Representative James A. Leach

Chairman, Congressional-Executive Commission on China

and

Chairman, House Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific

“Decentralized Democracy: A Model for China”

Library of Congress Symposium

May 6, 2004

Comments Prepared for Delivery*

In any discussion of the prospect of democratization of China we must begin with the basics.

At the root of the basics are theories of revolution, theories of the individual, theories of economics, and questions of the adaptability of abstract systems to the culture and heritage of people in varying circumstances.

Here a footnote is in order. Whether our intervention in Iraq is proper or counterproductive, the legitimacy as well as the challenge of imposing democracy in a hostile environment is under review here and abroad. Last week the head of a Baghdad psychological institution visited my office and, in response to questions I posed, noted that the majority of Iraqis want a strong leader, but one they would have a hand in choosing; and a credible legislature, also based on citizen input; but they increasingly object to the word “democracy” because it is foreign derived. They want, like Americans, to be citizens with democratic rights and the power to control their government, but they aspire to establish a government compatible with their own unique social and religious heritage.

If one assumes that abstract systems of government must fit historical frameworks and the accident of social challenges at given points in time, what is so interesting about China today is that the communist model, which convulsed the country for such an important part of the 20^th Century, is so alien to China’s heritage. While the radicalism implicit in Marxism-Leninism may have been useful in galvanizing nationalist sentiment as the Chinese people faced Japanese aggression during the Second World War, few theories either of revolution or governmental management have been more troubling for those who have experimented with them.

It is my thesis that just as Americans would be wise to learn from older elements of Chinese civilization, particularly as we contend with modern problems of family break-down and urban violence, the Chinese might want to review the possibility that the decentralized American model of democratic government fits their society better than it fits smaller, more homogenous countries, including those in Europe.

To bolster my thesis, I would like to dwell for a moment on the fundamentals of the American system.

While communism is based on historical, particularly economic, determinism with a presumptive vanguard leading a class struggle, American revolutionary philosophy is premised on the empowerment of individuals endowed by a Creator with inalienable rights.

Because Americans have a general aversion to radical thought and radical change—what Tocqueville described as a cultural penchant for moderation—we have a tendency to overlook one of the profoundest of political facts: that our philosophy not only provides the most adventuresome and humane model of political and economic organization in history, but it is also a more radical revolutionary model than that provided by Marxism-Leninism.

In contrast with Marxism-Leninism, Jeffersonian democracy postulates change from the bottom up, not top down, and affirms an everlasting right of the people to revolt against governments which don’t protect individual rights.

In a Jeffersonian context it is revolutionary to assume that governments derive their power and legitimacy from—and only from—the consent of the governed. It is counterrevolutionary to hold that rights are artificial things granted and thus removable by law, one’s own or anyone else’s.

I stress for a moment that the Jeffersonian model is more revolutionary than that provided by Marxist or extremist Muslim dogma because the hallmark of the right to revolt in natural rights theory is the establishment of constitutional democracies capable of channeling change without coercion. While during the Cultural Revolution Mao Zedong rationalized punitive acts by advancing a theory of permanent revolution, it is in individual rights centered systems that the permanence of revolution is ensconced. In an evolutionary way, ideas, people and movements are continually engaged because the right to revolt implicit in such documents as the Declaration of Independence and the Rights of Man provides a doctrine of empowerment to the people rather than to elitist leaders claiming the divine mantle of God, mandate of Heaven or the power to ride and interpret a crest of historical forces.

By contrast, totalitarian creeds from fascism to communism may be rooted in an effort to revolt against an existent government, but once power is usurped from prior authorities the right of individuals to establish a basis for future revolutionary or evolutionary change ceases. Such theories of revolution which call for change at the top and then deny further changes become rationalizations for oppression rather than emancipation.

America’s founders were moral as well as political philosophers.  They understood Locke’s admonition that man was prone to excess and that, in fact, nothing was more dangerous than a good Prince. Inevitably some decisions of such a Prince would be mistaken and invariably a good Prince will be succeeded by a less good one who would have the benefit of accumulated, unchecked confidence and power. Accordingly, the founders embraced Montesquieu’s separation-of-powers doctrine and established a limited, constitutional republic.

Likewise, in contrast with the Marxist foundation of socialism, Jeffersonian democracy embraced Lockean property concepts. Emphasis was placed on individual rights and private property, rather than social obligations defined by others and government ownership of the means of production.

