioners, according to a July 7 FDIC report.

The verdict handed down on November 25 marks the second time in eight years that Xu Na has been sent to prison for her association with Falun Gong. In 2001, Xu was given a five-year sentence for renting a room to Falun Gong practitioners who came to Beijing from other provinces, according to the RFA report. While serving her first sentence, Xu was reportedly beaten, deprived of sleep, force-fed, and tied down in uncomfortable positions for hours at a time, according to the November 26 FDIC report. Falun Gong has been outlawed in China since the Ministry of Civil Affairs issued a decision in July 1999 calling it an "illegal organization" that "harms society."

Manipulation of the Criminal Law

Xu's sentence reflects a broader trend in using the Criminal Law to penalize Falun Gong practitioners. The ill-defined charge of "using a cult organization to undermine the implementation of the law" is drawn from Article 300 of the PRC Criminal Law and is commonly used to sentence Falun Gong practitioners (for example, see page 96 of the CECC 2006 Annual Report). First inserted into the Criminal Law in March 1997, Article 300 was adopted to provide a legal basis for the government's "anti-superstition" campaign, which had targeted since the early-1990s various religious and spiritual groups deemed "heretical" or "superstitious." Following the commencement of the government's crackdown on Falun Gong in the summer of 1999, this campaign has gradually expanded into a highly-organized, nationwide "anti-cult" operation with a dedicated security force called the 6-10 Office (for more information, see pages 88-91 of the CECC 2008 Annual Report).

The Criminal Law does not precisely define what constitutes a "cult organization" (xiejiao zuzhi). In practice, Chinese authorities have applied the cult designation arbitrarily against religious groups perceived as potential political threats, including Christian and Muslim groups. On October 30, authorities in Neixiang county in Henan province sentenced house church pastor Zhu Baoguo to one year of reeducation through labor for leading an "evil cult," according to a November 18 China Aid Association report. In 2007, an official report published on the Web site of the Jinghe County Political-Legal Committee in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region called for "severe strikes" against "cults" such as Falun Gong and a Muslim group called the "Islam Liberation Party" (for more information, see previous CECC analysis).

The Supreme People's Court and the Supreme People's Procuratorate issued a joint interpretation on "criminal cases involving cult organizations" in October 1999 that outlined vague criteria for designating a "cult organization." Such criteria include "harming society," "deifying" its leadership, "seducing and deceiving" others through "superstitions and heresies," and "controlling" the group's membership. No further details were given to clarify key terms such as "deify" or "control." According to this joint interpretation, activities prohibited by Article 300 of the Criminal Law include, among many other things, the publishing, printing, duplicating, or distributing of publications with "cult"-related content or symbols of "cult organizations."

Xu's Husband Dies in Custody

Yu Zhou died in police custody 11 days after he and his wife were detained, as reported by the Times of London on April 20. In an interview with AFP, Xu's lawyer confirmed that Yu died in police custody. Fans of Yu's band -- Xiaojuan and the Co-Residents of the Valley -- also wrote of Yu's death on Chinese language blogs. Authorities offered conflicting accounts of the cause of Yu's death, initially telling his family that he died of diabetes, and later attributing his death to a hunger strike. His relatives, however, indicated that Yu had no history of diabetes and that results from an autopsy the family demanded were withheld from them, according to a June 11 report from Clearwisdom.net. Xu's lawyer told AFP that "there are suspicions that he was beaten to death while in prison, but so far we have been unable to collect any evidence." Security officials prevented Xu from attending her husband's funeral.

For more information on Yu Zhou and Xu Na, please see the Congressional-Executive Commission on China's (CECC) Political Prisoner Database. For more information on the government's persecution of Falun Gong practitioners, please see Section II -- Freedom of Religion -- Falun Gong in the CECC's 2008 Annual Report.