Unlike Marx, who believed that religion was the “opiate of the people,” our country’s founders held that ethical values, derived from religion, anteceded and anchored political institutions. It is the class struggle implications of Marxism—the exhortation to hate thy fellow citizen instead of love thine enemy—that stands in stark contrast with the demand of tolerance built into our Bill of Rights.

From the American perspective, the real opiate of the 20^th Century would appear to be intolerance, the instinct of hatred which becomes manifest in the individual and unleashed in society when governments fail to provide safeguards for individual rights and fail to erect civilizing institutions adaptable to change and accountable to the people.

In America, process is our most important product. A great deal of emphasis is placed on the “how” rather than the “what” of policy, on the assumption that the public will not like all laws; therefore, to have respect for the law, people must have respect for the way a law is made. Otto von Bismarck joked that the public shouldn’t be allowed to watch too closely either law or sausages being made, but the fact is that, if anything, openness is America’s secret sauce.  It is no accident that the first protections we established in our Bill of Rights were freedom of expression and freedom of the press so that public officials could be held accountable. 

As Jefferson, Locke’s philosophical godson, observed: “The basis of our government being the opinion of the people, the very first object should be to keep that right; and were it left to me to decide whether to have a government without newspapers or newspapers without a government, I should not hesitate to prefer the latter.”

In America, we developed a system of separation of powers at the national level and purposeful tension between the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial branches; and then we decentralized power by quadruplicating the same separation-of-power arrangements at the state, county, and city levels. We established a system of courts, legislatures, and executive offices where there would not only be separations and tensions within but between levels of government. We have even been experimenting since the 1960s with skipping jurisdictions and providing federal funds directly to community groups operating poverty programs outside the formal framework of government institutions and, despite constitutional fences between secular and religious institutions, we have in recent years emphasized the utilization of faith-based organizations to administer government programs. Contracting out government functions, even those related to war, is becoming common.

I stress these decentralized tensions because all societies have problems of accountability, of reconciling freedom with equality of opportunity. In America, the greed of a few is evident in periodic corporate excesses and, now and again, comes into play in politics. But while corporate scandals sometimes involve large sums of money, American political scandals are generally quite cheap. The egregious sums of money that slosh through the political system are manipulated by interest groups to advance the electoral ambitions of candidates, but they cannot be used to enrich the candidate himself. The decentralization of power in America has by and large kept government accountable to the people and allowed an incentive market system to operate with a minimum of conflicts of interest.

Self-interest may not seem to be an attractive underpinning of moral philosophy, but history is demonstrating that a private incentive system effectively complements a political system based on individual rights, and vice-versa. As Mandeville in his 18^th Century satire of capitalism, the poem Fable of the Bees, so poignantly noted: “these are the blessings of the state, their crimes conspire to make us great.”

I stress the issue of corruption because it is so morally and economically debilitating in any society. One of my favorite quotes at the time of the Tiananmen Square demonstrations came from a BBC interview with a student demonstrator. The interviewer asked the student what he and his fellow demonstrators hoped to achieve. “Democracy,” the student said.  He was then asked what “democracy” meant to him. “No more corruption,” he responded.  He didn’t define democracy as the right to vote or freedom of speech. Instead, he defined its effect: the power of people to constrain corruption.

The problem of all citizens is to devise techniques to ensure that government becomes an honest broker of vested interests and, at the same time, helps lighten the load for those unable to help themselves.

In the context of China, the economic reforms Deng Xiaoping initiated in the late 1970s have produced certain regional and other inequities, but also unprecedented economic dynamism.

To harness this economic growth, China in the past quarter century, particularly the last decade, has undertaken a massive effort to revise its legal system. A new constitution was adopted in 1982 and it has already been amended four times. The Chinese government has enacted numerous laws laying out and formalizing the structure of the state, and creating comprehensive criminal, civil, and administrative procedures. In addition, the government has adopted commercial laws and regulations at every level, many specifically drafted to bring, or give the appearance of bringing, the country into compliance with the obligations of WTO membership.

• In international affairs, China has begun to wield influence in the Security Council and to assert its authority as a regional power, laying the groundwork for an expanded involvement on the Korean peninsula and in Southeast Asia, as well as the oil-rich but undeveloped Central Asian republics. But problems loom ahead that may yet undo some or all of the progress that has been made. 
• Widespread factory closures and lay-offs in the state-owned sector of the economy have left behind many unemployed workers, while urban and rural evictions to make way for new construction have created large groups of angry displaced residents, many of whom flock to Beijing to complain.
• Although widely publicized, many of the new laws have proven difficult or impossible to implement. In the area of international trade, the Chinese intellectual property regime is still more symbol than reality. In commercial and civil law, judgments are often difficult to enforce. Labor laws related to health and safety, overtime and payment of overdue wages, and laws forbidding the levy of illegal fees are most often honored in the breach.                         
• Despite much anti-corruption legislation and the establishment of multiple overlapping supervisory institutions, most citizens have lost confidence in the honesty of Communist Party and government officials.
• Environmental abuse has created threats to health and prosperity, including severe air pollution, imminent insufficiency of drinking water, and the irreversible loss of natural resources.     
• An underfunded public health system cannot offer ordinary care and is dangerously incapable of coping with the sudden health crises in a globalized world.
• China’s policy of seeking to press Beijing’s norms on Hong Kong and greater authority over Taiwan are unacceptable to the populations concerned, while the “autonomy” guaranteed by China’s nationalities laws is undercut by harsh state security policies.

As the 21^st century advances, the impact of these and other problems may lead to the Communist Party’s loss of any legitimacy it ever had. This loss in turn might precipitate the worst nightmare for China’s leaders: widespread unrest, possibly social and political chaos.

Many in China are already aware of the growing gap between the winners and the losers in the new economy.  The Party has recently invited some of the winners – the entrepreneurs, developers, professionals, and financiers – to join the Party as “socialist builders.”  The jury is still out whether these new members can save the Party from irrelevance in a changing economy.  To persuade prospective members that Party membership will mean real influence on policy and leadership, the Party has also been experimenting with “inner-Party democracy,” with a goal of producing a higher general quality of leadership and perhaps greater accountability.

The losers, however, seem to have become alienated from the Party.  Farmers have organized themselves to resist unjust local government decisions, and evicted residents have adopted radical tactics to draw the state’s attention to their complaints.  The Chinese leadership in Beijing increasingly betrays a siege mentality in the face of the misery and anger that petitioners bring with them to the capital.

In this context, the question is pondered in and outside China whether democracy can help the Chinese people resolve such enormous problems. Chinese political theory still depends on the borrowed Leninist model. In conformity with that model, China claims to have implemented “democratic centralism,” in which “the individual should be subordinated to the organization; the minority should be subordinated to the majority; the lower-level organ should be subordinated to the higher-level organ; the local authority should be subordinated to the central authority.”  The so-called “democratic” part of the model is defined as the “mass line,” which allows some upward movement of ideas from the people to the central leadership, but functions most powerfully in campaigns to publicize and enforce the center’s decisions on the people.  In a state built on this model, the individual is effectively reduced to a cipher, present only to be controlled, and the government remains more a source of, rather than cure for, social problems.

The cure will depend on a simpler idea of decentralized democracy: one that gives each individual a public voice; one that provides for every individual’s participation in the choice of officials and policies; and, just as important, one that empowers each individual openly to criticize the results and to change them.

For basic democracy to work anywhere, citizens need a free flow of information, so that, for example, public health crises such as HIV/AIDS or SARS can come to light without delay; so those injured by state officials or policies can safely speak out and organize to oppose them; and so that those harmed by corrupt or incompetent officials can blow the whistle and initiate procedures to remove them without fear of retribution.

But in a huge country like China democracy can facilitate the resolution of actual and potential crises only if the government listens to its citizens and implements on a decentralized basis the solutions they demand.

Democracy in any country means the legal empowerment of every individual.  To try to get help from the State, the losers in the new economy now take advantage of China’s extensive system of xinfang, meaning “Letters and Petitions.”  The xinfang system is based on the establishment of special offices at every level of Chinese government.  The offices are staffed by people with the duty to receive and resolve the questions brought before them.  This system has deep roots both in early Chinese philosophy and in the history of China’s imperial governments.

In explaining how Heaven legitimizes a new ruler, the Warring States philosopher Mencius quotes from an early classic, The Book of Documents:

“Heaven sees with the eyes of its people.

Heaven hears with the ears of its people.”

Emperors attentive to Mencius’ warning devised ways to remain legitimate by being open to the views and complaints of the populace.  A colorful Tang dynasty practice involved the ligui, or “Report Coffers,” set out around the court in the four cardinal directions. In these coffers citizens placed requests for help, complaints of injustice, and criticisms of various kinds.