Source: -See Summary (2009-01-14 / English) \| Posted on: 2009-02-01
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Two Young Uyghurs Detained for Distributing Leaflets Calling for Student Demonstration

Authorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) capital of Urumqi have detained two young Uyghur men for distributing leaflets on a university campus calling on students to organize a public demonstration. Available information suggests the leaflets may have called on students to protest tobacco and alcohol sales. Two security staff at Xinjiang University (XU) detained 20-year-old Miradil (Mir'adil) Yasin and 19-year-old Mutellip Téyip on December 20, 2008, after seeing them distribute leaflets within the campus gates, according to a December 25 report of the event on the XU Web site and a Xinhua report posted January 1, 2009, on the Xinhua Bingtuan Web site. Two people outside the campus gates fled the scene as the detention occurred, according to the reports. The Xinhua article reported that the two Uyghur security staff and their ethnic Hui colleague who interrogated the men were initially unable to understand the contents of the Uyghur-language leaflets, but according to the XU report, university authorities later determined the leaflets had "reactionary" and "malicious" content aimed at "inciting students to demonstrate in the streets and create chaos." The XU authorities reported this information to Urumqi public security offices, which took the two young men into detention. Their current whereabouts and further developments in their cases are not known. According to the Xinhua report, Miradil Yasin and Mutellip Téyip identified themselves as XU students, but the XU report did not describe them as students. The Xinhua article reported that based on information provided by XU, public security offices detained on the same day a "criminal gang" made up of more than 20 people. (For additional reporting on the initial detentions on the XU campus, see also a December 26 article from Radio Free Asia's Uyghur service, based in part on interviews with local authorities including XU security staff involved in the case, and a December 30 press release from the Uyghur American Association.)

The reports provided no additional information on the specific contents of the leaflets, but information from two other Urumqi universities where leaflets were found on the same day suggests that leaflets at all three campuses may have similarly called on students to peacefully demonstrate against tobacco and alcohol sellers. The Xinjiang Agricultural University said in a December 30 report that the leaflets found on that campus urged ethnic minority students to gather at the campus gymnasium on December 21 and demonstrate in support of removing tobacco and alcohol from supermarkets, stores, and banquet halls. A December 26 report from Xinjiang Medical University, where officials held a meeting to address the discovery of leaflets there, described the contents of the leaflets as aiming "in name to improve the lifestyle habits of ethnic minority students," but claimed that in fact the contents amounted to "reactionary speech" that aimed to spur students into an "illegal assembly" that would disrupt "stability and unity." The report said that through the meeting, students were able to recognize that "to advocate lashing out at tobacco and alcohol businesses in fact [amounts to] an act of beating, smashing and looting, and this is forbidden by our country's laws."

In the aftermath of discovering the leaflets, the three universities reported taking measures to strengthen propaganda campaigns and oversight of students. The XU article noted that the school is in the process of carrying out anti-separatism education activities, and reported that the school's Communist Party committee called on staff to improve their sense of responsibility and urgency in their work to fight separatism and "infiltration." According to a second December 25 report from XU, the XU Communist Party secretary called on the university to strengthen "management" of places including dorms, cafeterias, and shower halls, and intensify "supervision and control" of technologies including Internet and cell phone messaging. A department at the Xinjiang Medical University convened a meeting on December 22 to address the leaflets, noting that the distribution of the leaflets indicated that the "fight against separatism" remained "complex and severe," and calling for an "unceasing strengthening of students' political immunity" against perceived threats to stability, according to another December 26 report from that university. The article also said that the meeting demonstrated that students would not be "hoodwinked" by the "pretense" of "illegal religion." The article reiterated XUAR government calls to emphasize the concept of "stability above all else." Xinjiang Agricultural University described taking measures on December 20 and 21 for "prevention and control" within the school and called on school departments to attach high importance to anti-separatism and anti-infiltration education, according to the report from that school. The Xinjiang Agricultural University also described plans to reward the student who informed officials of finding the leaflets. XU authorities gave monetary rewards to the security staff involved in stopping distribution of the leaflets on that campus and held a meeting to honor them, according to the two XU reports.

The confiscation of leaflets and detentions of Miradil Yasin, Mutellip Téyip, and others occurred within a heightened security climate in place in the XUAR in the past year since preparations for the Beijing 2008 Summer Olympic Games, limited Chinese government reports of terrorist activity, and protests among Uyghurs and Tibetans in early 2008. The universities' characterization of the planned anti-tobacco and anti-alcohol demonstrations as illegal gatherings associated with separatism may have reflected a response both to the possibility of large-scale assembly as well as to religious expressions deemed by authorities to be "extremist." Separatism, terrorism, and "extremism" form the "three forces" designated by the government as threatening the region's security. The government's "strike hard" campaigns against the "three forces" have spurred tight controls over religious practice in the region and caused other rights abuses. Disrupting the planned demonstration also continues a trend in restricting grassroots religion-based efforts to address social issues such as substance abuse.

For more information on conditions in the XUAR, see section IV--Xinjiang in the CECC 2008 Annual Report.

Source: -See Summary (2009-01-12 ) \| Posted on: 2009-02-01
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State-Controlled Catholic Church Celebrates Independence from "Foreign Interference"

China's state-controlled Catholic church held a meeting in December to celebrate the Chinese church's policy of appointing bishops independently of Holy See practices for designating the religious leaders. The Catholic Patriotic Association (CPA) and the Chinese Catholic Bishops Conference, the two Communist Party-controlled organizations that lead China's state-sanctioned Catholic church, convened the meeting on December 19 in commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the church's policy of "self-selecting" and "self-ordaining" bishops, according to a December 19 Xinhua report. (For overseas reporting on the meeting, see a December 19 Union of Catholic Asian News report and December 20 Asia News report.) Du Qinglin, head of the Communist Party's United Front Work Department and vice-chair of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, said at the meeting that the church began "self-selection" in 1958 to address bishop shortages, "eliminate foreign interference in internal affairs," and "withstand the threat of 'ruthless punishment' from foreign forces." Du called on Catholics to "unflinchingly" continue the church's policy of independence and said that as one of the pre-conditions for improving Sino-Vatican relations, the Vatican must not interfere in China's internal affairs, including by "using religion to interfere." As noted in the Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2008 Annual Report, the two countries do not maintain diplomatic relations.

As reported in the CECC 2007 and 2008 Annual Reports, although CPA policy requires that the registered church depart from the practice of recognizing Holy See authority to select bishops and instead make bishop selections based on its own internal procedures, in recent years the CPA has tolerated discreet involvement by the Holy See in the selection of some bishops. The church ordained a total of five bishops in 2007 all of whom had Holy See approval, after breaking with the practice of ordaining Holy See-approved bishops for some appointments in 2006.

The Holy See-selected bishops who serve China's unregistered Catholic church community continue to remain vulnerable to government abuse, the CECC reported in its 2008 Annual Report. The approximately 40 bishops who serve the unregistered church are reported to remain in detention, confinement in their homes, in hiding, or under strict surveillance by the government. In the past year, authorities continued their pattern of detention and harassment of Jia Zhiguo, the unregistered bishop of Zhengding diocese in Hebei province. Authorities also have harassed registered bishops, in some cases coercing them to officiate consecrations for the registered church.

For more information, see section II--Freedom of Religion in the CECC 2008 Annual Report.

Source: -See Summary (2009-01-09 / English) \| Posted on: 2009-02-01
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Xinjiang Authorities Issue Plan Combining Rural Reform With Continued Political Controls

Authorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) issued an opinion in December 2008 to accelerate rural reform and development, combining policies aimed at improving conditions in rural areas with steps to continue tight political controls in the region. The Opinion on Deepening the Promotion of Rural Reform and Development (Opinion), issued by the XUAR Communist Party Committee and XUAR government on December 8, follows national plans issued in 2007 and earlier in 2008 to promote development in ethnic minority regions. The Opinion sets 2020 as a target date for realizing reform goals and describes as one of its basic principles the need to "grasp reform and development in one hand and unity and stability in the other." The plan precedes a work report by XUAR government chairperson Nur Bekri, posted January 8, 2009, on the Xinjiang Daily Web site, calling for increased measures to promote stability, while also outlining development objectives for the coming year. (For related information, see also a January 6 article on the Xinjiang Daily Web site providing an analysis and forecast of economic and social conditions in the XUAR.)

The Opinion outlines general measures to promote reform and development in areas such as land contracting, agriculture, finance, employment, the environment, health, and education. Measures include:

Integrating economic and social development between rural and urban areas and implementing preferential development policies in the southern XUAR to close the gap in conditions between southern and northern regions of the XUAR (Point 6). The Opinion's attention to the southern XUAR coincides with news of specific measures to support the region. The central government will subsidize 53.4 billion yuan for a five-year period starting in 2009 to support development in three southern XUAR districts, according to a January 4 report on the Xinjiang Peace Net. The government also has proposed providing free high school education to students in these three districts, in a measure designed both to promote vocational skills and uphold "social security and stability," according to the Communist Party secretary of the XUAR Education Department, as quoted in a January 8 report from the People's Daily.