To an American eye xinfang resembles a constituent services system.  In China, however, the catch is that nobody really has to pay heed to the petitions that come in. In Iowa, by contrast, a constituent who contacts a Congressman’s office and is ignored, or receives rude, dismissive treatment will make his or her displeasure known with a vote at the next election. 

The rising exasperation and desperation of petitioners in Beijing and the provincial capitals that have been reported in recent years reveals a populace ready for a more responsive government, one which provides legal and political ways to insist rights not be trampled.

The capacity of citizens to insist on rectifying wrongs is a missing element of the current Chinese system. While the creation of structures to answer this demand is up to the Chinese people, it is instructive that xinfang petitioners are increasingly focusing on opening up the National People’s Congress and asking that it encourage elections at all levels.  The National People’s Congress has sponsored a few pilot election projects at the lowest levels of political organization, but it is difficult to assess their value because there have been, to date, so few projects.

This past March, just before the annual meeting of the National People’s Congress, China’s state news agency asked readers which issue they thought should take priority on the NPC agenda.  More than 80% of those responding said “corruption.”  This high level of concern about corruption may reflect the shocking news that 13 top provincial officials were convicted of corruption, some cases involving amounts of money that in Chinese terms appear astronomically large. To get an idea of the significance of those cases, consider how Americans would react to the news that the governors or lieutenant governors of half of our states were felled by corruption scandals in a single year. This is one reason why most Chinese view the problem as more systemic than aberrational, and the attempts at accountability more superficial than comprehensive.

Corruption was an important question to the magistrates of the Qin and Han dynasties, China’s first unified imperial systems.  One magistrate’s grave from 188 B.C. contained a handbook of key cases distributed to local magistrates to instruct their handling of particular problems, including official misuse of public money, property, and servants.

Recognizing that widespread corruption might undermine its legitimacy, the Communist Party in the aftermath of the 1949 Revolution, established a number of top-down mechanisms to fight, or give the appearance it was fighting, the problem. The first such mechanism was the “Control Commission,” established in 1950. Other bodies were created in subsequent years, such as the Central Disciplinary Inspection Commission, the Ministry of Supervision, the Ministry of Inspection, and the Procuracy.  Many of these organizations have branches at all governmental levels.  But even with a dizzying multiplicity of these supervisory agencies, little seems to slow the flourishing corruption “industry.”

Each instance of corruption has its injured party: the residents forced off their land to increase the wealth of an urban developer; the honest taxpayers who must take up the slack when corrupt officials help their children’s companies evade the value-added tax; the honest bidders on public contracts who lose opportunities to well-connected bidders; the villages whose hard-earned school fees are diverted to pay for fancy lunches for bigwigs.

In some cases, the injured party has the power to strike back.  In one recent case, a high Bank of China official made suspect loans to a wealthy property developer and his wife for a lucrative Shanghai development project.  Some of the loans were made from the Bank’s Hong Kong branch. They came to light under the Special Administrative Region’s Transparency rules and a Hong Kong investigation ensued. Investors on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange could rely on Hong Kong’s laws to rectify malfeasance.  The banker was fired, expelled from the Party, and sentenced to 12 years in prison for corruption. The developer’s wife was arrested but a Hong Kong investigation into the financial dealings of the developer himself hit a dead end in Shanghai.  The mainland Chinese people whose homes were razed to make room for the development financed by the fraudulent loans were unable to hold any of the three accountable under Chinese law. Indeed, some of the homeowners who made their way to Beijing to complain were themselves punished as troublemakers.

The lesson here is that even the existence of laws cannot prevent or even result in the punishment of corruption if they can be trumped by a veiled “party in interest.”  Another lesson is that lack of transparency in the banking and securities industries may well be a “glass ceiling” that prevents China from participating more widely in the world’s capital markets.  Already, some journalists report that interest in Chinese IPO’s has cooled, as investors realize that a gulf exists between the due diligence available in China and that practiced elsewhere.

And, ironically, Chinese anti-corruption laws have been misused by a vengeful local government to punish a progressive South China newspaper for its exposés.  The Southern Metropolitan Daily, published in Guangzhou, reported in 2003 a student’s death in the harsh “Custody and Repatriation” system.  Its articles on the case ultimately resulted in the State Council’s decision to abolish the system.  The newspaper also played a role in publicizing the threat of SARS, which local officials evidently sought to cover up to avoid hurting the local economy.  Southern Metropolitan Daily also reported on the avian flu threat in 2003.  But this year local government officials found an excuse to prosecute the editors involved, using the anti-corruption laws to attack the newspaper’s allocation of bonus money.  As a result of these prosecutions, the independent voice of the Southern Metropolitan Daily has been curtailed.

From this type of case, we learn that it is not enough to pass laws and rules to control corruption from the top.  Even the best laws require the power of an informed and active citizenry able to hold officials accountable with the sanction of the ballot box.

China is large and diverse with a multi-century tradition of decentralized provincial autonomy and, at various points in its history, a reliance on magistrate-scholars. It is this decentralized magistrate-scholar tradition coupled with expanded democratic rights that authorities in Beijing might be advised to think through as they deal with various tensions in internal citizen relations.

Hong Kong is a case in point. America as well as China has an enormous vested interest in the success of the “one country, two systems” model in Hong Kong. From a Congressional perspective, it would appear self-evident that advancing constitutional reform—including universal suffrage—would contribute to the city’s political stability and economic prosperity.

The people of Hong Kong made plain their aspirations for greater democratic autonomy, aspirations fully within the framework of the “one country, two systems” formula, when they so impressively demonstrated on July 1 last year. In the aftermath of those peaceful demonstrations, the Hong Kong government appeared to listen to the people and withdrew controversial national security legislation pending additional consultations with the populace of the city.  The people of Hong Kong again showed their keen interest in participatory democracy when they turned out in record numbers for District Council elections last November.

Regrettably, however, recent decisions by Beijing setting limits on constitutional development in Hong Kong, appear to be inconsistent with the “high degree of autonomy” promised by the central authorities in the 1982 Joint Declaration and the Basic Law.

Whether the 21^st Century is peaceful and whether it is prosperous will depend on whether the world’s most populous country can live with itself and become open to the world in a fair and respectful manner. Hong Kong is central to that possibility.  As such, it deserves our greatest attention, respect, and good will.

Hong Kong is important unto itself; it is also a model for others. What happens there is watched particularly closely by the Taiwanese. In a globalist world where peoples everywhere are seeking a sense of community to serve as a buttress against political and economic forces beyond the control of individuals and their families, it is next to impossible to reconcile political systems based on unlike institutions and attitudes. Mutual respect for differences is the key to peace and prosperity in a world in which history suggests conflict has been a generational norm.

With reference to Taiwan, last month marked the 25^th Anniversary of the enactment of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA).  As one who was a proponent of the Act, I am proud of a small provision I authored relating to human rights and democratization. And as a lead member of what came to be know in the 1970’s and 1980’s in Taiwan as the Congressional “Gang of Four,” a small band of Senators and House members (which also included Senators Kennedy and Pell and Representative Solarz) who advocated greater democratization on the island, I came to know many of the current leaders of Taiwan. It is with the greatest respect that I observed the courage and sacrifices of those who challenged their government to open up to democracy. It is therefore with the humility of a legislator who never had to face, as they did, the prospect of imprisonment for holding views different than that of authorities in power that I am obligated to underscore a message of restraint for Taiwanese leaders today.

But first let me stress that the vibrant multi-party system and opportunity-oriented economy that has developed over the past 25 years on Taiwan is a prototype for the world of progressive political and economic change.

The miracle of Taiwan’s peaceful democratic transition is of great significance not only to its 23 million citizens, but also to the billion residents of the Chinese mainland who now have the chance to review another model of governance and social organization of a people with a similar cultural heritage.

The government and citizens of the United States have an enormous vested interest in peaceful relations between Taipei and Beijing. All Americans strongly identify with Taiwan’s democratic journey and we join in celebrating the fact that the people of Taiwan now enjoy such a full measure of human freedom.

More broadly, we are acutely conscious that the 20^th Century was the bloodiest century in world history. It was marred by wars, ethnic hatreds, clashes of ideology, and desire for conquest. Compounding these antagonisms has been the prideful miscalculation of various parties.  Hence it is in the vital interests of potential antagonists in the world, particularly those on each side of the Taiwan Strait, to recognize that caution must be the watchword in today’s turbulent times. Political pride and philosophical passion must not blind peoples to the necessity of rational restraint. Peaceful solutions to political differences are the only reasonable framework of future discourse between the mainland and the people of Taiwan.

Here, it is critical to review the history both of the breakthrough in U.S.-China relations that occurred during the Nixon Administration and the philosophical aspects of American history which relate to issues of a nature similar to mainland-Taiwan divisions today.  First, with regard to U.S. recognition of China, which was formally ensconced in a carefully negotiated communiqué and two subsequent understandings, the U.S. accepted a “One China” framework for our relations with the most populous country in the world.  The three Executive Branch communiqués were complemented by the Taiwan Relations Act, which establishes a commitment of the United States that no change in the status of Taiwan be coercively accomplished through the use of force.