Promoting steps to retrain rural residents, shift them to different sectors of employment, and promote programs to export the local labor force (Points 15 and 16). As reported by the Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC) in its 2008 Annual Report, the government maintains a labor transfer program that has sent young ethnic minority men and women to jobs in the interior of China. Overseas reports have indicated that local authorities have coerced participation and mistreated workers.

Developing rural health care, including rural health cooperatives (Point 23). As noted in the CECC 2008 Annual Report, the central government announced plans to increase public spending on healthcare in rural and remote areas, with particular attention to China's western and interior areas. The government announced nationwide plans for healthcare reform in January 2009, according to a January 18 report from Xinhua.

The Opinion also describes steps to promote continued political controls, including:

Strengthening the management of religious affairs, including by strengthening implementation of a two-point system to monitor mosques and religious leaders, by continuing to impose political training on religious personnel, and by forbidding "underground" scripture readings and private pilgrimages (Point 30).

Deepening political propaganda education campaigns in the areas of ethnic unity and anti-separatism reeducation (Point 29).

Point 22 includes among measures for educational development, a call for accelerating the promotion of "bilingual education," a policy which has undercut legal protections for the use of ethnic minority languages (Point 22).

Point 26 includes a call for developing social welfare undertakings in areas such as helping the poor and disabled, providing disaster relief, and aiding orphans. The CECC 2008 Annual Report reported, however, that elsewhere the XUAR government has taken steps to curb the development of civil society groups, including Islam-focused groups that have aimed to address social problems.

The politicized content of the December Opinion, coupled with the XUAR government's poor track record in promoting equitable development, call into question the Opinion's potential to guide improvements in rural conditions and protect rural residents' rights, including ethnic minority rights. As noted in the CECC 2008 Annual Report, although economic reforms and development projects have raised living standards in the region, they have also furthered unequal allocation of resources that favor Han Chinese and have served as a platform for advancing political controls. The government has tied some development projects to the promotion of "social stability" and used development projects to channel migration to the XUAR, resulting in broad demographic and assimilation pressures in the region.

For more information on conditions in the XUAR, see section IV--Xinjiang in the CECC 2008 Annual Report.

Source: -See Summary (2009-01-07 ) \| Posted on: 2009-02-01
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CHARTER 08 and the Detention of Liu Xiaobo

On the eve of December 10, 2008, the 60th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, over 300 Chinese citizens signed and posted online a document titled "Charter 08," calling for political reform and greater protection of human rights in China. Signers included leading intellectuals, lawyers, writers, farmers, and workers. Over the past week, many hundreds more people in China have signed, with some reports placing the number of signers in the thousands. Chinese abroad have signed the Charter as well.

Liu Xiaobo, one of the original signers of the Charter, and a prominent intellectual and dissident, has been detained, apparently for expression protected under international human rights standards that the Chinese government has recognized. Specifically, Mr. Liu's activities are protected under Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which provides that "[e]veryone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression," and a similar provision in Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which China signed in 1998 and has committed to ratify. Article 20 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 22 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provide for the right to freedom of association. Articles 35 and 41 of China's Constitution, which provide the right of citizens to free speech, free association, and to criticize their government, also should protect Mr. Liu's activities. As of December 17, Mr. Liu's wife reportedly had not received an official notice of his detention, as required under Article 64 of China's Criminal Procedure Law. At the time of this writing, Mr. Liu's whereabouts remain unknown. In addition, at least 48 members of the group that initially signed Charter 08 have reported being questioned or harassed by authorities.

Charter 08 contains 19 recommendations, including, among other things, a call for guarantees of human rights and respect for human dignity, direct elections of legislative bodies and administration officials, an independent judiciary, separation of powers, and the guarantee of freedom of religion, freedom of speech, and freedom of assembly. The Charter urges Chinese citizens to work together "for major changes in Chinese society and for the rapid establishment of a free, democratic, and constitutional country . . . to bring a brilliant new chapter to Chinese civilization."