The American heritage is that consent of the governed is the principal basis of governmental legitimacy, but from the beginning of the republic we have accepted the notion there are many sovereign states that do not share our philosophical value systems.  Accordingly, we chose to formally recognize the government in Beijing as the effective government of the Chinese people even though, like Moscow at the time, that government was philosophically modeled in a way we found inappropriate. 

Ironically, while anti-communist, the party of Chiang Kai-shek on Taiwan had certain organizational attributes similar to the Communist Party on the mainland.  And in one circumstance of philosophical consistency, both the Kuomintang of Chiang Kai-shek and the Communist Party of Mao Zedong claimed to be the governing party of all of China, including Taiwan.  Hence, the Nixon “one China” approach did not contradict the nationalistic positions of the Kuomintang or the Chinese Communist Party. 

The dilemma which comes to be accentuated with the passage of time is the question of whether Taiwan can legally seek today de jure independence on the basis of a referendum of the people.  Here, there are contrasting models in American philosophy and history as well as security concerns for all parties to a potential rupture that must be prudently thought through.

Philosophically, Americans respect Jeffersonian revolutionary approaches.  We also respect Lincolnesque concerns for national unity.  Jeffersonian radicalism dictates one way of looking at Taiwan; Lincolnesque concerns that a house divided can not ultimately stand lead to another conclusion.  It is in this context that America delivered a split judgment. The three communiqués affirmed “one China” and the Taiwan Relations Act affirmed de facto, but not de jure, relations with a government of a non-state, one which was authoritarian in the 1970’s but strongly democratic today. But from the perspective of the American government, there should be no doubt of the consistency of American policy. Under this President, as each of his predecessors – Presidents Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan, Bush, and Clinton – the governing American position is the acknowledgment of the Chinese position that there is but one China of which Taiwan is a part. For U.S. or Taiwanese leaders to assert any other position would create an earthquake in world affairs.

The issue of Taiwan is unique but anything except abstract. It is conceivable that missteps of political judgment could, more readily than many suppose, lead to World War III. More likely, misjudgments could precipitate a civil war as irrational, although of a vastly different kind, as the Taiping Rebellion of the 1850’s. While it may be natural for many Taiwanese-Americans and many, but perhaps not a majority of Taiwanese on the island, to advocate irrevocably breaking off all ties with the mainland, there should be no misunderstanding the consequences of such a decision. It would lead to a war and the death of millions.

The precepts of “self-determination” and “independence” may in most political and historical contexts be conceptually almost synonymous.  But these two precepts are juxtaposed on one place on the planet. Taiwan can have de facto self-determination — meaning the ability of a people to maintain a government accountable to its populace — only if it does not attempt to be recognized with de jure sovereignty by the international community.  To be precise, the Taiwanese people can have self-determination as long as they do not seek independence; if they assert independence, their capacity for self-determination will collapse. Hence, for the sake of peace and security for peoples of the island and the broader Asia-Pacific region, there is no credible option except to emphasize restraint.

While clarity of national identity is psychologically attractive, security for the Taiwanese people comes best with political ambiguity. There is simply nothing to be gained by steps toward independence if such steps precipitate a catastrophic and unwinnable conflict between the mainland and the island.

Care has to be taken that all parties concerned fully comprehend the latent and deepening dangers across the Taiwan Strait. The last thing any of us want is a replay of “The Guns of August,” with Taipei becoming a 21^st century Sarajevo. Taipei’s leadership must understand that while it may be true that Beijing’s priorities today generally relate to economic development, there is no peaceful prospect of sundering the mainland’s “one China” claim. Any unilateral attempt by either side to change the status quo across the Taiwan Strait is fraught with danger of the highest order.

As we make it clear to China that the U.S. is steadfastly committed to ensuring that the status of Taiwan not be altered by force, we also have an obligation not to entice Taiwan through ill-chosen rhetoric of “ours” or “theirs” into a sovereignty clash with China. Substantial Taiwanese self-determination can be maintained only if sovereign nationalist identity is not trumpeted.