The reported treatment of signers of Charter 08, including Mr. Liu, around the 60th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, raises questions about recent statements made by Chinese officials with regard to China's human rights record. In November, China announced that it would release its first National Human Rights Action Plan. On December 5, China submitted its national report to the UN Human Rights Council under the Universal Periodic Review process. In a section titled "Speech, News Media Freedoms," the report highlights China's constitutional protections for freedom of speech and the freedom to criticize government officials, and notes that "criticizing the government" has become an important feature of Chinese life. President Hu, along with other top leaders, consistently have called for ensuring citizens' rights to "participation," "expression," and "oversight" as a check on government abuses.

CECC Recommendations:

Press the Chinese government to release Liu Xiaobo immediately.
Urge the Chinese government not to permit the intimidation or harassment of individuals who sign Charter 08, or who solicit new signatures.
Call on the Chinese government to protect unconditionally signers' rights to free expression and free association.

Commission Resources on Charter 08, freedom of expression, and political imprisonment in China:

Commission Analysis: "Over 300 Citizens Issue 'Charter 08'; Several Activists Detained"; "United Nations' Human Rights Day";
Section II-Freedom of Expression in the Commission's 2008 Annual Report;
U.S. Department of State Press Statement, "Harassment of Chinese Signatories to Charter 08";
Search for Liu Xiaobo's record in the Commission's Political Prisoner Database;
Partial List of Political Prisoners Known or Believed To Be Detained or Imprisoned in China as of October 31, 2008 (1,088 cases, including case summaries in English).

Source: -See Summary (2008-12-17 / English / Free) \| Posted on: 2008-12-20
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New Science and Technology Plan for Ethnic Minorities Raises Questions About Ethnic Minority Rights

The Chinese central government has issued direction on advancing science and technology development among ethnic minorities and in ethnic minority areas, combining potentially beneficial provisions with those that may clash with the protection of ethnic minority rights. The Opinion Concerning the Increased Strengthening of Science and Technology Work Among Ethnic Minorities and Ethnic Minority Regions (Opinion)--issued November 3 by the State Ethnic Affairs Commission, Ministry of Science and Technology, Ministry of Agriculture, and the China Association for Science and Technology--builds off of two national programs on science and technology as well as China's first "five-year" program devoted specifically to ethnic minorities and ethnic minority areas. The Opinion describes the promotion of science and technology development as an extension of Communist Party and government policy toward ethnic minorities and links it to strengthening "ethnic unity," the "unity of the motherland," and security in China's border areas. Noting that development of science and technology work has been "delayed" among ethnic minorities and in ethnic minority areas, the Opinion designates the first 20 years of the 21st century to accelerate development. Article 6 of the Opinion describes five broad goals for the science and technology work:

Strengthening training of ethnic minority science and technology personnel and personnel in ethnic minority areas;
Improving science and technology infrastructure and services;
Spreading scientific knowledge;
Increasing science and technology investment, including funds for materials in ethnic minority languages; and
Strengthening the science and technology work force and building a long-term mechanism for science and technology work.

Some provisions have potential to bring benefit to ethnic minority communities, though their overall impact remains unclear amid China's past failures to implement development projects that adequately protect ethnic minority rights. Article 8 calls for greater research on diseases occurring in ethnic minority areas and among ethnic minorities, as well as strengthening disease prevention and increasing support for the development of ethnic minority medicine. It does not specify steps for ensuring ethnic minority communities maintain oversight and gain benefit from the development of ethnic minority medicine. Article 11 promotes multi-lingual materials to popularize science and follows earlier efforts to provide multi-lingual materials on health issues. Outside the area of materials to promote government development and health campaigns, however, the government has taken steps in some regions to curb the use of ethnic minority languages, calling into question the government's commitment in this area. (See, for example, past Congressional-Executive Commission on China analyses (1, 2, 3) for more information.) Article 13 details the Opinion's aim of training ethnic minority personnel, including through vocational training, but as noted in the CECC 2008 Annual Report, some areas have taken steps to reduce higher education in ethnic minority languages, placing linguistic assimilation pressures on ethnic minorities and undercutting legal protections for the use of ethnic minority languages. In addition, while article 14's call for infrastructure and personnel support from the interior of China has potential to bring benefit, such measures may also continue longstanding government policies to promote migration to ethnic minority areas, resulting in broad demographic changes and assimilation pressures. Finally, it is unclear if efforts to promote "scientific thought" and to raise the "scientific cultural quality" of ethnic minorities and residents of ethnic minority areas, as called for in article 10, will respect ethnic minority beliefs and traditions.

As noted in the CECC 2007 and 2008 Annual Reports, the central government has increased support for development projects in ethnic minority regions, with mixed results. Aid projects, including the Great Western Development program launched in 2000, have increased migration, strained local resources, and furthered uneven allocation of resources that favors Han Chinese. Given this track record, coupled with the Chinese government's failure to fully implement broader protections for ethnic minority rights and solicit ethnic minority input for development projects, it remains unclear whether the new Opinion will result in improvements for ethnic minorities' livelihoods and will safeguard ethnic minority rights.

For more information, see Section II--Ethnic Minority Rights, Section IV--Xinjiang, and Section V--Tibet, in the CECC 2008 Annual Report, as well as the Special Focus on ethnic minorities in the 2005 Annual Report.

Source: -See Summary (2008-12-11 ) \| Posted on: 2008-12-20
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Government Improves Anti-Domestic Violence Efforts; Victim Protection Remains Limited

In order to provide better protection to domestic violence victims, four Ministries (Public Security, Civil Affairs, Health, and Justice), one Party-controlled organization (All-China Women's Federation), the Party's Central Propaganda Department, and the Supreme People's Procuratorate jointly issued the Opinions on Preventing and Deterring Domestic Violence (Opinions) on July 31, 2008. Highlights in the Opinions include: requiring public security officers to respond to complaints made through the "110" telephone emergency hotline (Article 8); requiring hospitals and healthcare workers to undergo training programs to prevent and curb domestic violence (Article 11); and requesting All-China Women's Federation offices to establish domestic violence hotlines (Article 13). The Opinions appear to increase the government's responsibility in handling domestic violence cases, according to an article published by the organization West Women on September 9.

To ensure the safety of domestic violence victims involved in cases pending before a court, the Institute of Applied Laws under the Supreme People's Court also issued the Court Guidance on Cases Involving Domestic Violence in Marriage (Guidance, partially reprinted on Divorce Net) in May. Article 27 of the Guidance advises courts to issue protection orders to "prohibit offenders from beating, threatening, harassing, or stalking victims, or having unwelcome contact with the victims and their children," and if necessary, to require offenders to receive psychological therapy. Such protection orders can also order offenders to "temporarily move out of their residences, if necessary and if the cases meet qualifications." In addition, the Guidance provides that "during the effective period of the protection order, no party should handle valuable marital properties."

According to reports in the Legal Daily (reprinted in Xinhua) on August 18, the People's Daily (English translation by All-China Women's Federation) on October 10, and the Chongqing Times (reprinted in the Chongqing Municipal People's Government Web site) on October 23, the Guidance has resulted in at least six protection orders issued by courts to prohibit spousal intimidation in the provinces of Jiangsu and Hunan, and Chongqing city in August, September, and October of this year. According to these reports, these are the first court orders issued to protect personal safety in civil cases.

According to All-China Women's Federation, the number of domestic violence complaints averaged 40,000 per year from 2005 to 2007, up from 20,000 in 2000, as reported in China Daily on November 25. One-third of China's 267 million families have witnessed domestic violence, and 94 percent of domestic violence victims are women, according to the same report.

Current laws regulating domestic violence appear to be incomplete and inconsistent, and appear to reflect the government's reluctance to intervene in domestic violence disputes, according to experts' analysis that appeared in a November 27 Women's Watch-China article. The revised Marriage Law in April 2001 was one of the first legal documents with references to domestic violence, according to the November 27 article. Article 46 of the Law on the Protection of the Rights and Interests of Women, as amended in 2005, mandates that "the state take measures to prevent and deter domestic violence." Domestic violence offenders are punishable under Articles 234, 236, and 260 of the Criminal Law, and Article 43 of the Public Security Administration Punishment Law. China's Civil Procedure Law also allows victims to file civil lawsuits against offenders. At least 69 local regulations contain references to the prevention and prohibition of domestic violence, according to the People's Daily (English translation by All-China Women's Federation) on October 10. Nevertheless, scholars indicate that current laws and regulations are difficult to implement because laws and judicial interpretations are too abstract or narrow, and do not assign clear and concrete legal responsibilities, according to a May 16 article in the Shenzhen Lawyer's Net (reprinted in Women's Watch-China).