Together with our historic “One China” policy, the Taiwan Relations Act has to date made an enduring contribution to peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.  It provides a sturdy framework to help ensure Taiwan’s security. There should be no doubt that Congress stands with the Administration in a common determination to fulfill obligations under the TRA. But these obligations presuppose that Taiwanese leaders must understand and mainland resolve the stakes at issue and refrain from capricious actions that invite conflict or make constructive dialogue impossible. 

Beijing also has implicit obligations to the international order. Yet it is amazing how so-called realists in government circles in so many capitals underestimate the “soft power” of people-to-people and cultural relations.

While recent years have witnessed a new maturity and sophistication in Chinese foreign policy, more nuanced and pragmatic policy approaches have not generally been applied to Taiwan.

For instance, instead of seeking to isolate Taiwan, isn’t it in Beijing’s interest to be magnanimous toward the people of the island?

If advocacy of independence is off the table, shouldn’t Beijing cease its objections to the foreign travel of Taiwanese leaders?

Shouldn’t it shepherd Taiwanese membership in international organizations that do not imply sovereignty—such as helping Taiwan gain observer status in the World Health Organization?

Rather than setting deadlines for unification or continuing a counterproductive military buildup, wouldn’t Beijing be well-advised to emphasize culture and economics in its relations with Taipei?

Wouldn’t the granting of scholarships to Taiwanese students yield greater dividends than misdirected investments in threatening missile systems?

Wouldn’t it be reasonable to assume that Taiwanese attitudes toward the mainland would improve if Beijing’s leaders made air transport between the island and the mainland easier?

And wouldn’t it be reasonable to assume that the attitudes on the mainland would become less polarized if the Taiwanese promoted tourism and education exchanges with mainland residents?

Shouldn’t each side barrage the other with cultural exchanges—painting, poetry, dance, drama?

And, on the military front, wouldn’t it be in both side’s interests to upgrade communications, widen professional exchanges, and engage in confidence building measures to reduce the likelihood of accidental conflict?

In all human circumstances, wars in particular, there are analogies, although seldom exactly replicable conditions. I began this too-long speech with an aside about attitudes toward democracy in Iraq. A follow-on analogy may be in order. This President’s father masterfully led the international community in the liberation of Kuwait. American diplomacy, however, that preceded Saddam Hussein’s decision to invade is open to question. In her one meeting with Saddam, the American ambassador did not have the presence of mind to warn of the consequences of military action, in part because few in Washington or the region thought Saddam’s saber rattling to be more than show. Likewise, a high profile Congressional delegation that visited Saddam apparently also missed the big picture. At the risk of presumption and perhaps over-statement, America today is watching ‘the build-up of polarizing attitudes on both sides of the Taiwan Strait that demands attention and review by all parties, including the United States. Whether prospects of conflict are 50% or only 5%, they are too high.

The greatest geo-strategic irony in world affairs is that the U.S. and China have a commonality of interest and are working well together to resolve or at least constrain challenges associated with North Korea where the economics and politics of an isolated, rogue regime have deteriorated to the point of potential implosion. But it is Taiwan where economics and politics have conjoined to take more progressive strides than any place on earth over the past generation that the greatest prospect of conflict may exist in Asia. In this circumstance common sense would indicate that the U.S. has an obligation not to egg Taiwan on in unrealistic independence ambitions and China has an obligation not to commence a series of steps that could escalate tension and lead in a domino decision-making fashion to unavoidable conflict.

Nonetheless, we must recognize that mainland Chinese society is changing far more rapidly than most Americans realize. While the political system largely protects status quo power arrangements, the ability of individual citizens to discuss and criticize governmental policies within family, school, and workplace environments increases with each passing year. And in the field of economics, the late Deng Xiaoping underscored China’s pragmatism with his cat and mice metaphor.

To some degree, that pragmatism has been extended to Communist Party ideology. The class basis of social leadership has been broadened. The Party is now told it represents the advanced forces of production, culture, and the fundamental interests of the vast majority of the people, and as a consequence entrepreneurs and citizens of accomplishment are being encouraged to seek Party membership.

But just as red-painted cats aren’t very cagey in the marketplace, so gray coats aren’t very invigorating in government. Competitive decentralized politics best fits competitive, free markets.

Perhaps the only revolutionary leader held in high esteem in both Beijing and Taipei is Sun Yat-sen. His principal contribution to Chinese political thought is the precept of a three-stage, guided evolution to political democracy. His modern day disciples are frustrated that they are stultified in a second stage, the so-called period of “democratic tutelage,” a time marked in today’s China by a freeing up of commerce but not politics. These citizens assume that the country is now capable of moving rapidly to the third stage, full democracy, and that there is simply an incompatibility of China’s free markets with its authoritarian political system.   

From an American perspective, the assumption is that China’s economic and social system cannot develop to its fullest unless the rule of law and its associated rights—including freedom of speech and of the press, due process for disputes over contractual obligations, and a judiciary that efficiently and fairly adjudicates disputes—are made central tenets of Chinese life.

Instability is simply too easily unleashed in society when governments fail to provide safeguards for individual rights and fail to erect political institutions adaptable to change and accountable to the people.

Let me conclude with one of my favorite anecdotes about a Chinese leader. A little over a generation ago a group of French journalists interviewed Zhou Enlai and at the end of their discussion asked him what he thought was the meaning of the French Revolution. He hesitated and then said, “It is too early to tell.”

With Zhou’s restraint in mind, it may be too early to tell the exact ramifications of a quarter century of economic reform in China. But it is certain that the ramifications are deep and profound and whether political change will occur this week, next year, or next decade, change is inevitable. The only question is whether that change will be principally for the good.

From a Chinese perspective, Zhou may have been right to reserve judgment. It is too early to assess the meaning of the French Revolution in an Asian context. Thirty years ago, many western educated Asians were Franco-Jeffersonian democrats. Jefferson’s emphasis on individual rights—life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness -- and the revolutionary French call for liberte, egalite, fraternite appeared to be compelling universalist notions vastly preferable to Marxist jargon. Today, however, Asian intellectuals accept the market economy and recognize the coercive nature or, at best, irrelevance of Marxism. But they look at the interventionist nature of contemporary American foreign policy in the Middle East and the violence of American culture at home and many have concluded that unconstrained power and unmitigated freedom can sometimes produce negative consequences. They believe that rights should be tempered by a concomitant emphasis on responsibilities and that a cohesive society requires a greater neo-Confucian family and, by implication, governmental discipline.

So while the future of the Chinese-American relationship may primarily relate to the direction of change in China, it also relates to the direction of change in American governance and culture. America sees issues between our countries reflected in the balance of trade, in the sharing of global obligations, in the defusing of tensions in countries like North Korea, in Chinese belligerency, or lack thereof, in relations with its neighbors. But, at the same time, China is apprehensive about the possible development of an American enemy-oriented mindset and about the potential dissolution of traditional American family values. They would like us to become more Confucian as we would wish them to become more Jeffersonian.

In the years since the tragedy at Tiananmen Square, pundits at several points have declared U.S.-China relations to be at a confrontational crossroads. Each time, the leadership of both countries chose to exercise restraint and find ways to pragmatically address the issues of concern. These action-reaction incidents suggest Beijing’s leadership is prepared to moderate decisions based on overriding economic and other pragmatic priorities and that Washington is prepared to maintain its focus on the long-term and endeavor to build a cooperative, mutually beneficial framework for Sino-American relations, one that welcomes greater Chinese participation in the rules-based international system, and encourages progress by China toward a more open, accountable, and democratic political system.

Finally, a note about the consequences of a possible advancement of decentralized democracy in China. Such would enhance what used to be quaintly described in America as “domestic tranquility” by making internal decision-making more accountable to and thus more acceptable by the people. It would also make the prospect of conflict with other countries, particularly the United States, less likely. But great power differences of judgment and interests would continue. History suggests that democracies are less prone to go to war with each other, but governments reliant on citizen input can from time to time accentuate a populist hardening of differences, which in a U.S. – China context could include issues as diverse as trade policy, family planning, and the muscularity of power projection. Democracy implies a political process—preferable to all others—but it is not a guarantor of good judgment. What it provides, however, is a shortened feedback mechanism to ensure policy adjustments when policy mistakes are made.

The nature of politics is that pride plays a disproportionately large role relative to its role in other human enterprises. The human factor—foibles in particular—can never be underestimated in governmental decision-making. As two obscure 19^th century Italian political theorists – Vito and Paretto – noted: whatever the political system, at critical times a few at the top have the authority to make decisions for a nation. In times like these, leaders, no matter how democratic and well intended (or the reverse), can make mistakes that carry monumental consequences. It is in this sobering context that the most important bilateral relationship of the 21^st Century will be between China and the United States. If that relationship is ill-managed, the likelihood of conflict and economic trauma will be great. But if the relationship is managed well, the benefits in terms of economic prosperity and world peace will be commensurate.   

*summarized in delivery