Advocates continue to call for national legislation on domestic violence. The Party-controlled All-China Women's Federation has expressed its support for an anti-domestic violence law during the 2009 National People's Congress, as reported in the Legal Daily (reprinted in the Guijing Net) on October 8. A proposal reportedly was submitted to the National People's Congress in March 2008, according to a March 16 report in the Procuratorial Daily (reprinted in China News).

For more information about the discussion on domestic violence, see Section II - Status of Women in the Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2008 Annual Report.

Source: -See Summary (2008-12-11 ) \| Posted on: 2008-12-20
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Over 300 Citizens Issue "Charter 08"; Several Activists Detained

More than 300 Chinese citizens--including scholars, writers, lawyers, and activists--issued Charter 08 (English / Chinese), an open statement calling for greater rights and political reform in China on the eve of December 10. The date coincides with the 60th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Human Rights Day. The prominent intellectual Liu Xiaobo has been detained under suspicion of "inciting subversion" in connection with Charter 08, according to a December 10 Independent Chinese Pen Center article (in Chinese). Several other activists also have been detained in advance of Human Rights Day.

In a December 9 statement issued by Chinese Human Rights Defenders (CHRD), CHRD describes Charter 08 as a declaration for "bold political reforms, including an end to one-party rule and replacement of the current political system with one based on human rights and democracy." The signatories propose a 19-point plan, which includes direct elections of legislative bodies and administration officials, the establishment of a federated republic, an independent judiciary, separation of judicial, executive, and legislative powers, environmental protection, and the safeguarding of human rights, including the freedoms of assembly, association, religion, and speech. According to Professor Perry Link, who translated Charter 08 into English, the signatories intend the document "to serve as a blueprint for fundamental political change in China in the years to come." Inspired by the Charter 77 movement in Czechoslovakia, the signatories will form "an informal and open group" dedicated to advancing human rights and democracy in China, according to the CHRD statement. Charter 08 calls on Chinese citizens to work together "for major changes in Chinese society and for the rapid establishment of a free, democratic and constitutional country . . . to bring a brilliant new chapter to Chinese civilization."

Chinese authorities detained Liu Xiaobo and another prominent Beijing-based intellectual, Zhang Zuhua, for their involvement with Charter 08, according to a December 9 Associated Press (AP) article (via Newsvine). The AP reported that authorities released Zhang Zuhua after holding him for 12 hours and warned him to cease his involvement with the charter. Zhang's home was searched and his computer, notebooks, and passport seized, according to the December 9 statement issued by CHRD. Zhang said that the police informed him they are conducting a formal investigation and they have confined him to his home, according to a December 9 Telegraph article. The South China Morning Post (subscription required) reported that Liu Xiaobo's wife, Liu Xia, said that at least 10 police searched their home and confiscated computers, articles, and books. The Committee to Protect Journalists issued a statement on December 9 calling for Liu's release, as did Reporters Without Borders.

Chinese authorities have detained and harassed other activists in advance of Human Rights Day. On December 4, in Guizhou province, authorities detained two human rights activists, Chen Xi and Shen Youlian, who were organizing a symposium and other events to commemorate the 60th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, according to a Human Rights in China press release. Three other symposium organizers, Liao Shuangyuan, Huang Yanming, and Du Heping, reportedly "disappeared" before December 4. All five of the Guizhou activists signed Charter 08.

For more information on the arbitrary detention of activists and restrictions on freedom of expression, see Section II - Rights of Criminal Suspects and Defendants and Freedom of Expression in the Congressional-Executive Commission on China's 2008 Annual Report.

Source: -See Summary (2008-12-09 ) \| Posted on: 2008-12-20
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Propaganda Head Liu Yunshan Calls for Positive Spin on Economy

Liu Yunshan, head of the Communist Party's Central Propaganda Department (CPD), called on propaganda officials to prioritize "economic propaganda work" to deal with the current economic downturn, according to remarks he made on November 18, 2008, as reported in a Xinhua article (in Chinese) of the same date. Liu, spe